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Cognitive processes have traditionally been studied objectively within controlled 
environments, and how they unfold for different individuals in the flow of everyday life 
remains unexplored. This is partially due to the difficulty of studying cognition in real 
world settings. Capturing subjective perceptions of cognition may be of use. Self-
reported cognitive failures, being minor slips and errors during routine activities, are a 
construct of interest. Cognitive failures are associated with schizotypy, a constellation 
of personality traits thought to represent psychosis-proneness. It has been posited that 
subjective impairment represents a cognitive marker of psychosis risk. However, there 
is a “gap” between objectively normal performance and subjectively impaired cognition 
in schizotypy which is not understood. Additionally, cognitive failures are poorly 
defined, and there is debate concerning the validity of subjective complaints as a 
measure of cognition.  
The aims of this thesis were to develop a clearer conceptualisation of cognitive failures, 
and to consider the nature of the relationship between failures and schizotypy. Two 
systematic reviews were initially undertaken to inform further empirical research. 
Review 1 involved the examination of cognitive failures in healthy populations, and 
highlighted that a range of trait and state factors co-occur to shape the likelihood 
cognitive failures will occur. Ongoing concerns regarding the validity of self-reported 
cognition were also evident. It was proposed that cognitive failures capture capacity in 
the real world; aspects of cognition separate to objectively-determinable ability. In 
Review 2, cognitive failures were examined in psychologically disordered and 




Directed by these findings, Study 1 addressed the impact of self-awareness on self-
reported cognitive failures. Self and observer ratings of neuroticism and cognitive 
failures were compared for 409 healthy target participants and were moderately 
correlated. Neither high nor low neuroticism or self-awareness corresponded with a 
reduced correlation between self and observer reports of cognitive failures. This 
supported that groups who report heightened failures genuinely experience more errors 
in day-to-day life. 
Studies 2 and 3 focused on the schizotypy-cognitive failures relationship. Study 2 aimed 
to examine self-reports of 863 healthy participants and found increased failures in high 
schizotypes relative to low schizotypes. In addition, it was found that negative affect 
mediates this relationship, suggesting that emotion contributes to the experience of 
failures in schizotypy. 
Study 3 involved the assessment of both subjective and objective cognition in 127 
healthy participants. Cognitive failures and schizotypy were moderately correlated. 
Deficits were evident for emotional but not neutral content on a working memory task. 
Fearful stimuli combined with high task difficulty elicited the most errors. However, 
self-reported cognitive failures did not correlate with objective cognition even when 
incorporating emotional processes. It seems that high schizotypes demonstrate normal 
cognition until overwhelmed with high levels of cognitive load and emotion. 
Together the results underscore the significance of self-reported cognitive failures as 
reflecting aspects of cognition distinct from objective ability. Cognitive failures warrant 
further attention from both researchers and clinicians as potentially reflecting 
dysfunction of emotion regulation and increased risk for psychological disorders 
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1.1. Cognition – its significance and determinants. 
Cognition is crucial for our successful interaction with others and the world around 
us, and enables us to cope with the constant demands of our busy lives. Cognitive 
ability refers to the optimal level at which an individual is able to perform across 
various domains, including information processing speed, memory, and verbal and 
spatial ability (Plomin, 1999), in order to successfully navigate tasks and solve 
problems. A term more widely known by the general population, and also explored 
extensively within cognitive research, is intelligence. This differs slightly from ability in 
that it is broader, encompassing not only performance capability within each domain of 
cognition, but also one’s underlying aptitude for “catching on” to what needs to be 
understood, or done, in any given situation (Gottfredson, 1997). Although not 
completely interchangeable, the research on factors shaping both ability and intelligence 
are considered here. Ability is often thought of as innate, and is known to be primarily 
shaped by biological factors including structural features of the brain, such as overall 
grey matter volume (Andreasen et al., 1993; McDaniel, 2005), and neural efficiency 
(Neubauer & Fink, 2009). Brain structure and function are in turn shaped by genetics, 
with intelligence conceptualised as a polygenic trait that has a heritability index 
somewhere between 0.4 and 0.8 (Nisbett et al., 2012). To a lesser extent, personality 
traits may also contribute, with some traits, such as conscientiousness, consistently 
associated with heightened cognitive ability (Bratko, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Saks, 
2006; Zeidner, 1995). However, by definition, traits that fall under the umbrella of 
personality reflect any cognitions, emotions, and behaviours that are enduring across 




personality traits, albeit ones that are particularly cognitive in nature (Barratt, 1995; 
DeYoung, 2011). While exploration of the key determinants of cognition continue, an 
individual’s level of ability is understood to remain relatively stable over time 
(Rönnlund, Sundström, & Nilsson, 2015), with alterations generally only occurring as a 
result of significant physiological events such as brain injury or disease.     
Optimal ability as assessed in the clinic or lab tends to be the focus of most 
existing cognitive research, and as such little progress has been made towards 
understanding how ability translates into performance in everyday life. Everyone 
experiences slips in attention from time to time, and generally these might lead to 
relatively benign consequences such as a missed appointment or an embarrassing slip of 
the tongue.  However, lapses in cognition can also have a major impact, from workplace 
injuries (Simpson, Wadsworth, Moss, & Smith, 2005), to train crashes (Reason, 1984) 
and major aviation accidents (Weigmann & Shappell, 1997), to medical errors resulting 
in disability or death (Tokuda, Kishida, Konishi, & Koizumi, 2011). Although these are 
extreme examples, even minor errors in thinking can prove an irritant that quickly 
become disruptive to functioning and wellbeing for those who experience them 
frequently. There is therefore a need to diversify cognitive research to also explore real 
world cognitive functioning, and the factors that cause some individuals to be more 
prone to difficulties than others. 
1.2. Problems with everyday cognition in psychopathology 
While the experience of slips in normal cognitive processes during daily 
activities is commonplace, certain populations experiencing psychological distress tend 
to complain of heightened problems with their day-to-day cognitive functioning. The 




populations with physical illness or injury, such as those with epilepsy (Canizares et al., 
2000) and cancer (Hutchinson, Hosking, Kichenadasse, Mattiske, & Wilson, 2012). In 
addition, proneness to distress is associated with increased risk for serious cognitive 
disorders such as dementia (Wilson et al., 2003, 2006). The relationship between issues 
with everyday cognition and serious psychological disorders has also been explored. 
Schizophrenia was initially labelled “dementia praecox,” referring to the insidious 
deterioration in cognition that was evident in the majority of patients prior to the advent 
of antipsychotic drugs (Adityanjee, Aderibigbe, Theodoridis, & Vieweg, 1999). 
Presently, abnormalities with cognition are seen as fundamental aspects of the core 
psychopathology of schizophrenia, and a variety of data have elucidated a clear profile 
of deficits in domains including working memory, executive function, and attention 
(e.g., Maggioni, Bellani, Altamura, & Brambilla, 2016; Reichenberg, 2010; 
Reichenberg et al., 2009). However, it is also known that this disorder is linked to 
problems with cognitive function during daily activities (Aubin, Stip, Gélinas, 
Rainville, & Chapparo, 2009), separate to its core symptoms of hallucinations, 
delusions, and disorganised thinking. There is of course significant potential confound 
from antipsychotic medications, however deficits in cognitive functioning are evident in 
the prodromal phase (Schultze-Lutter et al., 2012), and even prior to this, as early as the 
first grade (Bilder et al., 2006). Hence, issues with normal cognitive processes in 
schizophrenia tend to be conceptualised as reflecting the core neuropsychological 
deficits characteristic of the disease. 
However, the cognitive aspects of other psychological disorders have been given 
less consideration by researchers. Minor problems such as forgetfulness and distraction 
have been widely acknowledged as part of the symptomatology of depression and 




contribution of cognitive difficulties to the social and occupational impairments evident 
in clinical populations, as well as the large body of knowledge on laboratory-assessed 
neuropsychology, there remains a large gap in the literature around everyday cognition 
in mental illness. The evidence for the link between everyday cognitive difficulties such 
as distractibility or clumsiness and psychopathology therefore remains largely 
anecdotal, despite the fact that distraction and similar difficulties are “symptoms” of 
mental illness recognised by clinicians, lay people, and the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM 5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In 
contrast to perceptions of cognitive deficits as central to schizophrenia, it has generally 
been thought that such difficulties are secondary symptoms in depression and anxiety, 
emerging from the specific cognitive and emotional patterns associated with these 
disorders. For example, in depression, preoccupation with ruminative thoughts about the 
past diverts cognitive resources away from the tasks at hand (Watkins & Brown, 2002), 
resulting in distraction; worrying about possible future events has the same result in 
anxiety (Wells, 1995).  
While the basis for these issues is yet to be explicitly researched, it is interesting 
that there have been a number of recent interventions developed aimed at targeting 
minor cognitive complaints associated with mental health issues. For example, a 
multitude of “brain training” programs, often delivered via simple phone or computer 
apps, purport to improve sufferers’ ability to resist the distraction caused by negative 
thoughts (Cohen, Mor, & Henik, 2015). Within psychotherapy, mindfulness-based 
approaches similarly aim to improve ability to control the focus of attention (Jain et al., 
2007). While both treatment strategies are now in wide use, from a research perspective, 
the link between real world cognitive slips and psychological distress or disorders 




and the factors that may exacerbate cognitive problems in psychological disorder 
remain largely unknown.  
1.3. Significance of research into everyday cognition 
An improved understanding of the relationship between real world cognition and 
psychopathology is important for a number of reasons. Self-perceptions of cognitive 
difficulties in the flow of everyday life are of value for the insight they provide into the 
lived experience of people with psychological disorders. The translation of ability into 
capacity in ecological contexts is essential for successful functioning in all domains of 
life including self-care, occupational, and social. Given the functional impairment 
experienced to varying degrees by people with a range of psychological disorders, and 
the fact that this is a key determinant of help-seeking (Addington, Van Mastrigt, 
Hutchinson, & Addington, 2002; Roness, Mykletun, & Dahl, 2005), it is important that 
problems with everyday cognitive performance noted by the patient themselves are 
explored as potentially having a tangibly negative impact on quality of life. 
Another primary reason for research in this area is the possibility that problems 
with day to day cognitive functioning may contribute to the onset and maintenance of 
both psychological distress, referring to a low to moderate level of emotional discomfort 
that may be persistent or a reaction to life stressors (Horwitz, 2007), and also more 
severe mental illness. A cognitive model of psychopathology would posit that 
problematic information processing styles contribute to distress, which then amplifies 
problems with normal cognitive functioning, triggering further distress, and so on (e.g., 
Beck & Haigh, 2014; Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005). In this way, the impact of 
problematic cognition on multiple aspects of daily functioning may lead to a reduced 




distress feed back into each other, and minor issues with thinking can negatively affect 
psychological functioning and ultimately significantly reduce well-being. A co-
contributing relationship between distress and problems with cognition is already 
documented within dementia: healthy older adults who experience greater anxiety and 
are concerned about their cognitive functioning are more likely to exhibit impairment 
(Mecacci & Righi, 2006), and individuals who experience recurrent episodes of 
depression throughout their lifetime are at higher risk of developing dementia (Dotson, 
Beydoun, & Zonderman, 2010; Gabryelewicz et al., 2007). It is possible that in serious 
psychological disorders such as schizophrenia, even minor cognitive complaints could 
induce sufficient distress to further break down cognitive functioning, ultimately 
increasing risk of illness onset for at-risk and prodromal individuals (Palmier-Claus, 
Dunn, Taylor, Morrison, & Lewis, 2013). Hence, improved understanding of how 
distress and cognition interact will enable better conceptualisation of the role of day-to-
day cognitive difficulties in risk for mental illness. This may lead to a refinement of 
cognitive intervention, given that the majority of existing approaches target the 
biological bases of neuropsychological deficits, rather than focusing on amelioration of 
difficulties in real world functioning. 
Following on from this, problems with cognition may negatively impact 
treatment outcomes, particularly with regards to psychotherapy. Severe cognitive 
impairment in patients with issues such as traumatic brain injury and dementia are 
routinely considered and accounted for in approaches to therapy such as modified 
cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) programs (e.g., Fann et al., 2015; Kraus et al., 
2008). In such treatments, abstract psychological concepts are made concrete and 
talking kept to the minimum in order to facilitate information absorption by the patient, 




and failures experienced by individuals with psychological disorders are rarely taken 
into consideration. Complex psychotherapies, including those that focus more on 
therapist-client transference elements such as psychodynamic therapies, are evidence-
based treatments used for a variety of disorders including depression (Leichsenring, 
2001). It is possible that the ability of patients to engage with and benefit from such 
therapies may be interrupted by even minor cognitive problems. Hence, alongside 
improvements in understanding patients’ lived experiences of cognition as a risk factor, 
this research may also lead to improvement in the efficacy of certain psychotherapies by 
acknowledging problematic cognition in disorders in which it was previously 
unexplored.   
1.4. Self-reported cognitive failures as a means of exploring everyday cognition 
To study real world cognition as opposed to cognitive ability may require a shift 
in focus towards subjective experiences of functioning, constituting a move away from 
traditional, objective approaches to examining cognition. Despite psychological 
researchers’ desire to control for “context,” the laboratory is also problematic as it 
presents yet another specific context with its own (quite strange) demands and 
confounds (Reis, 2012). As such, there is a need to consider external validity as being of 
equal importance to internal validity (Reis, 2012). With regards to the study of 
cognition specifically, Reason (1984) argued that minor slips and lapses, whether 
catastrophic or simply embarrassing, warrant understanding purely on the basis of their 
being a part of everyday life. Indeed, he felt that venturing beyond the lab to consider 
the ordinary concerns of cognition within day-to-day living was likely to provide 
researchers with findings both theoretically and practically meaningful (Reason, 1984). 




be recognised as important in their own right. At the very least, there is a need to make 
explicit the implicit knowledge held about problems with cognition in psychological 
disorders. Although not necessarily neatly measurable, individuals’ perceptions of their 
own capacity to function successfully during the routine or unexpected demands of their 
daily lives can provide valuable information about how real world state and trait factors, 
including distress, influence real world cognition. Hence, this thesis will be utilised to 
explore subjective experiences of real world cognition, rather than focusing solely on 
eliciting samples of performance within the lab. 
Cognitive failures are a construct of interest in the study of subjectively-
perceived real world cognition. These are slips in thinking, and capture errors in 
memory, attention, perception, and action that often occur during daily life. Cognitive 
failures can be self-reported using a structured tool such as the Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982), which assesses 
proneness to committing a number of common errors in routine tasks. Such errors are 
viewed as the behavioural outcomes of cognitive slips. Whilst cognitive failures have 
been studied in several papers over the past three decades, the literature has been 
somewhat scattered, with no clear conceptualisation or definition as yet shared between 
researchers. Self-reported cognitive failures warrant further exploration as a means of 
examining everyday cognition and its correlates. This also has the potential to improve 
understanding of how psychopathology relates to cognitive functioning outside of 
clinical and research settings, in the real world.    
1.5. General thesis aims 
 This thesis will involve the exploration of the experience of cognitive failures in 




well as exploring how these relate to psychological distress and disorder. These aims 
will be met through two broad objectives: 
1) A systematic literature review of cognitive failures in healthy and clinical 
populations will help to confirm the construct’s relevance and utility as a 
measure of everyday cognition. This will also enable development of a clear 
conceptualisation of cognitive failures as they apply to both healthy and clinical 
populations.  
2) On the basis of the literature review, a series of empirical studies will be 
developed to explore the relationship between cognitive failures and 
psychopathology. Specific aims arising from the literature reviews will be 





















This chapter is based on a paper published in Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews. 
 
Carrigan, N. & Barkus, E. (2016). A systematic review of cognitive failures in daily 







Apparently healthy people experience the frustration (and sometimes 
embarrassment) of “brain farts” or cognitive failures on a daily basis. Common 
incidents include walking to a room only to forget what you were looking for, locking 
your keys in the car, or repeatedly pushing an apparently jammed door before noticing 
the large “Pull” sign emblazoned on its front. Whilst irritating and generally quite 
minor, some individuals tend to experience these slips more often than others. For these 
people, cognitive failures can represent a serious concern and barrier to successfully 
carrying out routine responsibilities. Currently, the factors that increase proneness to 
cognitive failures are not well understood, and comparisons with objective cognitive 
domains have done little to assist researchers in determining how such errors might be 
prevented.    
The ageing population is bringing to the fore our limited understanding of 
cognitive failures. Even healthy ageing appears to be associated with decline in specific 
types of cognitive functions, such as those involving the demand for recall (Hohman, 
Beason-Held, Lamar, & Resnick, 2011; Rast, Zimprich, Van Boxtel, & Jolles, 2009). 
However, increased awareness of dementia means middle-aged and older people are 
experiencing more anxiety about normal cognitive decline, a phenomenon known as 
“dementia worry” (Kessler, Bowen, Baer, Froelich, & Wahl, 2012). They are 
increasingly turning to commercial brain training programs to improve function. The 
marketplace for these cognitive training tools is projected to be worth US$5,721.2 
million by 2018 (Markets and Markets, 2014). Whilst training in a specific task may 




life cognitive functioning (Kelly, Loughrey, Lawlor, & Robertson, 2014; Valenzuela & 
Sachdev, 2009). Available tools target specific aspects of cognitive ability, but do not 
address everyday problems. Understanding the nature and triggers of cognitive failures, 
as well as their relationship to formal cognitive assessment, would help improve 
identification of individuals at risk of normal age-related cognitive decline, dementia, 
and some psychological disorders, at different points in the lifespan, prior to substantial 
reductions in cognition and functioning being realised. 
The term “cognitive failures” was coined by Broadbent et al. (1982) to refer to 
minor slips that cause the normally smooth flow of intended action (physical or mental) 
to be disrupted. Cognitive failures reflect a global liability towards frequent lapses in 
cognitive control. Several measures have been developed to assess the degree of 
liability one possesses to express cognitive failures; those identified in this review are 
listed in Table 2.1. The most widely used of these is the Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982), which is perhaps also the broadest 
measure in terms of domains of error assessed. We have decided to include all of these 
measures in the current review (as opposed to just the CFQ) as whilst they may focus on 
particular types of errors, they each tap into the subjective experience of cognitive 
failures. 
There has been a rich history of psychological researchers attempting to examine 
cognition as it occurs in daily life even prior to Broadbent et al.’s seminal paper. From 
the 1960s onwards, daydreaming was a particular phenomenon of interest by 
researchers such as Jerome L. Singer, Eric Klinger, and Leonard Giambra (e.g., 
Giambra, 1977; Klinger & Cox, 1987; Singer & Antrobus, 1963; Singer, 1975). 




researchers was undoubtedly on the type and intensity of the content of daydreams. In 
addition, these researchers focused on the potentially constructive nature of daydreams 
(e.g., in fostering creativity/problem-solving) rather than the associated negative 
outcomes reflected in the cognitive failures construct. McVay and Kane (2010) argue 
that mind-wandering reflects executive failure rather than function; this is the approach 
inherent in the cognitive failures construct as it stands today and is the focus of the 
current review.  
A number of concerns have been raised with regards to the validity of subjective 
measures of cognitive functioning. Some authors suggest self-reports of cognition must 
match up with performance on objective (laboratory-based) tasks in order to be 
considered valid (e.g., Herrmann, 1982). Therefore, the current lack of a neat correlation 
between the CFQ and objective outcomes is a concern for many cognitive researchers. 
This is linked to other more general concerns about self-reports of cognition, such as the 
high demand placed on respondents’ memory by requiring recall of specific experiences 












Table 2.1  
Self-report Measures of Cognitive Failures in Articles Selected for Review 
Measure  Domains of error 
assessed 




et al., 1982) 




- Misdirected action 
25 items describing 
common slips of 
thought and 
behaviour. Frequency 
rated along 5-point 
scale from Very Often 
to Never.  
 
Do you fail to listen 
to people’s names 




(CSS; Miers & 
Raulin, 1987) 
- Confused thinking 
- Speech deficits 
35 items designed to 
measure cognitive 
slips and distortion. 
Requires a True/False 
response. 
 
I often find myself 
saying something 














20 items describing 
behaviours arising 
from problems with 
executive control. 
Frequency rated along 
5-point scale from 
Very Often to Never. 
 
I get events mixed 
up, or get confused 
about the correct 






Smith, Della Sala, 
Logie, & Maylor, 
2000) 
- Memory 16 items describing 
particular types of 
memory errors. 
Frequency rated along 
5-point scale from 
Very Often to Never.  
Do you decide to 
do something in a 
few minutes’ time 
and then forget to 
do it? 
 
Reservations about subjective experiences of cognition also reflect the 
traditional approach of cognitive psychology, which focuses solely on objectively 
assessed “trait” intellect (see Horn, 1972). This is known to be predicted by several 




performance occur only in response to biological processes such as ageing, injury, and 
disease, and produce specific, well-documented cognitive profiles (e.g., González-
Blanch et al., 2007; Hildebrandt, Fink, Kastrup, Haupts, & Eling, 2013). Thus, the 
stability and predictability of trait cognitive ability makes it appealing to clinicians and 
researchers alike. However, most people feel instinctively that their cognitive 
functioning varies with their mood, environment, and particularly over time - some days 
they simply do not function as efficiently as usual, whilst on others they are far more 
focused.  The objective cognitive tasks considered the gold standard in both research 
and clinical settings, whilst useful, capture cognition in an idealistic environment, and at 
only one point in time. On the other hand, reports of cognitive failures could add to our 
understanding of how cognitive processes play out in real life,  improving ecological 
validity of research into human cognition. 
Review objectives 
Despite the potential for a better understanding of cognition in real-life contexts, 
subjectively-reported cognitive slips and failures comprise a small research area. The 
aim of this review is to identify and draw together the various different factors involved 
in day-to-day patterns of failures in healthy individuals. Three core questions will be: 
1) How do we define the construct of cognitive failures? 
2) What is the relationship between subjectively-reported cognitive failures and 
performance on objective tasks?  
3) What biological, psychological, and environmental factors influence levels of 




As yet, no review of the cognitive failures literature exists. The current systematic 
review is therefore necessary to facilitate the development of a unified model of factors 
that influence liability towards cognitive failures in otherwise healthy individuals. This 
is timely given that this area of study has evolved significantly over the past three 
decades.  
2.2. Method 
We designed and reported this systematic review based on the principles of the 
PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analyses) 
statement (Liberati et al., 2009).  PRISMA was developed from standards provided by 
the QUOROM (Quality Of Reporting Of Meta-analyses) statement, and is based on the 
definitions of systematic reviews and meta-analyses set forth by the Cochrane 
Collaboration.  
2.2.1. Search strategy 
Studies were identified by searching electronic databases and scanning reference 
lists. PsycINFO (1967-June 2015), Web of Science’s Social Sciences Citation Index 
(1956-June 2015), Scopus (1960- June 2015) and the Cochrane database were searched 
using the following index items via Boolean search criteria: “cognitive slip* OR 
cognitive failure* OR subjective cogniti* AND everyday;” “cognitive slip* OR 
cognitive failure* OR subjective cogniti* AND daily.” These search terms were derived 
from examination of seminal cognitive failure articles. No limits were applied for year 
of publication or language, but only English-translated papers were accessed.  
Reference lists of key articles were hand-searched. All types of papers were included in 




2.2.2. Eligibility criteria 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria were outlined prior to the search. Studies were 
included if they were: 
• Published in a refereed journal;  
• Identified cognitive failures or subjectively-reported cognitive impairment as 
one of their primary measures or outcomes; and  
• Utilised a quantitative, subjective measure of everyday frequency of cognitive 
functioning.  
Studies were excluded if they: 
• Sampled from a non-healthy/clinical population (e.g., dementia, disease, 
psychological disorders);  
• Were attempts to validate measures with specific populations (e.g., cultural, 
language groups) or created for specific populations (e.g., hospitalised elderly 
people);  
• Measured subjectively-reported cognitive performance with too few items (i.e., 
< 5 items if quantitative);  
• Came from non-psychological or health-related research fields (e.g., 
ergonomics); or 
• Studied an intervention (e.g., cognitive remediation, CBT for sleep problems). 
Case studies, letters to the editor, and conference abstracts were also excluded.  The 
researchers screened titles and abstracts of the articles gathered during the search 




confirmed by the second author, and were excluded if they focused on any excluded 
topic or did not use acceptable subjective measures of cognitive failure (Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1. Flow diagram of study selection for systematic review of published research 
on cognitive failures in healthy populations. 
2.3. Results 
We included 52 articles in the review. The studies varied widely in their research 
design and grouping of participants. Most of the studies used correlational designs (n = 
45), and the remainder consisted of experimental (n = 4), longitudinal (n = 2), and 




2.3.1. Study characteristics 
2.3.1.1. Location 
 A large portion of the studies were led by researchers based in the United States 
(n = 20). This was followed by the United Kingdom (n = 11), the Netherlands (n = 4), 
Canada (n = 4), Germany (n = 3), Ireland (n = 2), Italy (n = 2), the Czech Republic (n = 
1), Denmark (n = 1), Iceland (n = 1), Israel (n = 1), Japan (n = 1), and Switzerland (n = 
1). 
2.3.1.2. Study populations 
 All the articles in this review drew samples from non-clinical populations, 
including: 
• Student populations, both university and high school. 
• Organisation personnel, including hospitals and the military. 
• Community groups. 
2.3.1.3. Measures of cognitive failures and study design 
 Included articles varied in design and utilised a diverse range of tools to assess 
cognitive failures. Whilst the CFQ was the most common tool, four different structured 
self-report measures of cognitive failures were identified in this review. A brief 
overview of each of these is provided in Table 2.1. In addition to these, several authors 
chose to construct their own brief self-report measures of cognitive failures; these were 
also included in fitting with the broad criteria of a quantitative approach to assessment 
of cognitive failures.  
Whilst the majority of articles utilised retrospective self-report methods, a 




methodologies to capture cognitive failures in the flow of everyday life.  Six studies 
required participants to report failures either as they were experienced, or at regular 
intervals throughout the day via a diary system of data collection (Jónsdóttir, 
Adólfsdóttir, Cortez, Gunnarsdóttir, & Gústafsdóttir, 2007; Kane et al., 2007; Lange & 
Süß, 2014; McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009a; Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2012; 
Unsworth, 2015).  
The most common study designs involved comparison and self-reported 
cognitive failures with either: 1) other psychological features; or 2) performance on 
objective measures of cognitive functioning. Whilst similar in taking a primarily 
correlational approach, the relatively open criteria of this review meant that the focus in 
articles’ analysis of findings differed, limiting amalgamation and comparison of 
outcomes at times. This is considered in the limitations section of this review.   
The studies are arranged in tables according to the area they explored or 
compared. Some articles contained overlaps of topics; these were grouped per their 
primary focus.   
2.3.2. What are the key features of the construct of cognitive failures? 
2.3.2.1. Dimensions of cognitive failures 
Several studies examined the construct of cognitive failures (n = 13; Table 2.2). 
Cognitive failures were broadly defined as one’s tendency to experience errors and slips 
in functioning (Boomsma, 1998; Broadbent et al., 1982; Wallace, Kass, & Stanny, 
2002). The original Broadbent et al. (1982) study treated cognitive failures as reflecting 
a single trait usefully dichotomised into “high” and “low” groups. However, some 
authors highlighted that alongside this general component, the measure contains more 




underlying structure of the CFQ via factor analysis. The models produced ranged 
inclusion of two (Matthews, Coyle, & Craig, 1990b), three (Broadbent et al., 1982), 
four (Wallace, 2004; Wallace, Kass, & Stanny, 2002), and five factors (Pollina, Greene, 
Tunick, & Puckett, 1992). All articles highlighted memory and action slips as core 
dimensions measured by the CFQ, whilst perception, distractibility, and interpersonal 
intelligence were less consistently identified.  
Wilhelm, Witthöft, and Schipolowski (2010; see Table 2.4) point out that none of 
the various models have been independently replicated. These researchers’ re-tested 
previous models described by the earlier articles listed in this review using a large 
sample of 3,122, and found that none met acceptable standards of fit. Their own 
analysis removed 20 of the 32 items included in the German version of the CFQ, and 
revealed three factors: Clumsiness, Retrieval, and Intention Forgotten. They strongly 
argued against the use of the CFQ as a unidimensional measure, and these findings are 
strong given the size of their sample relative to the generally small samples used in 
previous failures research. Meanwhile, several researchers have previously argued just 
as strongly for the validity of studying the total CFQ score as per Broadbent et al.’s 
original suggestion, given that a large general factor is evident and the measure contains 
relatively few items (Larson, Alderton, Neideffer, & Underhill, 1997; Matthews, Coyle, 
& Craig, 1990a; Wallace, 2004). In contrast to Wilhelm et al.’s (2010) data-driven 
approach, these authors have proposed that researchers may choose the CFQ total or 
dimensional scores based on where study interests lie (Wallace, 2004).  
 CFQ scores were found to be distributed normally throughout the healthy 
population, although women tend to report more failures than men (Boomsma, 1998; 




suggested that 50% of variability in scores is due to familial heritability (Boomsma, 
1998). The authors of the study found no evidence for effects of shared environment; it 
was suggested that non-genetic variance in CFQ scores is shaped by external factors 
specific to the individual rather than the family unit. 
Exploring further the biological component of cognitive failures, two MRI studies 
reported that increased parietal grey matter was predictive of greater distractibility in 
everyday life (Kanai et al., 2011; Sandberg et al., 2014). One of these groups also found 
that reduced GABA in the occipital lobe was associated with increased risk of cognitive 
failures (Sandberg et al., 2014). Both findings were thought to be indicative of the role 
of organic deficits in everyday processing efficiency. High neural density may be a sign 
of inadequate synaptic pruning during development (Kanai et al., 2011); low GABA 
levels may limit the ability to selectively suppress sensory information (Sandberg et al., 
2014). Together, GABA levels and parietal grey matter volume explained about 50% of 
interindividual variation in failures (Sandberg et al., 2014). This supports a possible 
neural basis for the heritability of cognitive failures. 
2.3.2.2. Real world performance 
  The broad purpose of gauging subjective measures of cognition is to gain insight 
into “real life” cognitive functioning, beyond that contrived in the lab or the doctor’s 
office. Accordingly, cognitive failures have been found to correlate with spousal ratings 
of performance, indicating that at least some failures are observable behaviours 
(Broadbent et al., 1982). Further, positive correlations between the incidence of injuries 
(Larson et al., 1997) and at-fault traffic accidents and self-reported cognitive failures 
(Larson & Merritt, 1991) illustrate the unique ability of self-report to predict important, 




Conversely, findings regarding the association between cognitive failures and 
intelligence are mixed. They correlate moderately with academic outcomes as assessed 
by the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) in the United States (Unsworth et al., 2012); an 
aptitude test tapping cognitive ability rather than knowledge (Frey & Detterman, 2004). 
However, they do not correlate with other standard tests of intelligence (Broadbent et 
al., 1982; Larson & Merritt, 1991). Larson & Merritt (1991) proposed that cognitive 
failures are a qualitative feature of attention management style, and as such do not tap 
into the intentional, effortful processes that are engaged in intelligence testing.  
Interestingly, Larson et al. (1997) also found that left-handed individuals report 
more frequent cognitive failures than right-handers. Although left-handers are also 
known to be involved in more accidents than left handers, CFQ did not mediate the 
relationship between mishaps and handedness. Of interest is whether other traits 
associated with left-handedness contribute to mishaps and failures, or whether this 
purely reflects problems with equipment design. 
2.3.2.3. Relationship with stress 
In one of few studies involving repeated measurement, Broadbent et al.’s (1982) 
findings suggested that predisposition towards cognitive failures increases susceptibility 
to minor mental health symptoms following a period of exposure to stress – in this case, 
nurses placed on more stressful wards. A number of other researchers also found a 
positive correlation between cognitive failures and neuroticism, which was viewed as an 
indicator of increased vulnerability to stress (Matthews et al., 1990a; Matthews & 
Wells, 1988; Wallace, 2004). In Broadbent et al.’s (1986) later research, they further 
posited slips reflect a preferred (albeit problematic) processing strategy more likely to 




high CFQ-scorers may be able to perform just as well as their low scoring counterparts. 
This perhaps suggests that there are individual differences (i.e., trait-like factors) which 
predispose some individuals to experiencing cognitive failures when exposed to stress; 
this would in turn exacerbate the negative impacts of stress.  
Contrary to this, a week-long experience sampling study found no link between 
perceived stress levels and number of slips experienced as reported in vivo (Jónsdóttir et 
al., 2007). It is interesting that these findings contrasted with those regarding 
retrospectively reported stress; this may suggest a bias towards perceiving stress and 
daily errors and hassles in those who report increased failures. However, perceived 
stress captures only one component of stress; namely an individual’s perception of their 
control over factors in their life, as well as persistent background stress. It is possible 
more affective and acute measures of stress will be more closely associated with 
cognitive failures in the flow of everyday life. There are two studies which provide 
evidence to support this conjecture. First, negative mood states exacerbated cognitive 
failures in daily life for those who reported high levels of mind-wandering in the lab 
(McVay et al., 2009a).  Secondly, cognitive failures of individuals with good control 
capacity were more likely to be increased when faced with distracting environmental 
factors (e.g., chaos, unpleasant tasks), whereas those with poor objective control 
experienced failures regardless of context (Kane et al., 2007b). It may be that the CFQ 
is most useful in examining stress-triggered variations in performance, rather than stable 





Table 2.2  
Articles Examining the Construct of Cognitive Failures 
Reference Study sample and 
population 
Findings 
Broadbent et al. 
(1982)1,2 
910 participants across 
groups drawn from 
various healthy 
populations. 
CFQ correlations with existing measures suggest three aspects of cognitive 
failures being measured: memory, perception, and action. Weak correlations with 
social desirability and neuroticism scales; no correlation with intelligence. 
Matthews & Wells 
(1988)1 
160 students across 2 
studies. 
Increased CFQ scores were associated with increased trait anxiety/vulnerability to 
stress, as well as increased self-consciousness. 
Matthews, Coyle, 
& Craig (1990a) 1 
475 students across 2 
studies. 
Multiple factor analyses suggested different models, strongest being 1 factor and 7 
factor (covering cognitive and motor processing; types of context/information) 
models. Total CFQ score associated with neuroticism and coping styles including 
avoidant patterns of behaviour.  
Larson & Merritt 
(1991)1 
159 healthy adult male 
Navy recruits. 
CFQ scores were positively correlated with the number of times young men had 
been cited for causing a significant traffic accident. Intelligence was not related to 
accidents or CFQ scores. 
Pollina, Greene, 
Tunick, & Pucket 
(1992)1 
419 healthy students. Principal components analysis identified 5 internally-consistent factors: 
Distractibility, Misdirected Actions, Spatial/Kinaesthetic Memory, Interpersonal 




2379 American Navy 
recruits. 95% male. 
Increased CFQ scores associated with increased rates of mishaps including injuries 
from falling/jumping. Left-handed individuals reported both more accidents and 
more failures than right-handers, but the CFQ did not mediate the relationship 
between handedness and mishaps. 
Boomsma (1998)1 1651 healthy twin pairs 
and parents recruited 
from the community. 
Found the heritability of CFQ scores to be about 50%, with females reporting 
higher mean CFQ scores in both parent and child generations. There was no 
association between CFQ scores and education level or age. 
Wallace, Kass, & 
Stanny (2002)1 
335 healthy students and 
Navy personnel. 
Analysis yielded 4 internally-consistent factors of the CFQ: Memory, 
Distractibility, Blunders, and (memory for) Names. 




Notes: 1 = CFQ self-report; 2 = CFQ informant-rated, 3 = self-reports captured using experience sampling in vivo.
Reference Study sample and 
population 
Findings 
Wallace (2004)1 1095 students across 2 
studies. 
Support’s Wallace et al.’s 2002 findings of a 4 factor model, as well as the utility 
of total CFQ score as a general factor. Also identified associations between CFQ 








189 healthy volunteers. No correlation between perceived stress and number of slips reported over a week 
in a diary. A weak correlation with pre-diary estimate of functioning was present. 
Kanai, Dong, 
Bahrami, & Rees 
(2011)1 
145 healthy volunteers. Greater density of grey matter in the left superior parietal lobe predicted CFQ 




500 healthy adults. Carriers of C/C genotype of the dopamine receptor D2 were less susceptible to 
failures, with the genotype explaining about 1.9% of heritability in CFQ scores. 
The link was partially mediated by trait impulsivity.   
Sandberg et al. 
(2014)1 
36 healthy adult males. Increased GABA in the occipital lobe was correlated with decreased CFQ scores, 
and density of grey matter in the left superior parietal lobe also predicted CFQ 
scores. Together, variations in occipital GABA and LSPL accounted for 50% of 




2.3.3. What is the relationship of cognitive failures to performance on objective 
cognitive tasks? 
Several papers selected for this review investigated the relationship between 
cognitive failures and objectively assessed cognitive domains (n = 13; Table 2.3).  
Cognitive domains were studied via performance on lab-based tasks, and included 
attentional networks, behavioural inhibition, and working memory and executive 
control. Whilst performance outcomes in each of these domains were associated with 
self-reports of cognitive failures (e.g., Berggren et al., 2011; Ishigami & Klein, 2009; 
McVay et al., 2009a; Tipper & Baylis, 1987), findings were inconsistent and no 
definitive link between failures and a specific objective assessment is yet evident.  
2.3.3.1. Attention 
Nine articles focused on the relationship between different aspects of attention 
and everyday slips (Berggren, Hutton, & Derakshan, 2011; Broadbent, Broadbent, & 
Jones, 1986; Forster & Lavie, 2007; Ishigami & Klein, 2009; Meiran, Israeli, Levi, & 
Grafi, 1994; Murphy & Dalton, 2014; Tipper & Baylis, 1987; Unsworth, 2015; 
Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2012), with mixed findings. Several studies generally 
found that high distractibility on lab tasks was moderately correlated with more frequent 
cognitive failures (Forster & Lavie, 2007; Ishigami & Klein, 2009; Murphy & Dalton, 
2014; Tipper & Baylis, 1987). Two papers reported that failures did not correlate with 
any measure of attention; however, higher CFQ scores were associated with a relative 
performance advantage on a more complex search task compared to a simple focused 
attention task (Broadbent et al., 1986; Meiran et al., 1994). Individuals with higher 
cognitive failures demonstrated longer reaction times than those with lower scores, in 




conditions of low perceptual load (Forster & Lavie, 2007). They were also more 
susceptible to auditory distractors (Murphy & Dalton, 2014).  
To be distracted is to allow irrelevant information to interfere with performance 
of a current activity (Bergman, O’Brien, Osgood, & Cornblatt, 1995); it therefore seems 
likely that attentional abilities would influence frequency of slips in our busy, 
distraction-laden way of life. Supporting this, Meiran et al.’s (1994) study saw high 
CFQ scorers making better use of spatial cues in an attention task, but that this came 
with a “cost” – slower reaction times. This perhaps suggests that those prone to failures 
have more issues with inhibition than attention itself.  
Of note were two linked experience sampling papers by Unsworth et al. (2012; 
2015). These compared objective cognition with number of failures reported during 
everyday life over the course of a week. The initial study found that attentional control 
performance was correlated with reports of failures (Unsworth et al., 2012). However, 
the later extension of the analysis identified a relationship between intraindividual 
variations in attentional control (as indicated by shifts in reaction times from trial to 
trial) and daily slips (Unsworth, 2015). It is interesting that the association between poor 
attentional control and cognitive failures was most consistent for in vivo vs. 
retrospective reporting of failures. This perhaps supports the existence of a state-like 
component of cognitive failures concurrent to its trait-like elements, and accentuates the 
need to consider how best to make use of comparisons between existing objective 
assessments and failures.   
2.3.3.2. Inhibition 
The domain of inhibition encapsulates the ability to suppress actions that 




attention as discussed above. This objective domain also varied in its relationship with 
cognitive failures. Considering behavioural inhibition first, there were no differences 
between high and low cognitive failure groups on performance of a visual Go/NoGo 
task (Roche, Garavan, Foxe, & O’Mara, 2005). On a physiological level, however, 
those who reported more frequent cognitive failures demonstrated increased latency of 
antisaccade in an eye-movement inhibition task, suggestive of both poorer inhibition 
and greater distractibility (Berggren et al., 2011). Additionally, when completing a 
Go/NoGo task, individuals with higher cognitive failures demonstrated larger and 
earlier N2 and P3 components; event-related brain potentials thought to reflect activity 
of the cortical inhibition system (Roche et al., 2005). That is, participants with more 
cognitive failures have to work harder on a cortical level to inhibit their behavioural 
responses under challenging conditions. Taken together, these studies suggest while 
there may be no objective differences in behavioural inhibition in those prone to 
cognitive failures, they may possess a global cortical inefficiency in the physiological 
mechanisms which underpin behavioural and perceptual inhibitory responses.     
2.3.3.3. Working memory and executive control 
Working memory is defined as the ability to concurrently store and manipulate 
information (Baddeley, 2010), whilst executive control organises and maintains actions 
and thoughts according to goals (Kiefer, 2012). Working memory and executive control 
tasks are often grouped together since control of attention and resource allocation is 
essential in supporting working memory (Lara & Wallis, 2014). Like attention and 
inhibition, working memory and executive control are thought to be essential to our 
ability to process relevant information and stay “on track” to successfully carry out 
daily activities. Objective working memory capacity and lapses in executive control 




both found to be associated with cognitive failures in some (Kane et al., 2007; McVay 
et al., 2009) but not all studies (McVay & Kane, 2009). One study found that this 
association only held true for certain levels of cognitive load; participants with high 
working memory ability actually reported more failures when faced with less 
challenging tasks (Kane et al., 2007). This might link to the popularly-held lay view that 
boredom triggers mind-wandering, thereby increasing the chance of mistakes. However, 
it must also be considered that task-unrelated thoughts as assessed during lab-based 
tasks differ in nature to the kinds of failures reported in everyday life. Overall, 





Table 2.3  
Objective Cognitive Domains and Their Relationship With Cognitive Failures 
Reference Cognitive domains studied: 




Inhibition of behaviour 
Broadbent, Broadbent, & Jones (1986)1 X X                - - 
Tipper & Baylis (1987)1 √ - -  - 
Meiran, Israeli, Levi & Grafi (1994)1 √ - - - 
Roche, Garavan, Foxe, & O’Mara (2005)1 - - - X 
Kane et al. (2007)2 - - X 3 - 
Forster & Lavie (2007)1 X 3 - - - 
Ishigami & Klein (2009)1 √ √ X - 
McVay & Kane (2009)1* - - X - 
McVay, Kane & Kwapil (2009)2 - - √ - 
Berggren, Hutton, & Derakshan (2011)1 √ - - √ 
Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers (2012)2 √ - X - 
Murphy & Dalton(2014)1 √ - - - 
Unsworth (2015) 2 √ - √ - 
Note: √ = Significant association, X = no significant association, - = not examined in the study. 1 = CFQ self-report; 2 = self-reports of 
everyday failures captured in vivo via experience sampling, 3 = relationship was mediated by cognitive demands of the task at hand (i.e., 




2.3.4. What non-cognitive factors influence cognitive failures? 
2.3.4.1. Personality and functioning 
Thirteen papers looked at the relationship between personality, functioning, and 
the CFQ (Table 2.4). Higher cognitive failures were found to be related to negative 
affect (Payne & Schnapp, 2014), neuroticism (Wilhelm, Witthöft, & Schipolowski, 
2010) and trait anxiety (Mahoney et al., 1998), whilst hypomania was associated with 
lower scores (Rodriguez et al., 2013). Cognitive failures were proposed to be one of 
multiple phenomena seen in people with these particular personality traits, and self-
awareness was considered to be significant in the interpretation of these findings. An 
example hypothesis was that neuroticism may lead to increased reporting of cognitive 
failures since inappropriate worries result in inflated reports of problems (the 
“complaint hypothesis;” Wilhelm et al., 2010). On this basis, it was proposed that 
measures of cognitive failures are contaminated by variability introduced via self-
awareness deficits (e.g., Chan et al., 2011; Rodriguez et al., 2013; Wilhelm et al., 2010).  
2.3.4.1.1. Dissociative experiences 
 Three papers focused specifically on exploration of how tendency towards 
dissociative experiences may relate to cognitive failures. The interest in this particular 
personality factor was based on obvious similarities between sub-clinical dissociative 
experiences such as derealisation (e.g., daydreaming) and mind-wandering aspects of 
cognitive failures. A strong positive correlation between dissociative experiences and 
cognitive failures was robustly and consistently found across all studies (Bruce, Ray, & 
Carlson, 2007; Merckelbach, Muris, & Rassin, 1999; Wright & Osborne, 2005). Both of 
these constructs were viewed as aspects of personality (Wright & Osborne, 2005) that 




1999) and subsequent difficulties integrating information and processes as usual (Bruce 
et al., 2007; Wright & Osborne, 2005). A related finding was that individuals who 
experience more involuntary autobiographical memories tend to have higher CFQ 
scores (Kamiya, 2014). Whilst the constructs are distinct, these types of involuntary 
memories may be linked to the more disruptive intrusive memories experienced in post-
traumatic stress disorder. The intrusions in Kamiya’s study were recorded whilst 
participants were walking without attending to anything in particular; it may be that 
those prone to mind-wandering experience fluctuations in cognitive failures in response 
to situations of reduced attentional demand.  
2.3.4.1.2. Schizotypy 
 Five articles examined the association between cognitive failures and 
schizotypy. This is a normally distributed personality structure incorporating cognitive 
disorganisation, unusual experiences, and social impairment, reflecting hypothetical risk 
for psychosis (Van Os & Kapur, 2009). Whilst some “high schizotypes” will develop a 
psychotic disorder, the majority will not (Kaymaz et al., 2012); psychometric measures 
of schizotypy are thus not considered to be of clinical utility. As such, schizotypy has 
been included in this review as a dimension of healthy personality similar to any other. 
All authors found a positive correlation between schizotypy and cognitive failures, and 
it was suggested that subjectively-reported cognitive complaints may represent an 
endophenotype of risk for schizophrenia (Corcoran, Devan, Durrant, & Liddle, 2013; 
Laws, Patel, & Tyson, 2008). Further, Pfeifer et al.’s (2009) longitudinal study 
identified higher cognitive failures as a predictor of later negative schizotypal symptoms 
(e.g., introversion, social anhedonia). Cognitive failures may: a) contribute to the 
development and maintenance of schizotypal symptoms; or b) coexist with other 




The debate over the impact of self-awareness on self-reporting was revisited in 
exploring cognitive failures as a core biomarker of schizotypy. Both Chan et al. (2011) 
and Laws et al. (2008) found robust correlations between schizotypy and cognitive slips 
in the absence of objective deficits. One group concluded that self-awareness problems 
precede other forms of cognitive impairment in psychosis (Chan et al., 2011); the other 
proposed awareness remains intact prior to illness onset, enabling high schizotypes to 
monitor subtle problems that go undetected by objective assessments (Laws et al., 
2008).   
Cognitive failures and schizotypy both have demonstrated heritability (e.g., 
Boomsma, 1998; Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam, & van Os, 2003). Despite the overlap 
between the two, there does not seem to be a shared genetic basis. Schizotypy in one 
family member was not predictive of cognitive failures in another, lending further 
support to the idea that cognitive failures rely on both inherited traits and individual 






Psychological Factors Influencing Cognitive Failures 
Reference Study sample and 
population 
Findings 
Personality and functioning 
Mahoney, Dalby, & 
King (1998)1,2 
138 healthy adults. CFQ scores were positively correlated with measures of stress and both trait and state 






Interpretation of combined results of five studies indicates that probability of reporting 
subjective impairment is increased by high neuroticism.  





Individuals at high risk for bipolar appraised themselves as more high-functioning than did 
low-risk individuals. There were no objective differences, and no relationship between 
CFQ and working memory scores. 
Kamiya (2014)1 24 healthy 
undergraduate 
students. 
The number of autobiographical memories experienced by individuals on a 20 minute walk 
was moderately positively correlated with CFQ score.  





Negative affective states were moderately correlated with overall CFQ scores, whilst 








Significant positive correlations exist between dissociative experiences and reports of 
cognitive failures. Cognitive failures were not related to fantasy proneness. 





Strong positive correlation between dissociative experiences and cognitive failures. 
Cognitive failures were not related to performance on working memory tasks involving 
secondary interference. 
Bruce et al. (2007)1 1040 healthy 
undergraduate 
students. 




















Two cognitive processes of cognitive failures and fantasy-proneness account for 58% of 
the link between dissociation and schizotypy.  




There were no differences between high and low schizotypes on a battery of executive 
function tasks. However, high schizotypes did report a greater frequency of everyday 
executive problems. 






related pairs from the 
community. 
Proneness to cognitive failures was associated with negative/depressive dimensions of 
schizotypy. Cognitive failures and schizotypy did not share a genetic basis. 
Chan et al. (2011)3 93 healthy students 
and community 
members. 
There were no differences between high and low schizotypes on a battery of executive 
function tasks. However, high schizotypes did report a greater frequency of everyday 
executive problems. Low schizotypes’ subjective reports were related to some objective 
outcomes. 
Corcoran, Devan, 
Durrant & Liddle 
(2013)1,3 
269 healthy students. Found a strong positive correlation between schizotypy and CFQ and DEX scores.  





 A portion of articles sought to study biological factors associated with cognitive 
failures in healthy individuals (n = 14; Table 2.5). Most of these explored circadian 
rhythm or the healthy ageing process. One article examined cognitive failures in 
pregnancy (Cuttler, Graf, Pawluski, & Galea, 2011). The authors found that whilst 
laboratory assessments failed to identify any deficits in pregnant versus non-pregnant 
women, some of their objective “field” tasks (e.g., remembering to call the researchers 
on a specific day) demonstrated impairments, as did women’s own self-reports of 
cognitive failures. The influence of depression and physical symptoms such as fatigue 
on subjectively-reported but not objective cognition was also noted, further highlighting 
the significance of ecologically valid measures in understanding experience.  
2.3.4.2.1. Sleep-wake cycle 
 Three articles explored the influence of sleep and the circadian cycle on 
everyday cognition. Severity of insomnia was reported to be associated with daytime 
cognitive failures, independent of mood and stress levels (Wilkerson, Boals, & Taylor, 
2011). Levels of wakefulness were also considered as an aspect of personality. Wallace 
et al. (2003) noted that individuals prone to boredom typically experience daytime 
sleepiness and distractibility, thus, high levels of cognitive failures are likely a natural 
consequence of their personality. Another study examined individual preferences for 
morning versus evening hours: individuals known respectively as “larks” and “owls” 
(Mecacci, Righi, & Rocchetti, 2004). Larks reported variable levels of cognitive failures 
with a peak in problems in the evening hours, whilst owls experienced their cognitive 
failures as stable throughout the day. This provides support for the existence of 





 Nine articles examined the relationship between cognitive failures and normal 
ageing. Whilst the CFQ has been used primarily to study young adults, it demonstrates 
no age-related measurement bias (Rast et al., 2009). Age-related cognitive decline is 
widely acknowledged as a relatively common phenomenon (Hanninen et al., 1996), but 
a longitudinal study found that higher failures predicted a steeper-than-usual trajectory 
of decline in verbal memory function in particular (Hohman et al., 2011). Despite this, 
there was little difference between the overall number of everyday failures reported by 
older and younger people (Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, Logan, & Strayer, 1994; Lange 
& Süß, 2014; Reese & Cherry, 2006), and two studies found that older people actually 
reported fewer slips (Kane, Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks, & Connelly, 1994; Mecacci & 
Righi, 2006). However, when Rast et al. (2009) analysed CFQ scores using a three-
factor model of the measure, they found that people tend to become more forgetful but 
less distractible with age. They noted a sharp decrease in distractibility seems to occur 
in those in their sixties, and proposed this may be due to the substantial reduction in 
attentional demands that comes with retirement-related lifestyle changes.  
On the other hand, Kane et al. (1994) did find objective deficits in attention and 
inhibition in older adults, although this did not correlate with self-reports with no 
increase in frequency failures. Some authors held that objective performance deficits 
and poor ratings by informants prove that older people do make more errors in daily 
life, but are incompetent in monitoring and reporting these (Harty, O’Connell, Hester, & 
Robertson, 2013; Mecacci & Righi, 2006).  In contradiction, an experience sampling 
study found a moderate correlation between older people’s CFQ scores and in vivo 
reports of slips (Lange & Süß, 2014), which would support their ability to provide 




limitations of the use of objective assessments as a comparison point for perceptions of 
day-to-day failures. In addition, there may be factors specific to older people to 
consider. For example, the advantage of life experience: older people can and do 
actively compensate for their absent-mindedness by adjusting the cues they use – both 





Biological Factors Influencing Cognitive Failures. 




Pawluski, & Galea 
(2011)1,2 
61 pregnant women. Found subjective impairment but no evidence of objective deficits in pregnant women. 






126 healthy U.S. military 
personnel and 137 
undergraduate students. 
Higher daytime sleepiness and proneness to boredom was predictive of everyday 
failures, and military personnel reported more sleepiness and failures than students. 




Frequency of reported cognitive slips was increased with neuroticism, anxiety, and 
extreme morningness (vs. eveningness in circadian typology). Morning types were 
more susceptible to errors in the evening, whereas evening types were more uniform in 
their failures throughout the day. 
Wilkerson, Boals, 
& Taylor (2011)1 
941 healthy 
undergraduate students. 
Found a positive relationship between severity of insomnia and cognitive failures, even 
after controlling for confounds of depression, stress and anxiety. 
Age 
Maylor (1990)1 320 female adults 
between the ages of 52-
95. 
Regardless of intelligence, individuals with higher CFQ scores were more likely to 
forget to call researchers in a memory task (i.e., had worse prospective memory). 
There was no relationship between retrospective and prospective memory 
performance. 
Kane, Hasher, 
Stoltzfus, Zacks, & 
Connelly (1994)1 
20 adults aged between 
64-77 years recruited 
from the community. 
Younger adults reported marginally higher CFQ scores than older adults. CFQ scores 
did not correlate with an absence of inhibitory suppression effect in older adults. 
Kramer, 
Humphrey, Larish, 
Logan, & Strayer 
(1994)1 
30 elderly adults. No differences between older and younger adults in self-reported failures, but older 
adults demonstrated slight objective impairment in some aspects of inhibition. CFQ 
correlated with several outcomes of objective inhibitory tasks. 






Reference Study sample and 
population 
Findings 
Mecacci & Righi 
(2006)1 
1826 healthy adults aged 
16 -85 years. 
Older people reported fewer cognitive failures than younger people, and their 
metacognition (attitudes/worry about cognition, cognitive confidence, etc.) did not 
seem reduced. However, across age groups, metacognitive worries were associated 
with increased failures.  
Reese & Cherry 
(2006)1,3 
96 healthy adults 
recruited from the 
community. 
Overall CFQ did not differ between older or younger adults, or between those with 
high or low verbal ability. CFQ scores were not related to objective performance. 
Rast, Zimprich, 
Van Boxtel, & 
Jolles (2009)1 
Cross-sectional data from 
1303 healthy adults. 
The CFQ appears free of age-related measurement bias. The factor of forgetfulness 
increases with age, whilst distractibility suddenly decreases in the mid-60s.  
Hohman, Beason-
Held, Lamar, & 
Resnick (2011)1 
98 adults with mean age 
75 followed over mean 
11.5 years. 
Higher levels of cognitive failures were associated with steeper rates of decline in 
objective verbal memory performance and increased activity in insular, lingual and 
cerebellar areas during memory processing. 
Harty, O’Connell, 
Hester, & 
Robertson (2013) 1 
90 healthy adults aged 18 
– 90.  
Older people tended to underestimate the frequency of their cognitive failures relative 
to informant reports. Older people also demonstrated poorer online awareness of their 
errors in an objective attentional task. There was no relationship between CFQ and 
objective cognitive performance. 
Lange & Süß 
(2014)1 
91 healthy adults aged 60 
– 76 years.  
The frequency of failures as collected via experience sampling correlated moderately 
with the CFQ. Neuroticism was more closely correlated with ES failures than the CFQ.  
There was no correlation between age and CFQ score.  





 In this systematic review, we identified and summarised existing studies of 
cognitive failures in healthy populations. The topics explored using the CFQ and other 
subjective measures varied widely. This paper focused on reviewing cognitive failures 
in healthy population samples, with the aim of identifying key features of cognitive 
failures and their relationship to objective cognition. We also aimed to develop a model 
of factors that influence liability towards cognitive failures in otherwise healthy 
individuals.  
2.4.1. Limitations 
There are several possible limitations of this review. First, appraisal of studies 
was difficult due to poor definition clarity for cognitive failures across articles. In 
addition, the fact that this area of research is still somewhat exploratory (with the bulk 
of articles describing correlational studies) meant that systematic critique of study 
quality as per the PRISMA statement was not feasible. The majority of studies used the 
CFQ however measures differed across studies. For instance, one study used qualitative 
analysis (Jónsdóttir et al., 2007) but focused on a quantitative outcome being the 
frequency of errors reported, and so was included here. Despite these limitations to our 
ability to present a truly systematic review, we feel that the articles included have 
allowed us to begin to develop a more comprehensive model of the cognitive failures, as 
per the overarching aim of this review. 
Time and access limitations meant that it is possible that not all relevant articles 
published pre-1990 were accessed; thus, information stemming from earlier trends in 
the approach to cognitive failures may be limited. Perhaps more pertinent to this issue is 




identifying relevant papers. Cognitive failure is a research area that has been constantly 
evolving for decades, and which has been viewed in different ways (and given different 
names) by various researchers. Whilst care was taken in selecting broad search terms, 
the addition of other search terms (e.g., attentional lapses, distractibility, accident-
proneness, mishap-proneness) may have ensured all articles, particularly older ones 
using different and more specific terms for cognitive failures, could be successfully 
identified. 
Finally, a systematic assessment of bias is absent from this review. This is 
primarily due to two reasons. The first is that this review is qualitative in nature, and 
does not represent a meta-analysis or attempt to answer a simple question around effect 
size for an intervention, and thus a statistical test of bias is not warranted. Secondly, the 
variety of study designs included in these reviews contrasts starkly with a more typical 
review which analyses primarily randomised-control trials. This precluded the use of a 
structured risk of bias tool. Nevertheless, the primary goal of synthesising existing 
findings around factors associated with cognitive failures is achieved. Targeted reviews 
designed to answer questions about the strength of the relationships revealed within the 
current review are required to provide a more rigorous analysis of the quality of the 
research.  
2.4.2. Features of the construct of cognitive failures 
Problems with memory and action slips are identified as core dimensions measured 
by cognitive failures (Broadbent et al., 1982; Pollina et al., 1992; Wallace et al., 2002). 
However, this tight definition may exclude some aspects of everyday failures such as 
more general cognitive functioning, distractibility, and mind-wandering. On the basis of 




errors in real world planned thought and action, proneness to which is determined by 
internal and external exacerbating factors. 
Although the definition of cognitive failures has been made clearer through this 
review, the dimensionality of the CFQ itself remains one of the key debates within the 
literature. Wilhelm et al.’s (2010) most recent analysis provided strong support for the 
CFQ including three dimensions. This later study is strong in terms of its large sample 
size and rigorous analytic strategy, but further research is required to confirm its 
assertions. Several authors who have analysed underlying factors of the CFQ argue for 
the use of a single score as reflecting a general factor of failures (Broadbent et al., 1982; 
Larson et al., 1997). This includes Wallace (2004), whose earlier four-factor model has 
been used by several researchers but who nevertheless acknowledges the utility of 
studying one general factor of failures only. This remains the approach of the majority 
of cognitive failures researchers. Thus, the unidimensional CFQ remains valuable for 
the insight it provides into the general experience of cognitive problems in daily life 
functioning. In addition, its decades-long use in correlational studies is just now 
beginning to be drawn into a cohesive literature that reveals the traits, biology, and real-
world tasks that relate to increased frequency of failures overall. At this stage, both 
schools of thought warrant further consideration. 
The mode of inheritance of cognitive failures has not yet been explored, however 
heritability could be conferred: 1) directly; 2) indirectly through a general inefficiency 
of information processing; or 3) indirectly through familial risk for personality 
variables, which in themselves increase the likelihood of failures occurring. Related to 
this is the finding that women are more at-risk for slips than men (Boomsma, 1998; 




biological basis, or indirectly via personality traits that occur at more elevated levels 
and/or more frequently in women and are also associated with cognitive failures. For 
example, women score more highly on neuroticism than men (Costa, Terracciano, & 
McCrae, 2001; Wilhelm et al., 2010), which may render them more alert to their own 
errors. More generally, women may simply have greater metacognitive awareness than 
men. Regardless of the mechanism, the heritability and gender differences of cognitive 
failures points towards a set of behaviours which are stable and trait-like. 
 The final core feature of cognitive failures is one that tends to be implied only; 
they encompass errors that occur in a particular context: “real life.” This assumption 
needs to be made explicit given that most cognitive research looks specifically at 
cognition that is not occurring in ecological contexts. The necessarily subjective 
approach of cognitive failures highlights that the personal, real-time experience of 
cognition in an everyday context is both measurable and meaningful, despite being a 
clear departure from traditional cognition research. 
2.4.3. Cognitive failures versus objective performance 
The correlations between self-reported cognitive failures and performance on 
domain-specific neuropsychological tasks are small at best (e.g., Ishigami & Klein, 
2009; Wallace et al., 2002). While the search for such a relationship has been the focus 
of much recent research into cognitive failures, it is interesting to note that multiple 
studies have compared selective attention with everyday failures, whilst few have 
explored other ability domains. Certainly, an attentional deficit would seem to be the 
most obvious neuropsychological concern, as mind-wandering could serve as the 
catalyst for many of the most common types of failures. However, further research into 




the potential significance of each of these in managing multiple and complex demands 
in daily life. Ignoring these gaps, if we take the criterion for validity of self-reported 
cognition to be correspondence with objective neuropsychological performance, the 
CFQ clearly falls short. However, as stated previously, we may not be looking at 
corresponding constructs in objective neuropsychological performance and 
subjectively-reported cognitive failures.  
Roughly half of the articles reviewed here attribute the gap between objective 
and subjectively-reported cognition to impairments in the ability to self-monitor (e.g., 
Chan et al., 2011; Rodriguez et al., 2013; Wilhelm et al., 2010). For example, 
neuroticism (Wilhelm et al., 2010), stress, and anxiety (Mahoney et al., 1998) are all 
related to cognitive failures, but may also induce biased styles of responding to 
questions regarding personal performance. Whilst this explanation is popular in the 
literature, the theoretical basis is not yet well established. Different authors view 
cognitive failure scores that are not predicted by neuropsychological outcomes as 
indicators of exaggerated (Wilhelm et al., 2010) or alternatively under-developed (Chan 
et al., 2011; Rodriguez et al., 2013) self-awareness or insight. The inconsistency in 
these interpretations may stem from authors adjusting them according to the direction of 
their expected results compared to those obtained. Recent research utilising experience 
sampling found that neurotic individuals reported increased failures in vivo, presumably 
in the absence of biases expected in retrospective self-reports (Lange & Süß, 2014). The 
debate around the role of self-awareness in cognitive failures is ongoing. 
Despite the lack of correlation with neuropsychological outcomes, cognitive 
failures relate closely to a range of real life outcomes. These include likelihood of being 




(Unsworth et al., 2012), and behavioural observations from spouses (Broadbent et al., 
1982). These findings further support the idea that objective and subjective assessments 
of cognition could represent two different but equally valuable concepts for 
measurement. The best way to conceptualise this difference is not yet clear. However, a 
quick glance at the nature of how we go about traditional neuropsychological testing - at 
one time point; in one isolated, idealistic test setting - would suggest that its 
correspondence to real world functioning would be poor. Within real world cognition 
multiple factors interlink, combine, and interact, in ways yet to be investigated, to shape 
our capacity according to levels of stress, the people around us, or even whether it is 
9am or 5.30pm. Again, this gap in our knowledge likely stems from the long-standing 
focus on ability in human cognition, which has been to the detriment of our 
understanding of how ability is implemented in the more chaotic setting of daily life.  
2.4.4. Factors contributing to cognitive failures 
 Given that the experience of cognitive failures seems to be distinct from 
neuropsychological ability, research in this area has gradually turned towards exploring 
the influence of other aspects of the individual and their daily context. Whilst the 
definition that arises from the existing literature highlights a possible primary basis in 
biology (i.e., genetics and sex), a range of secondary factors are also evident. We have 
grouped these into stable factors and variable factors (see Figure 2.2). 
2.4.4.1. Stable factors 
A number of factors that are considered trait-like are associated with increased 
frequency of cognitive failures (see the inner circles of the model, Figure 2.2). The 
strong link with dissociative experiences (Bruce et al., 2007; Merckelbach et al., 1999; 




dissociation are similar to those resulting in unexpected errors in routine tasks. 
Schizotypy is also related to more frequent cognitive failures (Giesbrecht et al., 2007; 
Laws et al., 2008; Pfeifer et al., 2009); this may be through similar mechanisms as there 
is a documented relationship between schizotypy and dissociation (Barkus, Stirling, & 
Cavill, 2010). Schizotypy represents the subclinical end of a spectrum of psychosis-
proneness, and failures may represent a subclinical level of the cognitive deficits often 
seen in schizophrenia. The possible mechanism by which neuroticism (Wilhelm et al., 
2010) and trait anxiety (Mahoney et al., 1998) increase the likelihood of cognitive 
failures in daily life has been discussed earlier, and is less clear. Whilst failures in both 
schizotypy and dissociation are viewed as reflecting core deficits in cognitive control, 
neuroticism and anxiety tend to be perceived by researchers as linked to problems of 
self-awareness.  
Alternatively, it is possible that failures represent patterns of cognition that are 
characteristic of certain personality types. Another possibility is that cognitive failures 
may contribute to (or even play a causal role in) personality. Taking schizotypy as an 
example, consistently high rates of cognitive failures could reduce success of social 
functioning, which is another feature of this personality structure (Miller & 
Lenzenweger, 2012). We could also interpret personality traits such as anxiety, 
neuroticism, and schizotypy as more broadly reflecting difficulties in emotional 
regulation, which determines ultimate sensitivity of cognitive capacity to external 
stressors. Using another example from schizotypy, an additional load such as stress is 
needed to trigger problems in objective performance in high schizotypes (Smith & 
Lenzenweger, 2010), and this would likely be reflected in everyday failures. This 
remains speculation however, due to the limited research on the relationship between 




is evidently strong, and provides further evidence that there is stability in tendency 
towards failures. 
2.4.4.2. Variable factors 
Equally as influential in cognitive failures are state-based, variable factors (see 
the outer circles of the model, Figure 2.2). Those identified in the current review vary 
widely, and experience would suggest it is likely that many more have yet to be studied.  
 Most people would agree that their ability to concentrate appears to be reduced 
in times of high stress, or when they feel fatigued or have low mood. Accordingly, day-
to-day cognitive failures seem to increase reliably in response to poor sleep quality and 
low mood (Payne & Schnapp, 2014; Wilkerson et al., 2011), as well as high anxiety 
(Mahoney et al., 1998; Mecacci et al., 2004). Unsurprisingly, the environment and 
current activity influence failures as well. Challenging tasks or chaotic surrounds can 
trigger slips (Kane et al., 2007) but so can finding oneself feeling bored (Wallace et al., 
2003). Although no studies exist as yet, we could also suspect contextual features such 
as social setting (and individual expectations associated with this) and task saliency 
would also impact the flow of cognition. 
 Hormonal state and age are biological factors which, whilst more stable than 
emotional or environmental states, also constantly change over time. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that hormonal changes can significantly impact on normal cognition. 
This has been particularly evident in women, with the whole gamut of phases including 
pre-menstrual states, menstruation, pregnancy and “baby brain,” and menopause 
interfering with normal cognition in women (e.g., Cuttler et al., 2011; Henry & Rendell, 
2007; Keogh, Cavill, Moore, & Eccleston, 2014; Sherwin, 2013). This could be another 




processes that may interrupt functioning either directly, or indirectly through symptoms 
such as fatigue and lowered mood. However, research examining subjectively-reported 
failures across the menstrual cycle is yet to be conducted. 
Surprisingly, given popular views of ageing, the current review did not provide 
strong evidence for an age-related increase in cognitive failures. Older people tended 
not to complain of more problems than younger people (Kramer et al., 1994; Reese & 
Cherry, 2006) although some researchers did identify problems with specific areas such 
as memory, but not attention (Rast et al., 2009). Linking back to the self-awareness 
debate, it is possible that, as some researchers have suggested, older people are 
inaccurate in their reporting (Harty et al., 2013). However, it is also possible that older 
adults hold an advantage in terms of awareness of problems and experience in using 
compensatory strategies, resulting in the relative parity of young and old CFQ scores 
(Maylor, 1990). Some researchers have suggested that the lack of an increase in failures 
with age may be more closely associated with environmental factors (Rast et al., 2009); 
that is, the less demanding lifestyle of retirement limits opportunity for mistakes. This 
conclusion is debateable, as by definition, failures are unexpected errors in the normal 
flow of daily life, and their occurrence is not dependent on particular types of lifestyle 
or activities. Overall, the current findings suggest that heightened cognitive failures are 
not necessarily part of healthy ageing, and further research should seek to determine 
their utility as an early indicator of dementia that can be easily captured with a brief 
questionnaire. 
 The final factor identified in this review is time of day. Not only does lack of 
sleep impact functioning during the day (Wilkerson et al., 2011), but personal 




occur over the course of the 24-hour circadian cycle (Mecacci et al., 2004). We have 
placed time in the outer circle of our model of cognitive failures as it is the one factor 
that will always be exerting influence, no matter what else is in play in any given 
individual. Time may seem a superfluous inclusion, however, traditional assessment of 
cognition generally ignores it and the current findings suggest it is vital to explaining 
the fluctuations in functioning that we all experience throughout every day. The study 
of the stress-related hormone cortisol is an example of research that has acknowledged 
the significance of time of day. There is recognition of a diurnal pattern of cortisol 
secretion, which is biologically pre-programmed but also responsive to behavioural and 
environmental stressors (Dmitrieva, Almeida, Dmitrieva, Loken, & Pieper, 2013). As 
such, the preferred methodology includes sampling cortisol levels at multiple time 
points over multiple days. Given the link between stress and cognitive failures, this 





Figure 2.2. Factors associated with increased risk of cognitive failures.  
2.4.4.3. Co-occurrence and interaction of contributing factors 
Notably absent from our proposed model is underlying cognitive ability. Even 
very broad measures such as intelligent quotient are unable to predict which individuals 
will experience more or less cognitive failures (Larson & Merritt, 1991). Whilst this is 
potentially due to the different goals of objective and self-report approaches to cognitive 
research, the model we suggest here could provide for another explanation: ability may 
interact with context in which cognition is occurring. This fits with the findings of Kane 
et al. (2007) that those with low ability experience failures quite consistently, whilst 




environments. Despite the ongoing search for a link to neuropsychological performance, 
we consider that at this stage there is insufficient evidence for us to include cognitive 
ability in the model. However, the possible interaction of other stable factors with shifts 
in state is highlighted.  
As yet, very few studies have examined whether co-occurrence of factors may 
have an additive or otherwise impact on the likelihood of experiencing failures. The 
model proposed here highlights that whilst the various aspects of biology, personality, 
mood, and environment affecting cognitive failures are distinct, within an individual 
any combination of these could exert influence at the same time. Visually, the model 
depicted in Figure 2.2 as applied to one person would feature the outer circles 
constantly shifting around the stable inner ones throughout each moment of the day. 
The alignment of factors at any given point in time would determine how effectively 
that person will perform. This interplay is an unavoidable part of human life, but one 
which is routinely overlooked.    
Consideration of the effects of co-occurring factors may also help solve the 
debate on the problem of self-awareness and bias in reporting. For example, those 
personalities that have been linked to greater cognitive failures without necessarily 
exhibiting deficits of ability, such as schizotypal, anxious, or neurotic types, are known 
to be more reactive to both interpersonal and environmental stress (Collip et al., 2013; 
Gunthert, Cohen, & Armeli, 1999). It may be that such individuals experience problems 
whilst dealing with the time-pressures and hassles of daily responsibilities, but not when 
asked to perform in the relative calm of the laboratory. In a similar example already 
noted, people with a preference for morning hours (i.e., larks in circadian typology) are 




rather than having poor self-awareness, it may be that the occurrence of failures reflects 
a diathesis-stress-like process.  
2.4.5. Conclusions and directions for cognitive failures research 
Cognitive researchers have never been quite comfortable with the idea of 
measuring cognition using anything other than a relatively narrow range of objective 
assessment paradigms. The subjective way in which measures such as the CFQ gauge 
problems in everyday functioning is perceived as especially questionable. However, the 
findings of this review highlight that whilst self-reported failures do not appear to 
directly reflect any specific domain of ability, they are reliably influenced by a range of 
other factors. Some of these contributing factors are trait-like and have the potential to 
shape a person’s functioning from birth, whilst many are dependent on momentary 
shifts in surroundings and time of day. Therefore, concerns about the validity of treating 
cognitive failures as a measure of cognitive ability are founded. Instead, we propose that 
the construct of cognitive failures actually provides a measure of cognitive capacity. 
Capacity is understood here as one’s level of cognitive performance in a particular 
situation. It is perceived to be fluid; shifting over time and with context. This is distinct 
from cognitive ability, which is the relatively stable level at which a person may 
optimally function, given ideal circumstances. Ability is biologically determined (by 
genetics, age, and disease status), whilst capacity is additionally shaped on a momentary 
basis and reflects the fluctuations that are observed in performance during real life.  
Much of the research into cognitive failures thus far has been disparate in terms 
of both the construct’s conceptualisation and the contributing factors of interest. In 




of cognitive failures as a gauge of cognitive capacity, whilst preliminary, could provide 
a unitary basis for future research. We suggest the following key goals for further study: 
1) Elucidate the effects of co-occurrence of key trait and state factors in cognitive 
failures, such as trait anxiety and stress. 
2) Explore the relationship between cognitive failures and psychological disorders. 
3) In the long term, determine whether a brief self-report tool such as the CFQ, which 
could be easily administered by a primary-care clinician, holds potential as an early 
diagnostic indicator for diseases such as dementia and schizophrenia. 
4) Also in the long term, determine whether everyday cognitive failures may serve as 
a target for early intervention in diseases such as dementia and schizophrenia.   
Whilst the “what” for future research is relatively clear, the “how” is less so. The 
existing research makes clear that the full range of fluctuating factors relevant to day-to-
day cognitive experiences simply cannot be measured in the lab. The recent emergence 
of experience sampling methods offers a means of evaluating many of these factors in 
more ecologically valid ways. The often contrasting results presented in this review 
regarding retrospective versus in vivo reports of failures highlights a need to pursue 
this.  If for no other reason, this form of ambulatory assessment is necessary to capture 
the time of day effects that invariably influence us all. This method requires a great deal 
of refinement in its application to cognitive failures, however it may be the next step in 








3. A systematic review of the relationship between psychological disorders or 











This chapter is based on a paper that has been published in Cognitive Neuropsychiatry. 
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As people go about their daily lives, most experience the irritating phenomenon of 
cognitive failures – also known as cognitive slips or “brain farts.” Common failures include 
finding yourself re-reading the same page of a book multiple times, or putting salt instead 
of sugar on your cereal. As these examples illustrate, cognitive failures occur during routine 
tasks that one would usually have no difficulty in successfully completing (Clark, Parakh, 
Smilek, & Roy, 2011). As such, they represent a lapse in cognition in “real world” settings, 
rather than an ability deficit (Broadbent et al., 1982).  
Cognitive failures are experienced by everyone from time to time, and are normally 
distributed throughout the general population (Boomsma, 1998; Kanai et al., 2011). Some 
people are more prone to making errors than others; of interest are the factors that 
determine this vulnerability. Objective cognition largely captures (relatively) stable ability, 
whilst cognitive failures are thought to reflect capacity, where performance might shift 
depending on context (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a). Cognitive failures are shaped by trait-
based vulnerability factors related to personality (e.g., Bruce et al., 2007; Pfeifer et al., 
2009), but also appear to be shaped by fluctuating state factors including mood and stress 
(Ishigami & Klein, 2009),  wakefulness (Wallace et al., 2003), and even time of day 
(Mecacci et al., 2004).  
In addition to these contributing factors, people suffering from psychological 
disorders are also thought to be more vulnerable to cognitive failures (Broadbent et al., 





emphasis on traditional objective measures of cognition in both healthy and clinical 
populations, meaning knowledge around everyday cognitive functioning in psychological 
disorders is limited. This in turn places limitations on conceptualisation and treatment of 
patients’ cognitive difficulties. For example, in schizophrenia, up to 27% of patients exhibit 
normal neuropsychological functioning on objective assessments (Palmer et al., 1997), 
despite severe impairment in daily life. If clinicians refer primarily to test performance, 
they are unlikely to comprehend the breadth of disruption to the real-world functioning of 
their patients, and will thus be limited in their ability to provide effective treatment. There 
is therefore a need to improve our understanding of subjective experiences of cognition in 
patients’ daily lives. This review will serve to form a preliminary picture of the association 
between cognitive failures and different psychological disorders.  
3.1.1. Measurement of cognitive failures 
There are a number of approaches utilised in measuring cognitive failures. Several 
experimental tasks have been designed to capture aspects of cognition essential to everyday 
life. For example, the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson, Manly, 
Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997) assesses susceptibility to everyday attention failures, 
whilst tip-of-the-tongue studies examine proneness to word retrieval failures (Maylor, 
1990). Recently more naturalistic measures have been applied, such as testing prospective 
memory by instructing participants to call at a prescribed time in the future (Cuttler et al., 
2011). Alongside such tasks, there has also been increasing interest in self-reported 





Several self-report tools have been developed, with the most widely used being the 
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982). The CFQ requires 
individuals to indicate how frequently they have experienced a list of minor perceptual, 
memory, and action failures in everyday life; higher scores reflect a general vulnerability to 
slips. Interestingly, correlations with the CFQ have been used to confirm the ecological 
validity of objective measures of everyday cognition, including the SART (Smilek, 
Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010). 
However, the use of self-reported cognitive failures leads to questions of validity. 
Given that neuropsychological assessments are considered the “gold-standard” method of 
capturing cognition, the poor correspondence between performance on neuropsychological 
assessments and self-reported slips is of concern to some authors (Donohoe et al., 2009; 
Wilhelm et al., 2010). It may be, however, that the two types of assessment are capturing 
different, but equally relevant and valid, aspects of cognition.  
The reliability of self-reported cognitive failures is also questioned. Particularly 
pertinent is the association between cognitive failures and neuroticism (Broadbent et al., 
1982; Matthews & Wells, 1988). Two views of this relationship are expressed: neurotic 
people 1) are genuinely more prone to everyday cognitive failures (Neupert, Mroczek, & 
Spiro, 2008; Suls & Martin, 2005), or 2) tend to exaggerate reports of failures due to their 
negative self-appraisal style (Wilhelm et al., 2010). It is necessary to determine more 
imaginative methods for validating the assessment of cognitive failures to ensure that the 





Certainly, the use of informants in cognitive failures could help to address concerns 
over both the validity and reliability of cognitive failures. Given the behavioural nature of 
many of the complaints captured under the banner of cognitive failures, it is possible that 
those living with one another could be aware of the extent to which they are experienced. 
Across the healthy population, self-reported cognitive failures show moderate correlations 
with informant ratings (Broadbent et al., 1982; Mahoney et al., 1998), as well as with real 
world outcomes such as the likelihood of being at-fault in a car accident (Larson & Merritt, 
1991). This suggests that self-reported cognitive failures are indeed of value as an 
indication of proneness to problems with real world cognition. Further studies are needed 
corresponding both subjective and informant ratings of cognitive failures to assist in 
addressing some of the measurement concerns; other creative methods such as real-time 
assessment may also be of use. 
3.1.2. Cognitive failures in psychological disorders and substance use 
Feeling overwhelmed with the demands of life tends to go hand-in-hand with 
difficulty thinking clearly. Cognitive failures are known to be associated with stress 
(Mahoney et al., 1998) and negative affect (Payne & Schnapp, 2014), and patients with a 
range of psychological disorders including depression, bipolar, generalised anxiety, and 
schizophrenia complain of similar difficulties (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
The link between these disorders and objective cognitive outcomes has been well covered 
(e.g., David, Zammit, Lewis, Dalman, & Allebeck, 2008), however investigation of 





the nature of a relationship between psychopathology and cognitive failures: 1) problems 
with cognitive functioning in everyday life causally contribute to aspects of illness such as 
negative affect (e.g., Carriere, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008a), or 2) vulnerable individuals’ 
already compromised systems struggle to cope with daily stressors, resulting in cognitive 
failures (e.g., Matthews, Coyle, & Craig, 1990). It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
elucidate how cognitive failures and psychological disorders influence each other; however, 
a review of the currently disparate literature will provide information about which 
particular disorders are most affected. 
This review will also consider the effects of substance use on cognitive failures. This 
is of interest for a number of reasons. First, there is already a large body of research that has 
demonstrated the impact substance use has on everyday cognition. For example, ability to 
successfully carry out cognition necessary for safe driving is adversely impacted by use of 
substances including alcohol (Marczinski, Harrison, & Fillmore, 2008) and cannabis 
(Downey et al., 2013). Whilst these findings are based on objective measures of cognition 
(i.e., driving simulators), they suggest that real world cognition – as in cognitive failures - 
may also be affected by substance use.  
Second, there is an overlap between psychological disorders and substance use. A 
high proportion of individuals with a psychiatric diagnosis will either have co-morbid 
substance use disorders, or use substances including nicotine, alcohol, and illicit drugs 
(Weaver et al., 2003). In those studies that do measure cognitive failures in clinically-





substance use, most likely due to the complexity of clinical presentations. Therefore, it is 
important to consider any findings for the effects of substance use on cognitive failures; 
even those studies considering substance use in otherwise psychologically healthy 
individuals would provide useful information.  
3.1.3. Objectives of the current review 
There have been several studies examining cognitive failures in individuals with 
psychological disorders and in substance use; however, their findings are yet to be drawn 
together. This review will seek to determine whether or not there is a relationship between 
cognitive failures and different psychological disorders or substance use, and how this 
relates to objective cognitive outcomes. Specifically, three core questions will be explored: 
1) What is the relationship between cognitive failures and psychological disorders?  
2) What is the relationship between cognitive failures and substance use? 
3) How do subjective cognitive failures relate to performance on objective tasks in 
people with psychological disorders or in substance users?  
3.2. Method 
We designed and reported this systematic review based on the PRISMA (Preferred 
Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analyses) statement, an internationally 
recognised 27-item method ensuring the highest standard in systematic reviewing (Liberati 
et al., 2009). PRISMA was developed as an update to previous standards provided by the 





definitions of systematic reviews and meta-analyses set forth by the Cochrane 
Collaboration.  
3.2.1. Search strategy 
Studies were identified by searching electronic databases and scanning reference lists. 
PsycINFO (1967-March 2016), Web of Science’s Social Sciences Citation Index (1956-
March 2016), Scopus (1960- March 2016) and the Cochrane database were searched using 
the following index items via Boolean search criteria: “cognitive failure* OR cognitive 
slip* OR subjective cogniti* AND everyday;” “cognitive slip* OR cognitive failure* OR 
subjective cogniti* AND daily.” These search terms were derived from examination of 
seminal cognitive failure articles (e.g., Broadbent et al., 1982; Wallace et al., 2002). Several 
other search terms were considered but ultimately excluded.  
Whilst “mind-wandering” is sometimes used interchangeably with cognitive failures, 
it actually refers to a subtype of failure. Although this would perhaps support its use as a 
search term, preliminary searches found that the majority of recent papers focus on aspects 
of mindfulness or the content of daydreams, rather than errors that may arise in daily 
functioning.  “Accident-proneness” is another term that has previously been associated with 
cognitive failures (e.g., Reason, 1979), however this is now largely confined to human 
factors research where it refers to a concept encapsulating issues beyond human errors in 
cognition. The chosen search terms therefore reflect the current review’s focus on cognitive 
failures, defined as cognitive capacity in everyday life which is fluid and may fluctuate 





No limits were applied for year of publication or language, and translated foreign 
papers were accessed.  Reference lists of key articles were hand-searched. All types of 
studies apart from case studies and theoretical papers were included in the search. The last 
search was run on 15th March, 2016. 
3.2.2. Eligibility criteria 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria were postulated prior to the search. Studies were 
included if they were: 
• Published in a refereed journal;  
• Identified cognitive failures or subjective cognitive complaints as one of their 
primary measures or outcomes;  
• Sampled from populations with any psychological disorder listed in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual, including substance use disorders; OR  
• Sampled from healthy populations but examined substance use including that of 
alcohol and other drugs both illicit and non-illicit, but excluding caffeine; and  
• Utilised the CFQ as a subjective measure of everyday cognitive performance. 
Studies were excluded if they: 
• Sampled from a non-psychologically disordered population, including those with 
neurological disorders such as dementia or traumatic brain injury, or those with 





• Were attempts to validate the CFQ with specific populations (e.g., cultural, 
language groups) or created for specific populations (e.g., elderly people);  
• Came from non-psychological or health-related research fields (e.g., ergonomics); 
or 
• Studied outcomes of a new intervention. 
This search strategy focused on the CFQ, excluding objective, laboratory-based 
measures such as the SART. This enabled an exploration of everyday cognitive 
functioning, with self-reported failures capturing real world errors that cannot be replicated 
in the lab. It should also be noted that there are a number of other self-report tools available 
including the Attention-Related Cognitive Errors Scale (ARCES; Cheyne, Carriere, & 
Smilek, 2006), Short Inventory of Minor Lapses (SIML; Reason, 1993), and the 
Prospective and Retrospective Memory Failures Questionnaire (PRMQ; Smith et al., 2000). 
However, preliminary searches failed to identify a substantial number of articles that 
utilised these measures with clinical populations. In addition, the CFQ is one of the 
broadest measures, covering slips in memory, attention, and perception. Therefore, a sole 
focus on the CFQ was chosen to ensure consistency and clarity. 
This review was left open to clinical populations with any kind of psychological 
disorder as listed in the DSM 5, excluding those defined by neurological issues or severe 
cognitive impairment, such as dementia, learning disorders, and ADHD. Given the field of 





a means of providing a preliminary overview of the literature, as per the aims of this 
review.   
Case studies, letters to the editor, and conference abstracts were excluded. The 
researchers screened titles and abstracts of the articles gathered during the search against 
the exclusion criteria. Selected articles were then read and excluded if they did not meet 
criteria. 
 
Figure 3.1. Flow diagram of study selection for systematic review of published research on 







We included 21 articles in the review. The studies varied widely in their research 
design and grouping of participants. Almost all of the studies used correlational designs    
(n =19), with some longitudinal studies (n = 2; Manning, Teo, Guo, Wong, & Li, 2016; van 
den Bosch, Rombouts, & van Asma, 1993). 
3.3.1. Study characteristics 
3.3.1.1. Location 
The largest portion of articles came from the United Kingdom (n =8), these were 
largely studies looking at substance use. The United States contributed the next largest 
portion (n = 4), followed by the Netherlands (n = 3), and Australia (n = 1), Bosnia-and-
Herzegovina (n = 1) Canada (n = 1), the Czech Republic (n = 1), Ireland (n = 1), and 
Singapore (n = 1). 
3.3.1.2. Study populations 
We identified studies focusing on a range of different psychological disorders. 
Sampled populations included those with: 
• Affective disorders, including major depressive and bipolar disorders. 
• Anxiety disorders. 






We identified papers sampling from users of the following substances: 
• Nicotine. 
• Alcohol. 
• Cannabis, ecstasy, and polydrug use (i.e., use of two or more substances by the 
same individual, either at the same or different times).  
We examined the studies and arranged them into sub-tables according to the disorder 
or substance they examined. Some articles contained overlapping topics; these were placed 
into sub-tables based on their primary focus.  
Whilst it was not the purpose of this paper to additionally conduct a meta-analysis, we 
calculated effect sizes for each study that provided sufficient statistical detail. The majority 
of studies identified for this review provided CFQ means and standard deviations, which 
enabled calculation of standardised mean differences (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). As such, d 
and 95% confidence intervals were calculated for those studies that presented data on 
between-groups differences in CFQ scores, and are presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. A 
small number of studies instead reported correlations between CFQ scores and those of 
diagnostic measures; in these cases, r correlation coefficients were transformed into d for 
ease of comparison (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009).  The size of these 





3.3.2. Relationship between psychological disorders and cognitive failures 
3.3.2.1. Affective disorders 
As per Table 3.1, four papers examined depression and consistently demonstrated a 
profile of elevated cognitive failures (Farrin, Hull, Unwin, & Wykes, 2003; MacQueen, 
Galway, Hay, Young, & Joffe, 2002; Preiss, Kramska, Dockalova, Holubova, & Kucerova, 
2010; Sullivan & Payne, 2007). Effect sizes for the differences between depressed and 
control individuals were generally large. In bipolar populations there were only two studies 
identified, neither of which found any evidence of a relationship between the disorder and 





Table 3.1  
Associations Between Affective Disorders and Cognitive Failures  
Reference Study population Findings Group differences: p-






40 patients with past or current 
major depressive disorder 
(SCID for DSM-IV). 
Mean age 36.2 years; 30 
males. 
Patients reported more cognitive failures, and 
this predicted poorer memory performance 
independent of mood. There was no difference 
in failures reported by symptomatic versus 
improved patients (i.e., antidepressant non-
responders versus responders).  
Clinical vs. control: p < 




43 UK military servicemen 
with mild depression (BDI > 
10).  
Mean age 35.79 years. 
Depressed men performed worse on an attention 
task and also reported higher CFQ scores than 
non-depressed men. 
Clinical vs. control: p <  






37 outpatients with bipolar I or 
II in depressed, hypomanic, 
mixed, and euthymic phases of 
illness (SCID for DSM-IV). 
Mean age 46.2 years; 20 
males. 
75% of patients displayed mild 
neuropsychological impairment, but self-
reported cognitive failures did not correlate 
significantly with measures of mood or 
objective outcomes.   
CFQ – depression 
relationshipa:  p =.06; 
0.67** 
CFQ – mania relationshipa:  
p = .09; - 0.59** 
Sullivan & 
Payne (2007) 
26 individuals with seasonal 
depression, 8 with major 
depressive disorder (Seasonal 
Pattern Assessment 
Questionnaire > 11; BDI-II 
>17).  
Both patient groups reported greater experiences 
of cognitive failures than healthy individuals. 
There was no difference between the two 
depression subtypes. 
MDD vs. control:  
p < .001; 1.68 [0.89, 
2.47]**** 
MDD vs. SAD:  






Notes: p values for some studies were not reported and thus are not included in the table. a = r coefficients transformed into 
Cohen’s d; CIs not calculated. Classification of effect sizes: trivial (Cohen's d ≤ .2); * small (Cohen's d > .2); ** moderate 
(Cohen's d > .5); *** large (Cohen's d > .8); **** very large (Cohen's d > 1.3). 
  
Reference Study population Findings Group differences: p-
value; Cohen’s d [95% 
CI]  
 Age 18-22 years; 4 males.  SAD vs. control: 








32 outpatients with depression, 
currently in euthymic stage 
(MINI). 
Mean age 46.8 years; 12 
males. 
Found no differences in attentional networks in 
euthymic patients compared with controls. 
Attentional performance did not correlate with 
CFQ scores. Group comparisons for CFQ scores 
were not reported. 
Did not report on group 
differences or relationship 







101 elderly patients with 
bipolar, currently in euthymic 
stage (SCID for DSM-IV). 
Mean age 69.3 years; 50 
males.  
Patients reported no greater failures than 
controls despite exhibiting impairment in 
several objective domains. Patients with worse 
objective performance reported fewer cognitive 
failures than those with better performance.  
Clinical vs. control: p = 





These studies mirror recent attempts to uncover a neuropsychological profile of 
depression. These have so far identified central deficits in the objectively-measured 
domains of attention, executive functioning, and to a lesser extent episodic memory (e.g., 
McDermott & Ebmeier, 2009; Rock, Roiser, Riedel, & Blackwell, 2014).   
The presence of objective deficits in patients in remission supports cognitive 
impairment as a core feature of depression, impacting psychosocial functioning 
independent of mood fluctuations. Accordingly, patients whose mood responds positively 
to antidepressant treatment continue to report heightened cognitive failures in everyday life 
(MacQueen et al., 2002). Farrin et al. (2003) described a vicious cycle between depression 
and cognitive failures, whereby normal errors trigger strong, negative reactions (thoughts, 
feelings) that drain cognitive resources, further increasing the chance of errors. Similar 
levels of failures were noted in those with seasonal affective disorder (Sullivan & Payne, 
2007), suggesting that the failures may not be specifically associated with any one subtype 
of depression.  
However, two studies of individuals with bipolar disorder found that patients in 
various phases of illness (depressed, hypomanic, mixed, and euthymic) tended to report 
fewer failures relative to both healthy controls (Schouws, Comijs, Stek, & Beekman, 2012) 
and their own objectively-assessed neuropsychological deficits (Burdick, Endick, & 
Goldberg, 2005). This pattern of “under-reporting” is difficult to interpret, as illness 





adjustment or lowering of perceptions/expectations of functioning over time. In addition, 
hypomanic symptoms may reduce awareness of errors made in an everyday context.  
3.3.2.2. Non-affective disorders 
We identified only seven articles that focused on psychological disorders other than 
mood disorders (Table 3.2). These included two examining anxiety disorders, three on 
trauma-related disorders, and two on schizophrenia. The findings of these papers were less 
consistent than those regarding depression. There appear to be weak links between 
increased cognitive failures and anxiety (Grisham, Norberg, Williams, Certoma, & Kadib, 
2010; Merckelbach et al., 1996), and one of these papers found a comparatively stronger 
association with depression (Merckelbach et al., 1996). The findings regarding 
schizophrenia were mixed, with one group identifying no increase in failures for psychosis 
compared to controls (Donohoe et al., 2009), whilst the other found a large difference, 
comparable to the heightened reports of those with major depression (van den Bosch et al., 
1993). The most robust findings related to trauma, with CFQ scores being greatly increased 
in those with PTSD symptoms (Boals, 2008; Boals & Banks, 2012; Koso, Sarač-
Hadzihalilovic, & Hansen, 2012). More detailed information about these findings is 






Associations Between Non-Affective Disorders and Cognitive Failures 
Reference Study population Findings Group differences: p-





Nijman, & de 
Jong (1996) 
3 studies including 30 females 
with spider phobias and 224 
outpatients with anxiety (panic 
disorder, GAD, social phobia, 
OCD, atypical anxiety) or 
depression (SCID for DSM-
III-R). 
Mean age 31 years; 30 females 
only – mean age 35 years; 105 
males. 
CFQ scores were correlated with general 
psychopathological symptom severity. 
Clinically anxious individuals and those with 
OCD reported fewer failures than healthy 
controls, whilst clinically depressed individuals 
reported more than controls. Individuals with a 
phobia did not differ to controls in their CFQ 
scores.    
Spider phobic vs. control:  
-0.01 [-0.51, -0.49] 
Anxiety vs. control:  
-0.39 [-0.64, -0.14] * 
Depressed vs. control: 
0.91 [0.43, 1.41]*** 







23 patients with compulsive 
hoarding patterns and 17 non-
hoarding patients with current 
anxiety (GAD, social phobia, 
OCD, panic disorder, specific 
phobia, PTSD) or mood 
disorders (ADIS for DSM-IV). 
Mean age 49 years; sex of 
clinical groups not reported. 
 
 
Patients reported more cognitive failures than 
healthy controls, but there were no differences 
between hoarding and non-hoarding patients. 
Hoarding vs. clinical 
controls:  
p > .05; 0.2 [-0.45, 0.86]* 
Hoarding vs. non-clinical 
control: 







Reference Study population Findings Group differences: p-
value; Cohen’s d [95% 
CI] 
Post-traumatic stress disorder 
Boals (2008) 13 Holocaust survivors (no 
diagnostic measures; assumed 
to evidence PTSD symptoms 
as per previous findings with 
this population).  
Mean age 72 years; 13 males 
only. 
Intrusive thoughts (i.e., Holocaust-related PTSD 
symptoms) predicted the frequency of everyday 
failures. 
CFQ - PTSD symptom 
relationshipa: p < .05; 
1.46**** 
Boals & Banks 
(2012) 
909 undergraduate students 
who had experienced a 
traumatic event (PCL-S > 43 
and DSM-IV-TR criteria). 
Mean age not reported; 319 
males.  
PTSD symptoms were related to cognitive 
failures, and an interaction with perceived stress 
had an additive effect on cognitive failures.  
CFQ-PTSD symptom 






45 adult male ex-servicemen 
(DSM-IV criteria). 
Mean age 44 years; 45 males 
only. 
Severity of PTSD symptoms was related to both 
objective cognitive impairment and increased 
CFQ scores.  
Clinical vs. control: 








24 patients with schizophrenia 
and 13 patients with 
depression (DSM-III-R 
criteria). 
Mean age schizophrenia 28.7 
years; mean age depression 
39.9 years; sex of clinical 
groups not reported. 
All psychiatric patient groups experienced 
higher levels of cognitive failures than normal 
individuals, and these ratings were consistent 
over a 3-month period. Symptoms relating to 
anxiety and depression were found to be most 
closely associated with everyday failures. 
Schizophrenia vs. MDD: 
-0.25 [-0.93, 0.42]* 
Schizophrenia vs. controls: 
1.2 [0.56, 1.84]*** 
MDD vs. controls:  





Notes: p values for some studies were not reported and thus are not included in the table. a = r coefficients transformed into 
Cohen’s d; CIs not calculated. Classification of effect sizes: trivial (Cohen's d ≤ .2); * small (Cohen's d > .2); ** moderate 
(Cohen's d > .5); *** large (Cohen's d > .8); **** very large (Cohen's d > 1.3). 
Reference Study population Findings Group differences: p-
value; Cohen’s d [95% 
CI] 
Donohoe et al. 
(2009) 
51 stabilised patients with 
chronic schizophrenia (SCID 
for DSM-IV). 
Mean age 39.8 years; 20 
males. 
Patients did not report more cognitive failures 
than controls. Cognitive failures and objective 
neuropsychological assessment correlated only 
for some patients with good clinical insight (i.e., 
good awareness of illness). Overall, clinical 
insight and cognitive insight (cognitive failures 
correlate with objective outcome) not linked. 
Clinical vs. controls: 





3.3.2.2.1. Anxiety disorders 
Anxiety symptoms in a healthy student population were correlated positively with 
CFQ scores (Merckelbach et al., 1996). However, in another sub-study the same authors 
found that clinically anxious patients reported failures similar to controls, and less than 
depressed patients (Merckelbach et al., 1996). Conversely, clinically anxious participants in 
the second identified anxiety article reported significantly more errors than controls, 
although there were no differences between hoarding and non-hoarding patients (Grisham 
et al., 2010). It was somewhat surprising that there were so few papers on failures and 
anxiety disorders, given the significant impact anxiety can have on everyday functioning. 
There were also some limitations of the identified papers; primarily, both studies featured a 
mixed sample rather than being disorder-specific. Included were individuals with a range of 
anxiety disorders, such as panic disorder, social phobia, and OCD, as well as those with co-
morbid depression. Given the heterogeneity of these disorders, the current review provides 
only a limited glimpse of the potential link between anxiety and everyday cognition.   
3.3.2.2.2. Post-traumatic stress disorder 
Individuals with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are another group 
experiencing a high frequency of cognitive failures (Boals & Banks, 2012; Boals, 2008), 
with symptom severity related to both daily slips and neuropsychological deficits (Koso et 
al., 2012). Intrusive memories surrounding trauma and “flashbacks” are thought to drain 





situational stress appears to interact with PTSD symptoms for an additive effect that can 
trigger even more failures (Boals & Banks, 2012).   
Whilst the findings in these three articles were consistent, it is notable that they 
involved quite different forms of PTSD. Boals and Banks’ study (2012) utilised a student 
population reporting the experience of at least one traumatic lifetime event which led to 
clinical symptoms of PTSD. Such events included a serious accident, or an unexpected 
death. The other studies, meanwhile, included survivors of Holocaust concentration camps 
(Boals, 2008) and servicemen who were torture survivors from the Bosnian war (Koso et 
al., 2012). These prolonged experiences of pain and harm would precipitate complex 
trauma, quite distinct to the one-off incidents faced by students. Whilst the “brain-drain” 
caused by intrusive memories provides one explanation of cognitive failures, complex 
trauma involves sequelae additional to PTSD, such as elevated arousal systems, 
somatisation, dissociation, and high risk for repeated harm (Herman, 1992); all of which 
may also impact cognition. Other factors of potential significance that have yet to be 
considered are time since traumatic event (e.g., 20 years between Bosnian war and article 
publication vs. 60 years between Holocaust and article publication), and presence of 
psychotic symptoms.           
3.3.2.2.3. Schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia was another disorder for which no distinct profile of cognitive failures 
is yet evident, with findings of both increased (van den Bosch et al., 1993) and normal 





different groups: recently hospitalised patients versus “stable” chronic patients. A possible 
explanation for the discrepancy in findings, therefore, is difference in phase of illness. 
Chronic sufferers may develop compensatory strategies through their experiences, and thus 
evidence fewer cognitive failures than younger individuals recovering from their first 
psychotic episode. However, given the paucity of information on inclusion criteria and 
sample characteristics in the current literature, further phase-specific research is necessary 
before such conclusions can be drawn. Another issue is that schizophrenia, control, and 
other patient groups differ in age in van den Bosch (1993) et al.’s study, with the increased 
age of depressed patients perhaps likely to increase failures relative to the younger 
schizophrenia group. However, as per the findings of our previous review, contrary to 
popular belief older people do not report increased cognitive failures relative to younger 
people (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a), making this unlikely. 
Van den Bosch et al. (1993) found that a tendency to be overwhelmed by cognitive 
demands – “cognitive overload” – is a subset of cognitive failures that is associated 
specifically with psychotic symptoms. They suggest the complexity of sensory information 
in everyday life overloads compromised sensory processing in psychosis.  However, the 
broader finding of this study was that heightened failures are present regardless of whether 
depression or schizophrenia was the diagnosis (van den Bosch et al., 1993). This, combined 
with the findings reported in section 3.3.2.1, support a view of anxiety and depression (i.e., 
negative symptoms) as most significant to cognitive failures in schizophrenia. Further 





failures and schizophrenia may highlight a significance of interactions between symptoms 
and day-to-day factors, such as stress and time of day.    
3.3.3. Relationship between substance use and cognitive failures 
Eight articles explored the impact of substance use on cognitive failures: two on 
nicotine, one on alcohol, and five on cannabis, ecstasy, or polydrug use (Table 3.3). Of 
these, only the alcohol paper studied a clinical population: patients with alcohol 
dependence disorder. Daily smoking seemed to be associated with increased failures 
(Parrott & Kaye, 1999; Wan, Friedman, Boutros, & Crawford, 2008), as did alcohol 
dependence (Manning et al., 2016). The literature on cannabis and ecstasy did not provide 
clear evidence; only cannabis seemed to have a small detrimental effect on everyday 
cognition (Fisk & Montgomery, 2008). It is important to note that the bulk of these studies 
assessed substance use patterns via self-report only, with limited information collected. It is 
therefore unclear how dosage, method of use, and frequency of use may differentially shape 





Table 3.3  
Associations Between Substance Use and Cognitive Failures  
Reference Study population Findings Group differences: p-
value; Cohen’s d [95% 
CI] 
Nicotine 
Parrott & Kaye 
(1999) 
 
25 each of smokers 
(mean age 24.3 years; 15 
male), abstaining 
smokers (mean age 23.5 
years; 11 male), and non-
smokers (mean age 26.5; 
7 male). 
Abstaining smokers reported greater stress, 
lower arousal, less pleasure, and more cognitive 
failures than both non-smokers and non-
abstaining smokers. There were no differences 
between these latter groups. 
Smokers vs. non-smokers:  
0.40 [-0.16, 0.96] * 
Abstaining vs. smokers: 
0.89 [0.31, 1.47] *** 
Abstaining vs. non-
smokers: 




440 non-smokers (170 
males), 107 daily 
smokers (43 males), and 
47 non-daily smokers (18 
males). 
Overall mean age 19.01 
years. 
Daily smokers reported greater frequencies of 
cognitive slips, and non-daily smokers reported 
more slips in memory than non-smokers. 
Daily vs. non-daily:  
-0.02 [-0.42, 0.37] 
Daily vs. non-smokers: 
0.31 [0.08., 0.54] * 
Non-daily vs. non-
smokers: 
0.33 [-0.02, 0.68] * 
Alcohol 
Manning, Teo, 









Alcohol dependence diagnosis post-inpatient 
detoxification was associated with increased 
CFQ scores relative to controls. 







Reference Study population Findings Group differences: p-
value; Cohen’s d [95% 
CI] 
Cannabis, ecstasy and polydrug use 
Rodgers (2000) 15 ecstasy users (mean 
age 31.4 years; 7 males), 
15 cannabis users (mean 
age 30.25 years; 7 
males). 
Verbal memory deficits were identified in both 
ecstasy and cannabis users, whilst only ecstasy 
users exhibited impaired delayed memory. 
Subjective impairment did not significantly 
differ between groups. 
Ecstasy vs. cannabis: 
p > .05; 0.54 [-0.19, 1.27] 
** 
Ecstasy vs. control: 
p > .05; 0.01 [-0.71, 0.72] 
Cannabis vs. control: 




& Ling (2001) 
3 studies comprising 91 
regular ecstasy users. 
Mean age 26.6 years; 52 
males. 
Ecstasy users reported more errors in 
prospective memory in everyday life than 
controls; this matched with objective 
performance. This was not generalizable to all 
aspects of everyday cognition, with no 
differences in ratings on the CFQ. 






Mean age 21.56 years; 24 
males. 
Ecstasy/polydrug users exhibited greater 
subjective (also supported by informant) and 
objective deficits than non-users; however, 
cannabis was found to be the drug most closely 
linked to users’ everyday problems. 
Ecstasy/polydrug vs. 
controls:  





46 cannabis-only users. 
Mean age 21 years; sex 
not reported. 
Relative impairment in real-world memory 
functioning was identified in cannabis users, 
although this was not found in objective 
measures of executive processes. Significant 
others also observed more failures in users than 
non-users.  
Cannabis vs. control: 






Reference Study population Findings Group differences: p-




& Bridges (2011) 
42 ecstasy/polydrug 
users. 
Mean age 21.67 years; 14 
males. 
Regular illicit drug use was associated with 
deficits in objective and subjective prospective 
memory, but not cognitive failures more 
generally. Cognitive failures correlated with 
recency of ecstasy use.  
Ecstasy/polydrug vs. 
control: 
p > .05; 0.25 [-0.22, 0.72] * 
Notes: p values for some studies were not reported and thus are not included in the table. Classification of effect sizes: trivial 






Interestingly, none of these articles examined acute intoxication, focusing instead on 
functioning during withdrawal and periods of abstinence/sobriety, and incorporating a 
mixture of occasional and chronic users. It must be noted that few of these studies 
controlled for time since last use, with most asking for a specific period of abstinence (e.g., 
7 days since last ecstasy use) and relying on self-report only, rather than any objective 
measures of compliance. Given the possibility of intraindividual variations in drug 
clearance rates (as in ecstasy; e.g., De La Torre et al., 2000), the findings presented in this 
review should be viewed as providing only an early indication of the patterns of real life 
cognition associated with substance use.    
3.3.3.1. Nicotine 
There has been much research conducted into the effects of nicotine on cognition, 
with immediate beneficial effects after use evident even in non-users (Heishman, 
Kleykamp, & Singleton, 2010). However, this review identified only two papers that 
looked at the subjective experience of cognitive functioning in smokers. Daily smokers 
report more failures than those who smoke occasionally (Wan et al., 2008), and 
specifically, smokers experience more slips during periods of abstinence (Parrott & Kaye, 
1999). Abstaining smokers also reported more stress, lower mood, and reduced arousal, and 
experienced everyday life as having more hassles; this highlights the significance of 
nicotine for sustaining normal functioning in users (Parrott & Kaye, 1999). This paper also 
highlights the complexity concerning the nature of the relationship between cognitive 





factors such as mood and anxiety which could fully or partially account for cognitive 
failures’ association with substance use. These need to be taken alongside any alterations in 
brain functioning which may be a direct result of the substance use; although it is presumed 
in non-clinical samples that this would lead to elevated cognitive failures being transitory 
and temporally related to substance use. In assessing the existing research, it is important to 
note that both studies utilised groups with large variations in the number of cigarettes 
smoked daily (e.g., range from 5-60 daily for abstaining smokers; Parrot & Kaye, 1999). 
Given the well-documented effects of nicotine withdrawal, such large differences in dosage 
would be expected to impact upon cognition to different degrees.  
Nevertheless, an important issue raised in these two articles is the potential role of 
nicotine as a kind of self-regulator, vital for sustaining normal functioning and without 
which, cognition may be impaired. Related to this, Wan et al. (2008) noted potential 
patterns of use of nicotine for self-medication in schizotypal individuals, a group known to 
have increased emotional reactivity (Collip et al., 2013). Alongside aiding cognition, 
therefore, nicotine may also play an essential role in assisting emotion regulation in a 
subgroup of users, with use having an indirect impact on cognitive failures.   
3.3.3.2. Alcohol 
The only article focusing on alcohol use was also the only one to study a population 
with a substance use disorder (Manning et al., 2016). Individuals with alcohol dependence 
complain of increased cognitive failures even after a period of detoxification.  At three 





those who relapsed did not. This would suggest that, at least for alcohol dependence, 
cognitive failures are related to the intoxication and withdrawal associated with the 
substance use itself, rather than being related to any longer lasting changes in brain 
structure or functioning. Implicit within this is that cognitive failures result from alcohol 
dependence and are not a potential risk marker for it.  
The lack of articles studying alcohol was surprising, given the extensive literature on 
the effects of alcohol intoxication on cognition including executive function, inhibitory 
control, memory, and motor control (Peterson, Rothfleisch, Zelazo, & Pihl, 1990; T. A. 
Schweizer et al., 2006). There have also been more recent attempts to explore the impact of 
alcohol on cognition in more naturalistic settings (e.g., bars; Lyvers & Tobias-Webb, 
2010), however the lack of studies of subjective perceptions of cognition is stark when 
compared to research around other substances. 
3.3.3.3. Cannabis, ecstasy and polydrug use 
Five papers examined cannabis or ecstasy use; these proved difficult to isolate in 
users (Montgomery & Fisk, 2007), and many researchers chose to include polydrug users. 
Unsurprisingly, given the contrasting psychopharmacological effects of depressants and 
stimulants, findings were mixed. A small sample of both ecstasy and cannabis users 
recruited by Rodgers (2000) did not report any subjective impairment, but cannabis was 
associated with heightened failures in another (Fisk & Montgomery, 2008). Cannabis users’ 
complaints about problems with daily functioning were affirmed by their significant others, 





2008), adding weight to the notion that neuropsychological assessments are not necessarily 
capturing all the information related to real world cognitive functioning.  
Chronic ecstasy users reported problems with memory specifically but did not 
endorse cognitive failures in general (Heffernan, Jarvis, Rodgers, Scholey, & Ling, 2001). 
One study utilising highly chronic ecstasy users (average 346.5 tablets in lifetime prior to 
study) did find high levels of cognitive failures, but also acknowledged that most heavy 
ecstasy users are polydrug users (Montgomery & Fisk, 2007). Specifically, many people 
use cannabis to manage the low mood and irritability associated with the “come down” 
from ecstasy (Klugman & Gruzelier, 2003); typically, this pattern of use would be most 
common in chronic consumers. Indeed, further analyses in the study of chronic ecstasy 
users suggested cannabis as the key predictor of failures (Montgomery & Fisk, 2007). 
These findings reflect the literature around objective measures of cognitive functioning, 
where there are also conflicting findings as to whether ecstasy or cannabis is actually the 
main source of impairment (e.g., Croft, Mackay, Mills, & Gruzelier, 2001; Klugman & 
Gruzelier, 2003). In addition, there is the possibility that the combined effects of ecstasy 
and cannabis produce a cascade of neurobiological events which are particularly toxic. 
Further work is needed to tease apart the interacting effects of substances, indeed, the 
effects of legal substances such as alcohol and nicotine are often forgotten about in studies 
concerning illicit substances. 
The role of self-awareness in reporting cognitive failures was raised quite frequently 





chronic use of illicit substances may prevent accurate reflection on everyday performance 
(Rodgers, 2000). However, informant-self correlations support that cannabis users are 
capable of reporting on difficulties; the lack of association with objective cognitive 
outcomes suggests that the subtlety of users’ real life cognitive problems are not detectable 
in the isolation and calm of lab testing (Fisk & Montgomery, 2008).      
3.3.4. Subjective cognitive failures versus performance on objective tasks in 
individuals with psychological disorders 
Several papers compared cognitive failures and objectively assessed cognitive 
performance in a range of psychological disorders and patterns of substance use (n = 14). A 
range of objective domains were tested for correlation with everyday cognition; with 
attention, executive function and memory being predominant. In line with our previous 
review on the link between subjective and objective cognition in healthy populations 
(Carrigan & Barkus, 2016), there were no consistent associations evident between cognitive 
failures and any objective domains of cognition. These findings are displayed in Table 3.4, 







Comparison of Objective Cognitive Assessment and Subjective Cognitive Failures in Psychological Disorders and Substance Use 








Psychological disorders        
MacQueen, Galway, Hay, Young, & 
Joffe (2002) 
Depression    X   
Farrin, Hull, Unwin, & Wykes(2003) Depression  √     
Preiss, Kramska, Dockalova, Holubova, 
& Kucerova (2010) 
Depression  X     
Burdick, Endick, & Goldberg(2005) Bipolar  X X X   
Schouws, Comijs, Stek, & 
Beekman (2012) 
Bipolar (elderly)  X √ X  X 




X  X    
Koso, Sarač-Hadzihalilovic, & 
Hansen(2012) 
PTSD   √ √  √ 
Donohoe et al. (2009) Schizophrenia X √*  √* X  
Substance use 
Manning, Teo, Guo, Wong, & Li (2016) Alcohol X  √ √ √  
Fisk & Montgomery (2008) Cannabis use   X    
Parrott & Kaye (1999) Ecstasy use  X  X   
Heffernan, Jarvis, Rodgers, Scholey, & 
Ling (2001) 
Ecstasy use      X 
Montgomery & Fisk(2007) Ecstasy-polydrug use X  X  √  
Hadjiefthyvoulou, Fisk, Montgomery, & 
Bridges(2011) 





Notes: √ Denotes domain compared with CFQ scores and association identified. X Denotes domain compared with CFQ scores 
but no association identified. Columns left blank donate domains of cognition not studied by the cited article. *Parity only met 





3.3.4.1. Psychological disorders 
There was a consistent disparity between neuropsychological outcomes and self-
reports of daily functioning of people with a diagnosed psychological disorder, as in 
healthy populations (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016). Farrin et al. (2003) found a relationship 
between CFQ scores and errors and longer reaction times in depression, however other 
studies of affective disorders failed to uncover any relationship (Burdick et al., 2005; Preiss 
et al., 2010; Schouws et al., 2012). Cognitive biases present in individuals with mood 
disorders could be argued to skew reporting in a negative direction, however the experience 
of poor concentration is a well-accepted symptom of depression (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013; Watts & Sharrock, 1985). This disparity may actually be due to 
problems with the ecological validity of current objective measures. 
An article studying war veterans with PTSD was the only study to identify objective 
test parity with cognitive failures across all domains tested, including executive function, 
memory and verbal function (Koso et al., 2012). This perhaps supports the proposed 
mechanism behind increased failures in PTSD, whereby intrusive memories increase slips 
via depletion of cognitive resources (Boals, 2008). These findings also highlight the 
significance of the link between PTSD symptoms (such as flashbacks) that are precipitated 
by “triggers” in daily life, and the level of disruption to cognitive, occupational, and social 
function experienced by sufferers. Further consideration of the role of situational factors in 
cognitive failures in psychopathology more generally may serve to increase our 





Some final findings of note were produced by Donohoe et al. (2009) in their study 
on schizophrenia. The authors suggested that one element of insight into illness is cognitive 
insight or awareness of cognitive functioning. They suggested that the CFQ essentially 
provides a measure of cognitive insight, and so its utility lies only in identifying 
discrepancies between neuropsychological performance and self-reported perceptions of the 
same. Predicted premorbid intelligence quotient (as per the Wechsler Test of Adult 
Reading) and episodic memory were both correlated with CFQ scores only for a few 
patients with intact clinical (i.e., illness) insight. That is, clinical insight was necessary, but 
not sufficient, for cognitive insight.    
3.3.4.2. Substance use 
There was an even greater “gap” between objective and subjective cognition in 
substance use. As mentioned earlier, this was proposed to be due to metacognitive deficits 
in drug users (Rodgers, 2000), whether due to substance use or personality factors that 
predispose to substance use. Whilst correlations between subjective and objective cognition 
were not explored, ecstasy-polydrug users had both higher CFQ ratings and poorer working 
memory performance than non-users (Montgomery & Fisk, 2007), and alcohol dependent 
patients had increased CFQ scores as well as memory, working memory, and executive 
function issues (Manning et al., 2016). More significant cognitive problems may be 
expected in the clinical population of the latter study, but the former focused on highly 





experience a noticeable severity of problems and/or unable to compensate for them once a 
certain threshold of substance abuse is surpassed.  
3.4. Discussion 
A range of studies on cognitive failures in different psychological disorders were 
identified and examined within this review. Failures in substance users were also explored, 
given that substance use is known to influence objective cognitive performance, as well as 
being closely related to psychological disorders.  
3.4.1. What is the relationship between cognitive failures and psychological disorders? 
There appears to be links between a number of psychological disorders and 
heightened reports of cognitive failures. Patients with depression and PTSD were 
consistently more prone to everyday failures than controls, with medium to large effect 
sizes. Researchers looking at both of these disorders posited that particular aspects of their 
psychopathology drain cognitive resources to result in failures: in depression, catastrophic 
reactions to perceived errors (Farrin et al., 2003); in PTSD, intrusive thoughts and 
flashbacks (Boals, 2008). Individuals with bipolar disorder were the only group to report 
fewer cognitive failures than controls, which raised the issue of insight; this will be 
discussed in detail later. Schizophrenia is also associated with increased cognitive failures, 
although this is similar to the level seen in depressed patients (van den Bosch et al., 1993), 






It is important to note that the existing research is largely correlational in nature. 
Therefore, it is still unclear whether cognitive failures are consequent of other 
psychological symptoms or part of the core symptoms present in these disorders. 
Consideration also needs to be given as to whether cognitive failures are part of the 
inherited vulnerability for psychological disorders.  However, given the lack of disorder 
specificity, as well as cognitive failures’ correlation with neuroticism in both healthy and 
disordered populations (van den Bosch et al., 1993; Wilhelm, Witthöft, & Schipolowski, 
2010), it is possible that cognitive failures could relate to psychological distress or 
problems of emotion regulation more generally.  
3.4.2. What is the relationship between cognitive failures and substance use? 
The picture of cognitive failures in substance use is even less clear. Nicotine seems to 
be associated with cognitive failures in a dose-response fashion according to level of use, 
with daily smokers experiencing more failures than non-daily smokers (Wan et al., 2008).  
However, the significant factor appears to be withdrawal rather than intoxication, with 
abstaining smokers suffering more daily hassles and failures than non-abstainers (Parrott & 
Kaye, 1999). Nicotine is often used as an emotion regulation tool (Schleicher, Harris, 
Catley, & Nazir, 2010) with deprivation reducing thresholds for coping with stress. In 
abstaining smokers, increased failures may therefore occur alongside or as a kind of 
cognitive consequence of stress.  
Surprisingly, there was only one article identified that considered alcohol use; this 





immediately post-detox, but were reduced after three months in those who continued to 
abstain (Manning et al., 2016). Patients who relapsed did not experience the same reduction 
in cognitive failures, suggesting that time since alcohol dependence is perhaps more 
important than brain changes associated with abuse for everyday cognitive functioning. To 
highlight the limited research on self-reported everyday cognition and alcohol, we excluded 
only one alcohol article on the basis that it utilised a different measure of subjectively-
perceived cognition (Ling et al., 2003). This paper found that level of alcohol consumption 
in a non-clinical sample correlated with level of everyday memory problems, with heavy 
drinkers reporting more issues than moderate drinkers, and moderate drinkers more than 
abstainers. These papers suggest, similarly to nicotine, that potentially it may be the 
withdrawal state which is potent to predisposing to cognitive failures.  
Long term heavy cannabis use appears to be linked to increased vulnerability to 
failures to a greater extent than ecstasy (Fisk & Montgomery, 2008; Montgomery & Fisk, 
2007). Findings were overall limited, inconsistent, and complicated by polydrug use.  
Existing papers, whilst limited, suggest substance use has the potential to increase 
cognitive failures. As such, substance use needs further consideration as an issue affecting 






3.4.3. How do subjective cognitive failures relate to performance on objective tasks in 
people with psychological disorders or in substance users? 
There was no evidence of a direct link between objective neuropsychological 
outcomes and self-reported cognitive failures in either psychological disorders or substance 
use. Comparison between these two approaches to measuring cognition represents a key 
topic of interest, and contributes to the ongoing debate regarding self-awareness, reliability, 
and validity of subjective reports of cognition. Some authors suggest reported failures in the 
absence of neuropsychological deficits indicate impaired self-awareness related to illness 
(as in schizophrenia; e.g., Donohoe et al., 2009). This mirrors the debate around 
neuroticism, where increased self-reported failures are viewed as reflecting tendency for 
negative self-evaluation. Poor self-awareness is not necessarily indicated by a lack of 
relationship between objective and subjective cognitive measures. Rather, everyday 
cognitive failures may tap into aspects of cognition quite different to those accessed in the 
lab. If affective dysregulation is indeed a significant contributor to vulnerability for 
cognitive failures, then real world stressors both external and internal are likely to trigger 
errors for psychologically vulnerable individuals. This would occur regardless of one’s 
level of objective neuropsychological ability, hence the low correlation between lab-based 
and real world performance. The current findings highlight the need to develop more 
ecologically valid measures of cognition, particularly ones that can capture real world 






An earlier goal of this review was to elucidate distinct profiles of real life cognitive 
functioning for specific psychological disorders. However, the literature search revealed 
that this would not be possible. The number of studies for each disorder was limited; some 
disorders were the focus in as few as one or two articles, and others were not studied at all. 
The lack of studies was surprising, given the wide acceptance as “common knowledge” (as 
well as being acknowledged in the DSM 5) that mild cognitive issues often go hand-in-
hand with psychological disorders. Similarly, we were able to identify only a handful of 
articles exploring the link between CFQ scores and substance use. Most notably missing 
were papers regarding alcohol use, given its global popularity and legality. 
Ideally, a PRISMA review would also include an analysis of the quality of articles; or 
in the case of a meta-analysis a formal test of bias. However, this was not possible. This 
area of research is relatively small, and the necessarily broad scope of the search meant that 
articles were primarily correlational, using a variety of populations and methods; this 
makes comparisons using one set of criteria difficult. In addition, there remain 
inconsistencies in how cognitive failures are conceptualised. As such, it is important to 
qualify conclusions of the current review as tentative and preliminary. Targeted reviews 
designed to answer questions about the strength of the relationships revealed within the 







There are a few broad limitations identified which form recommendations for future 
research. In particular, phase of illness for clinical populations was not always considered. 
Both cognitive functioning and perceptions of functioning may shift over time. For 
example, individuals in prodromal stages of illness are likely to report increased cognitive 
problems (e.g., as in psychosis; Schultze-Lutter, Klosterkötter, & Ruhrmann, 2014), which 
may reflect acute awareness of decline in their functioning. The sense of there being 
“something wrong” may, in itself, ensure subjective monitoring is heightened. Chronic 
sufferers, by contrast, may have a different profile of failures; perhaps due to improvements 
in cognition related to medication, stabilisation of symptoms, development of 
compensatory strategies, or the lowering of expectations of their own capacities.  
Similarly, the impact of comorbid psychological disorders on cognitive failures is also 
yet to be addressed. Given that 45% of individuals hold two or more diagnoses (Kessler, 
Chiu, & Demler, 2005), of interest is how the interaction of symptoms might have an 
additive effect on failures.  
Related to this, substance use disorders are also frequently comorbid with other 
psychological issues (Weaver et al., 2003). The complex pharmacodynamics of substances 
of abuse, as well as prescribed medications, need to be considered in order to tease out key 
factors in cognitive failures. Adding to the difficulty of this task is the neuroprogression 
associated with severe mental disorders, in which neurological systems reorganise as illness 
progresses (Gama, Kunz, Magalhães, & Kapczinski, 2013). This may increase failures 





interacting differently with different substances at different stages. Perhaps increased 
interest in subjective cognitive complaints by neuroscientists will enable exploration of 
these issues in the near future.  
3.4.5. Clinical implications 
Despite the limitations of this review, the current findings highlight important 
implications for clinical practice. First, previous findings in healthy populations that 
negative affect and psychological distress increase cognitive failures can now be extended. 
Psychological distress seems to impact day-to-day cognitive functioning proportionately, 
such that individuals at the extremes of the distress continuum, (i.e., those with clinical 
disorders) report significantly higher levels of failures than those with subclinical levels of 
distress. Currently, the extent to which subtle cognitive deficits are considered by clinicians 
is limited (Burdick et al., 2005). A brief, self-report tool such as the CFQ could be 
introduced at the assessment stage in addition to neuropsychological measures in order to 
better inform clinicians of the particular struggles faced by patients. Similarly, cognitive 
failures could be used to monitor shifts in perceived daily functioning during treatment. 
Cognitive behavioural therapies could be designed to address cognitive failures directly; 
normalising the experience of mistakes, helping clients to identify and mediate the effects 
of triggers for slips and failures such as stress.  
3.4.6. Conclusions and future directions 
It has previously been suggested that cognitive failures reflect both trait vulnerabilities 





to this that a range of psychological disorders including depression, anxiety, PTSD, and 
schizophrenia are all associated with increased self-reported failures in everyday life. In 
addition, use or withdrawal from substances including nicotine, alcohol, and cannabis may 
also lead to heightened failures, particularly in those whose pattern of use is chronic. Self-
reported cognitive failures do not correlate with objective measures of cognition in either 
clinical or substance use populations, suggesting they may measure unique aspects of 
cognition.  
The next step in this area of research will be to determine whether some common 
factor is responsible for heightened cognitive failures across both clinical and non-clinical 
individuals. For example, we already know that cognitive failures are associated with 
negative affect and neuroticism in healthy populations; one possibility is that emotional 
dysregulation increases vulnerability to slips. Another important aspect of further research 
into cognitive failures will be attempts to resolve the ongoing debate around the validity of 
self-reports, specifically with regards to the role of personality traits that may impact the 
accuracy of self-perceptions, such as neuroticism.   
Although this review has focused on simple, retrospective self-reports, there are some 
new approaches to measurement of subjectively-perceived cognitive failures which will 
likely be of value in answering some of these remaining questions. A methodology of 
particular interest is ambulatory assessment, also known as experience sampling (e.g., 
Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, et al., 2003). This involves capturing self-reports of errors in 





Another major benefit of the use of experience sampling is the possibility for studying 
changes in functioning at multiple time points throughout each day. This would allow for 
examination of fluctuations, and the factors which may interact with trait and illness-related 
vulnerability to shape these shifts, such as time of day, stressors, and substance use. To 
date, only a handful of studies have utilised experience sampling to study cognitive failures 
in healthy populations (Kane et al., 2007; Lange & Süß, 2014; McVay et al., 2009; Neupert 
et al., 2008). This approach would seem to be the next step towards studying real world 
cognitive capacity in an ecologically valid way, but as it is not yet widespread, 
retrospective self-reports as captured via measures such as the CFQ remain invaluable in 






4.1. Schizophrenia and schizotypy 
4.1.1. The psychosis continuum and conceptualisations of schizotypy 
Schizophrenia is a severe psychological disorder comprising psychotic, affective, 
interpersonal, and cognitive symptoms (van Os & Kapur, 2009). It has a serious impact 
on quality of life, with increased mortality rates related to suicide as well as a high 
prevalence of comorbid health issues (McGrath, Saha, Chant, & Welham, 2008). 
Traditionally, the medical view of schizophrenia and related psychotic disorders has 
been dichotomous – one is either sick or healthy (Johns & Van Os, 2001). However, it 
is now increasingly being recognised that there exists a continuum of psychosis, along 
which individuals sit at varying levels of risk for disorder. This concept links to a 
diathesis-stress understanding of schizophrenia aetiology, whereby genetically 
vulnerable individuals may not necessarily manifest psychosis unless faced with 
particular environmental stressors (Walker, Kestler, Bollini, & Hochman, 2004). 
Similar notions of a continuum are now being incorporated into the recognition of the 
stage of symptom presentation; here rather than representing a continuum of risk, it 
allows the possibility of tracking how far along an individual is in the expression of 
illness.  
Clinical staging models of schizophrenia aim to utilise symptom profiles related to 
distinct stages of illness, recognising that early “warning signs” differ from the full-
blown symptoms that are the focus of the DSM and similar taxonomies (McGorry, 





physical disorders such as cancer and arthritis. In McGorry et al.’s (2010) research, 
illness stages are defined by severity and persistence of symptoms, as well as 
progression in domains such as neurocognitive and social functioning. Beyond the 
initial pre-clinical stage of increased risk (e.g., due to genetics) with nil current 
symptoms, stages include mild, non-specific symptoms; moderate, non-specific 
symptoms (“ultra-high risk”); first episode psychosis; incomplete remission; relapse; 
multiple relapses; and severe, unremitting illness (McGorry, et al., 2010).  The major 
clinical benefit of this model includes the ability to better target treatments, with less 
invasive options to be used for earlier stages to prevent full expression of psychotic 
illness. Supporting this model, neuroimaging evidence indicates increasing severity of 
pathological measures with stage of illness, as well as more effective (and benign) 
treatment for earlier versus later stages (Wood, Yung, McGorry, & Pantelis, 2011). 
However, the psychosis continuum is a broader concept still. Rather than 
notionally focusing on phases of illness it captures individuals at lower levels of 
severity and risk. This includes individuals with related but stable personality issues 
such as schizotypal personality disorder, and extends down to those who experience 
isolated psychotic-like phenomena but otherwise maintain a normal level of mental 
health and functioning. As such, clinically-defined psychosis relates only to a very 
small portion of the entire phenotypic continuum (Johns & van Os, 2001). Some of the 
interest in a continuum of psychosis stems from the realisation that psychotic-like 
experiences are far more common than previously thought, with evidence of a normal 
distribution throughout the general population (van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, 





verbal hallucinations occur in around 10-15% of children and adults in the general 
population (de Leede-Smith & Barkus, 2013), and delusional ideation in 25 – 30% 
(Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004).  
Schizotypy is one construct useful for exploring this continuum. It refers to a 
cluster of traits reflecting attenuated forms of positive, negative, and disorganised 
psychotic symptoms which are thought to reflect risk for psychosis. Schizotypy has 
emerged as a key construct in psychosis research due to its utility for improving 
understanding of the developmental trajectories, risk, and treatment of schizophrenia-
spectrum psychopathology, as well as for exploring variation in subclinical and normal 
groups, all within a single framework (Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015). Genetic 
research appears to support schizotypy as an intermediate phenotype for schizophrenia-
spectrum disorders, with healthy schizotypes and psychosis patients sharing genetic 
features (Kendler et al., 1981; Torgersen, Onstad, Skre, Edvardsen, & Kringlen, 1993; 
Walter, Fernandez, Snelling, & Barkus, 2016). Some of the single nucleotide 
polymorphisms which have been associated with schizophrenia have also been reported 
to be in excess in those who express schizotypy (Walter et al., 2016). Expression of 
schizotypy increases with genetic proximity to schizophrenia, with relatives of patients 
also high on schizotypy (Kendler & Walsh, 1995; Moreno Samaniego et al., 2011; 
Vollema, Sitskoorn, Appels, & Kahn, 2002). In addition to this genetic evidence, 
schizotypy and schizophrenia share other common aetiological factors including trauma, 
urbanicity, and cannabis use (Barkus, Stirling, Hopkins, & Lewis, 2006; Marzillier & 
Steel, 2007; Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam, et al., 2003; Weiser et al., 2007). As such, 





of the continuum of risk for psychosis in the general population (Claridge, 1997), with 
low, average, and high schizotypes in the non-clinical range, and schizotypal personality 
disorder and schizophrenia at its upper extremes. A number of factors including 
cognition, temperament, and physical and psychological environment interact with 
schizotypy to impact on mental health outcomes, determining an individual’s movement 
along the continuum (Brod, 1997).  
Although the concept of a psychosis continuum is now accepted by many 
researchers (e.g., Claridge, 1997; DeRosse & Karlsgodt, 2015; Johns & van Os, 2001; 
Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015), there remain varying conceptualisations of 
schizotypy. Meehl (1962, 1990) proposed that the psychological features making up 
schizotypy stem from underlying schizotaxia, a neurointegrative anomaly reflecting 
possession of a schizogene. Schizotaxia results in cognitive slippage, leading to the 
aberrant psychological and social functioning of schizotypes including subtle thought 
disorder and odd behaviour. Meehl’s view of schizotypy is very much a disease-based 
model, with around 10% of the population thought to evince it (Lenzenweger, Maher, & 
Manschreck, 2005). Whilst all schizotypes display their latent vulnerability to psychosis 
through functional abnormalities, not all will decompensate (Lenzenweger, 2006a). This 
implies that both exacerbating and protective factors operate against the backdrop of 
schizotypy to move people along the continuum of risk.  
Other researchers, such as Claridge (1997), describe schizotypy as representing a 
form of individual difference, meaning that all individuals in the normal population 
possess schizotypal traits to some degree. Meehl and proponents such as Lenzenweger 





conferral of psychosis risk, albeit in a small subgroup of high scoring individuals; a 
quasi-dimensional model of schizotypy. By contrast, Claridge’s view of schizotypy is 
fully dimensional across the entire population, with delineation of health and disorder 
occurring at some higher point along the continuum. Both approaches allow that only a 
subgroup of those who express schizotypal traits will go on to develop a diagnosable 
mental health disorder. Where they differ is whether the distribution of schizotypy is 
fully dimensional or if a meaningful clinically relevant cut-off exists which leads to a 
discontinuity and ensures the trait is therefore quasi-dimensional in its links with 
clinical disorders. Claridge and colleagues’ perspective incorporates personality 
features, but is more focused on a dimensional perspective that reflects attenuated 
versions of the different types of psychosis-related symptoms. The fully dimensional 
approach is most consistent with the concept of a continuum of psychosis, and may 
account for the high rates of psychotic-like experiences in the general population (de 
Leede-Smith & Barkus, 2013; Verdoux & van Os, 2002). Similar to the quasi-
dimensional approach, potentiation of illness is thought to occur when high schizotypes 
are exposed to external aetiological factors. However, proponents of Claridge also 
emphasise the potential for schizotypy to be adaptive. It has been shown that high 
schizotypes can experience subjective wellbeing (Goulding, 2004) and even benefit 
from strengths in areas such as a high level of creativity (Brod, 1997; Nelson & 
Rawlings, 2010).  
  The quasi-dimensional and fully dimensional approaches to schizotypy 
therefore overlap conceptually, with both acknowledging that stable personality-based 





traditional aspects of personality such as openness, neuroticism, and conscientiousness 
are not subsumed under schizotypy; rather they reflect an increasingly complex 
presentation of human personality. As such within this thesis, schizotypy is regarded as 
a cluster of traits present to varying degrees within all individuals; and which 
encompasses both stable personality features and psychotic-like symptoms that may 
fluctuate over time. Combined, these reflect current level of risk and the impact of 
external stressors.   
Research into schizotypy holds dual interest for researchers. First, the use of 
non-clinical schizotypy samples enables exploration of the psychosis-like symptoms 
and related psychological features free from potential confounds of medication, 
hospitalisation, distress, symptom severity, problematic coping strategies, and lack of 
insight that are associated with clinical populations (Barrantes-Vidal, Grant, & Kwapil, 
2015; Raine, 1991). Secondly, an understanding of schizotypy has the potential to 
enhance knowledge on the aetiology, onset, and treatment of schizophrenia. One of the 
advantages of this bottom-up approach to studying psychotic psychopathology is the 
identification of possible endophenotypes, such as social behaviours or styles of 
cognition, which act as markers of risk (Koychev et al., 2011; Kwapil & Barrantes-
Vidal, 2015). Given the breadth of the schizotypy construct in capturing the entirety of 
the psychosis spectrum, it enables consideration of markers that may be present pre-
morbidly, even prior to any discernible prodrome. “Basic symptoms” is a concept of 
recently renewed interest within psychosis risk, referring to subtle disturbances to drive, 
affect, thinking, speech, and stress tolerance that may not be detectable via objective 





decline in functioning that indicates the beginning stages of psychosis (Schultze-Lutter, 
2009). The eventuation of end symptoms from these basic ones is thought to occur on 
the basis of insufficient coping (Schultze-Lutter, 2009). Schizotypal traits provide a start 
point for examining cognitive basic symptoms, and as such, schizotypy research has the 
potential to provide direction for early intervention. 
It is however important to emphasize that the majority of individuals with high 
levels of schizotypal traits will not go on to develop psychosis (Kaymaz et al., 2012). 
Sub-clinical schizotypes rarely seek help; many even revel in unusual phenomena such 
as out-of-body experiences (McCreery & Claridge, 2002), spiritual or religious 
phenomena (Brod, 1997), and an impressive creative ability (Jackson, 1997). This 
means that ethically, disclosure of psychosis risk merely on the basis of schizotypy is 
not necessarily warranted. A study into participant perceptions of psychosis suggested 
that, given the low proportion of individuals who transition, the burden of awareness 
likely outweighs any benefits (Linscott & Cross, 2009). As such, the unique experiences 
and personalities of sub-clinical schizotypes are highly valued in research, but those 
who are not help-seeking are not usually informed of their psychometric status by 
researchers. 
4.1.2. Issues in measurement of schizotypy 
As mentioned, there have been multiple perceptions and approaches to 
understanding schizotypy, and as such there are a multitude of approaches to measuring 
schizotypy within general populations. Whilst clinical measures such as the Structured 
Interview for Schizotypy (SIS; Kendler, Lieberman, & Walsh, 1989) exist, it is argued 





such, self-reported schizotypy does not need to be qualified as “psychometric” 
schizotypy (Lenzenweger, 2006a). Several self-report questionnaires have been 
developed for this purpose. Some of these capture a broad subset of schizotypal traits 
such as the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason, 
Claridge, & Jackson, 1995) and the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ; Raine, 
1991). Others meanwhile capture specific symptoms such as the group of measures 
known as the Chapman scales (Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 1976), the Peters et al. 
Delusion Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 2004), and the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale 
(LSHS; Launay & Slade, 1981). Of the broader self-report measures, many take a 
dimensional approach mapping roughly onto the clinical dimensions of schizophrenia. 
A three-factor model of schizotypy includes positive, negative, and social impairment 
dimensions (Lenzenweger, 1991), whilst four-factor models comprise positive, 
negative, conceptual disorganisation, and asocial/non-conformity (Vollema & van den 
Bosch, 1995); the precise structure of schizotypy as measured via self-report differs 
according to the measure in use. 
The SPQ (Raine, 1991) has been chosen as the key measure of schizotypy within 
healthy populations, primarily because it is one of the broadest measures. It was 
developed using the DSM-III-R criteria for schizotypal personality disorder, covering 
three dimensions and nine subscales: cognitive-perceptual (ideas of references, odd 
beliefs or magical thinking, unusual perceptual experiences, suspiciousness), 
interpersonal (excessive social anxiety, no close friends, constricted affect), and 
disorganised (odd speech/thought, odd behaviour). Although developed to assist in 





variations in schizotypal traits within healthy populations. It has a normal distribution 
(Johns & Van Os, 2001; Raine, 1991), and taps into a broad range of subclinical and 
personality-based features, alongside attenuated symptoms of psychosis. Being based on 
personality disorder criteria, it is perhaps more conservative and oriented to clinical risk 
than other measures of schizotypy; a benefit of this is that healthy individuals scoring 
highly on the SPQ are likely closer to the upper end of the subclinical portion of the 
psychosis spectrum. Whilst it does not directly assess some of the broader personality 
features of schizotypy proposed by Meehl, such as anhedonia (1962), the SPQ still 
manages to capture a number of subtle variations in normal functioning in such a way 
that it is of use for studying schizotypal traits in non-help-seeking individuals. 
Some researchers have argued strongly for a dimensional approach to measuring 
schizotypy (e.g., Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015). As both schizophrenia and 
schizotypy are heterogenous, treating a measure such as the SPQ as unidimensional 
risks the generation of conflicting results via samples that differ in their makeup 
(Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015). However, given that schizotypal traits are thought to 
confer a general risk for schizophrenia-spectrum psychopathology, it is also meaningful 
to explore level of overall schizotypy. In particular, initial exploration of constructs 
linked to schizotypal traits warrant use of the holistic trait schizotypy in order to provide 
the best chance of successfully identifying an association at its most basic level. As 
such, it is primarily the total SPQ score which is examined in this thesis, in order to 
examine the effects and correlates of trait schizotypy as a whole. Findings relating to the 
widely used three-factor model of the SPQ identified by Raine et al. (1994) are reported 





An additional consideration in the approach to measurement of schizotypy relates 
to the treatment of data. In the existing literature, there are two key approaches to 
analysis: group and continuous. Given schizotypy is conceptualised as a continuum, it 
could be argued that it must be treated as continuous within data analyses. However, it 
is additionally useful to conduct group analyses comparing “high” with “low” 
subclinical schizotypes. Although this reflects the traditional, dichotomous medical 
model approach to disorder, group approaches are important in that they enable 
exploration of whether variables behave in the same way for individuals at both the 
upper and lower ends of the spectrum. Clinical cut-offs for self-report measures such as 
the SPQ are not yet known and as such, groupings must be made based on a potentially 
more arbitrary portioning of participants. Continued exploration of schizotypy in both 
continuous and group analyses is required for ongoing improvement in the 
understanding of schizotypy and its relationship to clinical risk, and this thesis utilises 
both approaches for this purpose.  
4.1.3. Criticisms of schizotypy 
A longitudinal study found that both positive and negative schizotypy predicted 
schizophrenia-spectrum psychopathology (positive OR = 1.50; negative OR = 1.87) and 
impaired functioning after ten years (Kwapil, Gross, Silvia, & Barrantes-Vidal, 2013). 
A recent review of studies of the general population found that between 5 – 40% of high 
scorers in the general population go on to develop a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder, 
depending on the scale of interest (Debbané et al., 2015). Although these rates suggest 
that the schizotypy construct improves sensitivity for predicting psychosis, longitudinal 





to explore the aetiology of schizophrenia and related disorders, For this reason, “At-
Risk Mental States” (ARMS) is a more recent construct of interest within the psychosis 
literature. Individuals experiencing ARMS exhibit a change from premorbid functioning 
characterised by various mental states such as nonspecific anxiety and depression, 
subthreshold psychotic symptoms, or brief transient psychotic symptoms (Yung et al., 
2003). ARMS may or may not progress to psychosis, but if this occurs, the ARMS may 
be retrospectively labelled a prodrome (Yung et al., 2003). This has become the focus of 
many researchers and clinicians, with programs of early intervention targeting ARMS 
populations well-established in a number of countries, including Australia (e.g., Yung et 
al., 2007).  
However, concern that schizotypy is somehow less valid than ARMS may be 
misguided. First, schizotypy is a much broader construct, capturing the entire psychosis 
continuum. It was never intended to be diagnostic (Barrantes-Vidal et al., 2015) but 
rather sought to explore more distal, even pre-morbid risk; ARMS research meanwhile 
targets those at more imminent clinical risk of conversion within twelve months 
(Schultze-Lutter, Ruhrmann, Berning, Maier, & Klosterkötter, 2010). In addition, 
schizotypy may enhance research with ARMS populations, with assessment of 
schizotypal traits providing additive value to ARMS in predicting risk (Debbané et al., 
2015). There have also been decreasing transition rates even within ARMS populations. 
In initial studies this was 40% (Yung et al., 2003), but a general pattern of reduction in 
transition over years of publication across continents and institutions (Hartmann et al., 
2016) has seen a recent meta-analysis identify a figure closer to 22% over twelve 





such, some researchers propose a return to schizotypy as a crucial construct in exploring 
psychosis aetiology (Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015; Lenzenweger, 2006b). 
Arguments include that schizotypy incorporates a broad range of symptoms and 
disorders beyond just rare or severe ones, and is therefore more useful than the more 
specific constructs that it subsumes (Barrantes-Vidal et al., 2015). Hence, subclinical 
schizotypes, even those who remain healthy and psychologically compensated 
throughout their lives, are of value for researchers looking to understand the 
developmental pathways of psychosis-related psychopathology.  
It is also worth acknowledging here criticisms of the widespread use of university 
students in the existing schizotypy literature. Although there is a need to broaden 
research to include other groups in the community, Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal (2015) 
point out that the use of students is restrictive but not invalid, as variation along the 
schizotypy spectrum is expected in this population as in any other. They also point out 
that whilst tertiary students are indeed at a slightly lower risk of developing 
schizophrenia than the general population, the current findings utilising this group point 
to the promise in expanding on this area with further research. In addition, study of a 
generally lower-risk group such as students may have the additional benefit of exposing 
potential protective factors (Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015). As such, a community 
population incorporating a large proportion of university students is utilised for the 
purposes of this thesis. This is done on the basis that this group reflects a similar level 
of variation to other subclinical groups; additionally, as the most studied group it has the 
most potential for drawing meaningful conclusions within a relatively new area of 





4.2. The relationship between schizotypy and cognitive failures  
4.2.1. Cognition in schizotypy 
As mentioned, the central focus of schizotypy research has been in exploring 
related markers of risk psychosis, and cognition is one of particular interest. A key 
feature of schizophrenia is cognitive impairment, which creates barriers to social, 
occupational, and academic functioning for affected individuals (Dickerson, Boronow, 
Ringel, & Parente, 1996; Fett et al., 2011; Harvey, 2010). Given that up to 80% of 
schizophrenia patients experience problems with cognition (Bora, Yücel, & Pantelis, 
2010), similar problems are also expected in schizotypy, albeit to an attenuated degree. 
There is some evidence that individuals high in schizotypy also demonstrate mild 
deficits in cognitive domains including working memory, executive function, and 
sustained attention, although overall intelligence quotient remains intact (Raine, 2006). 
But the presence of such deficits in schizotypy are debated; conflicting results exist, 
with many studies failing to identify any impairment relative to controls (e.g., Chan et 
al., 2011; Laws et al., 2008; Stratta et al., 1997). Nevertheless, as the review in Chapter 
2 of this thesis highlighted, people high on schizotypy consistently complain of a 
heightened level of cognitive failures in their everyday lives (Corcoran et al., 2013; 
Giesbrecht, Merckelbach, Kater, & Sluis, 2007b; Gooding, Tallent, & Hegyi, 2001;  
Pfeifer et al., 2009).   
The concept of basic symptoms was described earlier in this chapter (section 
4.1.1), and relevant here are a subset of issues known as cognitive basic symptoms, 
which include subtle problems in attention and memory (Schultze-Lutter, 2009). They 





becoming evident to the afflicted individual prior to a more concrete functional decline 
(Schultze-Lutter et al., 2014). Self-reported cognitive failures may capture cognitive 
basic symptoms. Indeed, some researchers have already proposed that failures represent 
a pre-morbid marker of risk, evident even in the absence of objectively-detectable 
impairment (Laws et al., 2008; Pfeifer et al., 2009). We would expect rates of cognitive 
failures to increase with psychosis risk, with patients with schizophrenia reporting the 
highest and healthy individuals scoring low on schizotypy the fewest. In this way, high 
schizotypes can be thought of as an intermediary group, reporting fewer cognitive 
failures than patients, but more than average or low schizotypes. Hence, cognitive 
failures are of interest as an endophenotype of schizotypy, particularly as one that is 
relatively early in its emergence along the continuum of risk. 
The mechanisms through which cognitive failures are heightened in healthy high 
schizotypes are unclear. It may be that an underlying base deficit in cognitive ability 
results in poorer cognitive functioning in daily life. However, the inconsistent findings 
regarding the associations between both schizotypy and objective cognitive ability, and 
cognitive failures and objective ability as described in Chapter 2, do not provide much 
support for this theory. Related to this, it has also been suggested that schizotypes’ 
reporting of high failures in the absence of reduced objective outcomes indicates that 
self-reports reflect self-awareness of cognition specifically, rather than cognitive 
outcomes more broadly (Chan et al., 2011; Laws et al., 2008). Perceptions of this 
problem vary from the claim that a mismatch between objective and subjective 
cognition equates to impaired self-awareness in schizotypy (Chan et al., 2011), to the 





awareness prior to illness onset, noting mild deficits that are not yet externally 
observable (Laws et al., 2008). Finally, it is also possible that this link may be due to an 
overlap in the two constructs, with measures of schizotypy including some items 
regarding thought function that are similar to those in the CFQ. The SPQ contains very 
few items that, at face-value, overlap with the CFQ; however, further research is 
required to confirm the extent to which problems with everyday cognition are also 
measured by the SPQ. 
As proposed in Chapter 2, cognitive failures appear to capture something different 
to objective cognition, and as such the assertion that they reflect primarily self-
awareness in schizotypy must be challenged. This is particularly vital for at-risk 
populations, for whom low levels of impairment coupled with the retained ability to 
utilise coping strategies may reduce the utility of traditional measures (Schultze-Lutter 
et al., 2014). Perhaps a more useful approach to the schizotypy-cognitive failures link is 
to relate it back to the model of cognitive failures proposed earlier (Carrigan & Barkus, 
2016a), incorporating both stable trait and shifting state and environmental factors. 
Schizotypy includes various features that may shape everyday cognition, and the 
expression of some of these is dependent on state. Increased negative affectivity and 
affective reactivity are features of schizotypy (Horan, Blanchard, Clark, & Green, 2008; 
Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, et al., 2003) that are shared with other personality traits also 
known to relate to cognitive failures, including neuroticism and state anxiety. Affective 
or emotional reactivity refers to the tendency to exhibit more intense emotional, 
physiological, and behavioural responses to emotional stimuli (Larsen & Diener, 1987). 





response. It is possible that healthy people high on schizotypy find it more difficult to 
maintain cognition at their optimal level of ability (i.e., that which is demonstrated in an 
idealised lab/clinic setting) when faced with the emotional stimuli and demands of real 
life.  
A significant emerging methodology in exploring cognitive failures in everyday 
life utilises experience sampling (ES) to answer questions about real world functioning, 
and a group of researchers have already used this within both psychosis and schizotypal 
groups.  One such study utilised schizophrenia patients, their first-degree relatives, and 
controls, and found that level of vulnerability modified increases in negative affect in 
response to stressors during the flow of everyday life (Myin-Germeys, Van Os, 
Schwartz, & Stone, 2001).  Whilst researchers are yet to focus specifically on cognitive 
failures in everyday life using ES, there is evidence that psychotic-like symptoms 
associated with poor concentration and control over thoughts occur more frequently for 
those high on positive schizotypy (Barrantes-Vidal, et al., 2013; Kwapil et al., 2012). In 
addition, stress at one time point increases the risk of problems with thought control at 
the next (Barrantes-Vidal, et al. 2013). These findings provide further support for the 
theory that stress reactivity contributes to everyday failures in schizotypy. 
It is also possible that aspects of schizotypy other than emotional reactivity contribute to 
cognitive failures. For example, multiple elements of the cognitive-perceptual factor of 
schizotypy may be pertinent. Transient perceptual disturbances may reduce the 
efficiency with which information in the environment is processed; likewise with 
experiences of suspiciousness. Interpersonal difficulties could also be to blame, with the 





stress. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore all of these possibilities. 
The current focus will be on the role of affect in contributing to the experience of 
cognitive failures for people high in schizotypy. The strong link between negative affect 
and cognitive failures in the broader population (e.g., McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009b; 
Payne & Schnapp, 2014), along with evidence of exaggerated emotional responses to 
everyday stressors in schizotypy, support the need to investigate whether emotional 
reactivity contributes to the experience of cognitive failures in this interesting group.   
Investigative significance of the schizotypy-cognitive failures relationship 
While cognitive failures may be thought of as relatively minor and benign, 
understanding patterns of failures and the impact of them on psychologically healthy 
schizotypes is important for a number of reasons. First, in relation to risk, a cognitive 
theory of schizophrenia posits that an innate cognitive deficit is actually the source of 
psychotic phenomena, rather than a by-product (Beck & Rector, 2005; Meehl, 1962). 
Thus, the subtle cognitive complaints of subclinical schizotypes may represent a 
manifestation of the earliest processes which, whilst having multiple possible 
trajectories including lifelong psychological health, may also lead to the development of 
a psychological disorder including schizophrenia. Depending on one’s preferred 
language, cognitive failures may be labelled a cognitive basic symptom (Schultze-
Lutter, 2009); a biomarker of risk (Diwadkar, Montrose, Dworakowski, Sweeney, & 
Keshavan, 2006); or an endophenotype (Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam, Jolles, 
Delespaul, & Van Os, 2002) of schizophrenia. Following the hypothesis that heightened 
emotional reactivity is key to the experience of these symptoms in high schizotypes, it is 





including positive psychotic symptoms. In this way, cognitive failures may have the 
potential to eventually facilitate upward movement along the spectrum of psychosis 
risk. Additionally, they may continually interact with stress to influence movement from 
remissive into relapse phases at various points during a person’s lifespan.   
Secondly, as mentioned previously in this thesis, cognitive failures have the 
potential to result in serious problems in day-to-day life, including major accidents and 
injury (e.g., Simpson et al., 2005; Weigmann & Shappell, 1997). In a population that 
apparently experiences such ongoing disruption to daily cognition in addition to a range 
of other psychological issues, failures are likely to have far-reaching negative effects on 
the occupational and social functioning of schizotypes. People high on schizotypy but 
below the clinical threshold may not seek help, leaving little chance for interventions 
such as medication or therapy being made available to ameliorate these issues. College 
students high on schizotypy report a poor quality of life equivalent to those with severe 
mental illness in areas such as daily activities, relationships, and health, despite 
objective measures suggesting their lives are relatively better (Cohen, Auster, 
MacAulay, & McGovern, 2014). The reasons for this are unclear. It is possible that self-
reports are impacted by negativistic biases (Cohen et al., 2014); however it is also 
possible that subtle issues with cognition are disruptive enough to contribute to an 
overall sense of reduced wellbeing. As such, the experience of cognitive failures within 
the everyday lives of those with schizotypal traits warrants further understanding, even 






5. Specific Aims of Thesis 
5.1. Key questions and aims 
Several questions arise from the literature review presented in the preceding 
chapters. First, the reviews in Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that real world cognitive 
functioning is quite different to ability as measured objectively, and as such cognitive 
failures permit the exploration of cognitive capacity in everyday life. However, the 
ongoing debate in the literature as to the validity of self-reported measures of cognition 
must be addressed prior to exploring failures further. To what extent does self-
awareness of one’s own cognitive and psychological functioning influence or distort 
self-reports of cognitive failures? 
In terms of better understanding the mechanisms underpinning cognitive 
failures, it is apparent that both state and trait factors are known to influence 
vulnerability to failures, but how do these interact? Schizotypy is a trait consistently 
linked to cognitive failures, and this relationship is of particular interest given that 
problems with everyday cognition have been proposed to be a marker for psychosis risk 
(Pfeifer et al., 2009). However, what is not yet known are the mechanisms through 
which people high on schizotypy tend to be more prone to failures. Both schizotypy and 
cognitive failures share a relationship with affect, therefore does emotional reactivity 
lead to heightened failures in schizotypes? If so, can we reduce the gap between 





stimuli to elicit reduced performance in schizotypes, similar to the issues they report in 
daily life?  
This thesis presents an attempt to answer these questions through a sequence of 
three empirical papers, with the hypotheses and individual studies described below. 
5.2. Hypotheses 
Specific hypotheses for each of these studies will be presented within each chapter. 
However, there are some broad main hypotheses for the combined findings of this 
thesis, which are presented here: 
1. Self-reported cognitive failures will not be distorted by self-awareness or 
neuroticism. 
2. High schizotypes will report increased cognitive failures in daily life. 
3. High schizotypes’ increased emotional reactivity will contribute to their 
experience of increased cognitive failures in daily life.  
Secondary hypotheses related to this are: 
a. Negative affect will mediate the relationship between schizotypy and 
cognitive failures.  
b. High schizotypes will also exhibit a relative deficit in performance on 
objectively-assessed neuropsychological working memory tasks 
containing emotional (vs. neutral) stimuli. 
Figure 5.1 on the following page depicts the relevant variables for each of the papers 











To address these hypotheses, the empirical research chapters are as follows: 
Chapter 6: Self-reported cognitive failures: Neurotic complaints or valid measure of 
real world cognition?  
This initial study will facilitate exploration of whether self-reports of cognitive 
failures correlate with informant ratings, and whether level of neuroticism or self-
awareness alter this relationship. This will provide information as to whether self-
reports of cognitive failures reflect biases of self-perception, and therefore the extent to 
which self-reported failures can be considered to have utility as a means of measuring 
everyday cognition. 
Chapter 7: Schizotypy and cognitive failures: Mediating role for affect.  
The second study will involve an initial exploration of the association between 
schizotypy and cognitive failures in a large sample.  Negative affect will also be 
measured in order to explore whether it acts as a mediator or moderator in the 
schizotypy-cognitive failures relationship.   
Chapter 8: Do complaints of everyday cognitive failures in high schizotypy relate to 
emotional working memory deficits in the lab? 
The third study will maintain the focus on the impact of emotion on cognition in 
schizotypy. It will be used to examine the effect of emotional stimuli on objectively-
assessed working memory performance. Of particular interest will be whether high 
schizotypes show a relative deficit for emotional vs. neutral content, and which types of 






cognitive failures accounts for differences in cognitive functioning in schizotypy will 
also be considered.  





















This chapter is based on a paper currently in preparation. It has previously undergone 
review at Personality and Individual Differences. 
 
Carrigan, N. & Barkus, E. (manuscript in preparation). Self-reported cognitive failures: 








Little is known about cognitive functioning as it occurs outside of the lab, during 
the course of everyday life. One way to explore this is through subjective self-reports of 
cognitive slips and errors. However, it is unclear whether self-perceptions are useful as 
measures of cognition, or whether they are biased by level of self-awareness of their 
own functioning. This paper will be used to examine the extent to which subjective self-
reports of cognitive errors may be considered reliable as a measure of everyday 
cognition.     
6.1.1. Self-reported cognitive failures 
Cognitive failures refer to common errors in cognition and action that occur during 
the course of daily activities, such as forgetting what you were looking for once you 
reach a room, or getting into the shower with your glasses still on. Importantly, 
cognitive failures occur during routine tasks that one has completed many times before, 
and as such reflect reduced capacity in the moment rather than an underlying deficit of 
ability. Current conceptualisations of cognitive failures would suggest that failures 
reflect trait proneness to slips, as well as the impact of fluctuations in transient factors 
such as mood, stress, environment, and time of day (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a). 
Proneness to cognitive failures can be captured via self-report measures that assess 
tendency towards experiencing a range of common slips, the most commonly used tool 







are normally distributed in the general population, although women tend to report 
slightly higher scores than men (Boomsma, 1998). The CFQ is associated with several 
real world outcomes such as university entrance exam scores (Unsworth et al., 2012) 
and the likelihood of being the at-fault driver in a car accident (Larson & Merritt, 1991). 
Therefore, self-reported failures appear to measure aspects of cognition relevant to real 
world functioning.   
6.1.2. Cognitive failures and neuroticism 
Cognitive failures are normal phenomena that are experienced by everyone from 
time to time. However, complaints of slips are increased in a range of psychological 
disorders, with individuals who have depressive disorders reporting the most markedly 
increased CFQ scores relative to controls (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016b). At the sub-
clinical level, negative affect, comprising aversive mood states and subjective distress 
(Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988), is related to cognitive failures.  For example, both 
state anxiety (Mahoney et al., 1998) and sadness (Farrin et al., 2003) correspond with 
increased frequency of cognitive failures. Similarly, trait neuroticism, which is 
associated with increased psychological distress and internalising psychopathology such 
as anxiety and depression (Aldinger et al., 2014; Hengartner, Ajdacic-Gross, Wyss, 
Angst, & Rössler, 2016), has been repeatedly linked to increased cognitive failures 
(Matthews et al., 1990a; Mecacci et al., 2004). Related literature has examined trait 
effortful control, a construct describing dispositional ability to maintain attention and 







Jentink, Drobes, & Evans, 2016). Researchers in this area have also found a close link 
between neuroticism, negative affectivity, and reduced cognitive control, suggesting 
that low capacity to regulate emotions results in high susceptibility to lapses in 
cognitive effort, or vice versa (Evans & Rothbart, 2007, 2009). Increased vulnerability 
to distress, whether manifested sub-clinically (e.g., high neuroticism scores) or 
clinically (e.g., depressive disorder), therefore appears to be important in determining 
proneness to cognitive failures in everyday life.  
However, the link between neuroticism and self-reported cognitive failures has 
raised concerns regarding the impact of self-awareness, being the ability to direct 
attention towards the self and accurately observe one’s own level of cognitive 
functioning, on the reporting of failures. It has been suggested that those who score 
highly on neuroticism tend to exaggerate reports of cognitive problems relative to their 
actual performance due to their negative self-appraisal style. That is, neurotic 
individuals may perceive their cognitive functioning to be worse than it actually is due 
to a negative bias. Therefore, the “complaint hypothesis” of increased failures in those 
scoring highly on neuroticism would suggest that self-reported cognition reflects a 
disposition to complain about one’s own cognition, rather than a reflection of how an 
observer might perceive them to move through their daily life (Wilhelm et al., 2010). 
This hypothesis is thought to be supported by correlations between cognitive failures, 
neuroticism, and dysfunctional aspects of self-consciousness (Wilhelm et al., 2010). 







lab-based measures and self-reports of cognitive failures means that subjective failures 
are not to be considered useful as a measure of everyday cognition (Horn, 1972; 
Wilhelm et al., 2010).  
Whilst many researchers in the field implicitly hold to the complaint hypothesis of 
cognitive failures (see Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a), there are other possible explanations 
for the link between cognitive failures and personality traits such as neuroticism. For 
example, a stress-vulnerability approach would posit that affective aspects of 
neuroticism may lead to the triggering of cognitive failures. Heightened emotional 
reactivity in neuroticism, being the tendency to experience heightened emotions in 
response to salient stimuli (Nock, Wedig, Holmberg, & Hooley, 2008), causes 
exaggerated physiological, psychological, and behavioural responses when evocative 
events occur (Ormel et al., 2013; Suls & Martin, 2005). Affective experiences trigger 
memory failures in neurotic individuals (Neupert et al., 2008), suggesting that everyday 
slips and failures too may occur as a kind of cognitive consequence of heightened 
emotional reactivity in neuroticism. Given the link between cognitive failures and 
negative affect, and the possible role of emotional reactivity in shaping everyday 
cognition in this group, it is important that the hypothesis that self-reported failures 








6.1.3. Role of self-awareness in self-reports of cognitive failures 
It is important to determine the extent to which level of self-awareness impacts or 
even distorts self-reported cognitive failures. The approach in current research has been 
to consider how well self-reported cognitive failures correspond to laboratory-assessed 
formal neurocognition. This has yielded no clear associations across studies (Carrigan 
& Barkus, 2016a). Laboratory-assessed neurocognition and the errors in thinking 
captured through cognitive failures could represent different facets of cognition. The 
myriad of emotions, stressors, and situations that shift and co-occur in everyday life 
simply cannot be replicated in the lab. It makes sense that real world settings are more 
likely to elicit errors than the idealistic conditions of the lab environment; thus, self-
reports of real world cognitive failures are likely to reveal problems that are quite 
different to those being studied in the lab. 
An alternative approach may be to compare self-reports of cognitive failures with 
those of someone who is close to the self-rater (e.g., a significant other). Although not 
objective in the sense of accepted gold-standard measures of cognitive performance, 
people who are in close contact have the opportunity to observe the behavioural 
outcomes of someone’s slips during daily life. There are several studies of self-observer 
comparisons of cognitive failures in traumatic brain injury (e.g., Robertson et al., 1997), 
dyslexia (e.g., Smith-Spark, Fawcett, Nicolson, & Fisk, 2004), and in polydrug users 
(e.g., Montgomery & Fisk, 2007). However, self-other comparisons for healthy 







Mahoney et al., 1998). Whilst the evidence is admittedly limited, the findings of 
moderate correlations in these studies suggest that self-reported failures reflect real slips 
in thinking that are reasonably observable to others. As such, comparison of observer 
and self-reports of cognitive failures is likely to yield information about whether self-
reported failure scores reflect real world cognition, or merely a tendency to complain. 
6.1.4. Current study 
The current study will be used to extend upon the existing research to explore the 
extent to which observer ratings and self-reports of cognitive failures correlate. In order 
to explore the accuracy of the complaint hypothesis of failures, the impact of 
neuroticism on the relationship between observed and self-reported cognitive failures 
will also be examined.  
Neuroticism is generally measured via self-report using tools such as the Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985), and similar to cognitive 
failures, self-reports correlate moderately with observer reports (Gomà-i-Freixanet, 
1997). However, unlike cognitive failures, self-reported neuroticism has long been 
viewed as a reliable measure of behavioural patterns that are reflective of this 
underlying trait, and these behaviours are generally considered to be observable. On this 
basis, level of correspondence between self- and observer-reports of neuroticism may be 
of use as an indicator of self-awareness of personality and psychological features. This 
is not an ideal measure of self-awareness, given the likely vast difference in internal 







comparison of self-perception and objective outcomes, and has been employed in 
studying a variety of factors and populations, including personality in healthy groups 
(Vazire, 2006), and cognition in brain injured patients (Fleming, Strong, & Ashton, 
1996). We therefore sought to determine whether disparity between observer and self-
ratings of neuroticism, as an indicator of general self-awareness of one’s own 
behavioural patterns, predicts greater disparity in self and observer-ratings of cognitive 
failures. 
It was hypothesized that neuroticism will be positively correlated with cognitive 
failures. It was also expected that observer and self-ratings of both failures and 
neuroticism will be moderately correlated. Two possible findings that would support the 
complaint hypothesis, that failures are distorted by poor self-awareness, were thought to 
be: 1) that the correlation between self and observer ratings of failures is reduced in 
high neuroticism relative to low neuroticism; and 2) that controlling for the effects of 
self-awareness also results in a reduction in the correlation between self and observer 
ratings of failures. Alternatively, if neither neuroticism nor self-awareness appeared to 










 Participants were 402 psychology undergraduate students whom provided self-
reports (targets), and each invited someone who saw them on a daily basis (e.g., partner, 
parent, sibling, or housemate) to be their informant. Target participants included 24% 
males, and had a mean age of 22.24 years (min = 18, max = 53, SD = 5.81). Informant 
participants included 46.3% males, and had a mean age of 29.82 years (min = 17, max = 
78, SD = 14.55). Information about ethnicity was not collected for either group. The 
makeup of relationship of informants to targets was as follows: partner/spouse 39.55%, 
parent 22.89%, close friend 16.17%, sibling 12.44%, housemate 6.22%, other relative 
1.74%, and son/daughter 1.00%.  
Data was collected from students between 2014 and 2016. Over three cohorts of 
students, 508 students overall completed the self-ratings. Of those participants and 
informants who provided data, 96% consented for its use in the research. 99 participants 
were excluded on the basis of missing, incomplete, or unmatched observer data. 
Inclusion criteria were open, with participants excluded only on the basis of having a 
psychotic or neurological disorder by self-report questionnaire (as per other personality 
research, e.g., Ettinger et al., 2005). This led to the exclusion of an additional seven 








6.2.2.1. Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 
The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982) is a 25-item 
self-report inventory used to assess slips in cognition experienced by the targets during 
the course of everyday life. The CFQ asks targets to indicate the perceived frequency 
with which they have experienced a list of common failures over the past six months; 
for example, “Do you find you forget what you came to the shops to buy?” The 
response format is a 5-point Likert-type scale (0 = never, and 4 = very often). Possible 
scores range from 0 to 100, with a higher score indicative of a greater propensity 
towards experiencing failures during daily life.  
Cronbach's alpha for the CFQ in the initial study was found to be .89 (Broadbent 
et al., 1982). The dimensionality of the CFQ has been a source of ongoing debate within 
the literature, with authors arguing alternatively for a unidimensional (e.g., Wallace, 
2004; Larson et al., 1997) or multidimensional (e.g., Wilhelm et al., 2010) model of the 
CFQ. Given the current study’s interest in self-awareness and observability of everyday 
failures in general, the decision was made to use the total CFQ score only. This was 
labelled as the variable CFQ-self. 
 The wording of each item on the CFQ was slightly modified in order to seek 
responses from informants regarding targets. For instance, the item previously worded 
as “Do you find you forget what you came to the shops to buy?” was re-worded to “Do 







Broadbent et al. (1982) have previously detailed a separate informant version, referred 
to as the CFQ-For-Others. This comprises eight items thought to be most easily 
apparent to those other than the individual who experiences the slips. Whilst it may be 
unlikely that even a significant other could observe all of the CFQ items (e.g., “Do you 
find yourself suddenly wondering whether you’ve used a word correctly?”), it is 
possible that they may be aware of this by virtue of knowing the other person very 
intimately.  Therefore, it was important for this study to compare self and informant 
responses on the full CFQ. The full CFQ score as rated by significant others is labelled 
as the variable CFQ-observer. 
6.2.2.2. Eysenck Personality Questionnaire 
The second questionnaire administered to targets was the Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985); the shortened 48 item version was 
used in this study. The EPQ has a yes/no format and assesses three facets of targets’ 
personality: Extraversion (e.g., “Are you rather lively?”), Neuroticism (e.g., “Are your 
feelings easily hurt?”), and Psychoticism (e.g., “Do you prefer to go your own way 
rather than act by the rules?”), as well as including a Lie scale (e.g., “If you say you will 
do something, do you always keep your promise no matter how inconvenient it might 
be?”).  All measures have good internal consistency and test–retest reliability, with the 
exception of psychoticism ( Eysenck & Eysenck, 1994). For the purposes of the current 
study, neuroticism (N) was the only scale of interest. In the same way as the CFQ, the 







item listed above, this was re-worded to “Are their feelings easily hurt?” The two 
variables in the analyses are labelled as N-self and N-observer. 
6.2.3. Procedure 
The study was approved by the institution’s human research ethics committee. As 
part of their coursework in a second year personality psychology subject, student 
participants were first asked to complete an online survey relating to their own 
experience and behaviour.  Following this, they were asked to request an informant to 
complete a modified version of the same survey. Targets were clearly instructed 
verbally and in writing to select an informant who knew them well and saw them every 
day or nearly every day, such as a partner, parent, sibling, housemate, or very close 
friend. Targets were asked to create and input an individualised code for their data, and 
to provide their informant with this in order to facilitate data matching.  
In the second stage of data collection, informants were instructed to complete the 
questionnaires with regards to their observations of the target’s experiences and 
behaviour. Informants were provided information about the questionnaire and study in 
written form only (i.e., via the first page of the online survey). It was emphasized to 
them their participation was not compulsory, and that their decision to participate or not 
would have no impact on their target’s coursework outcomes. Students examined their 
own data in the context of the course to gain an understanding of the observability of 
personality. Students and informants were also both asked for consent for the use of 







6.2.4. Statistical analyses 
Alongside the measured variables, two additional variables were calculated for the 
analyses: CFQ-disparity and N-disparity. CFQ-disparity was calculated by subtracting 
CFQ-observer ratings from CFQ-self ratings, such that a negative score would indicate 
under-reporting of one’s cognitive failures relative to objective reports, while a positive 
score would indicate over-reporting of one’s cognitive failures relative to objective 
reports. Similarly, N-disparity reflected subtraction of N-observer from N-self scores, 
with a negative score reflecting under-reporting of one’s own neuroticism relative to 
objective reports, and a positive score reflecting over-reporting. Absolute values (CFQ-
disparity-ab; N-disparity-ab) were also calculated to allow examination of the 
magnitude of difference in self vs. other reports separate to direction of self-reporting. 
As both self and observer reports of the N scale of the EPQ are widely accepted as a 
reliable measure of behavioural tendencies reflecting trait neuroticism, the N-disparity 
score was utilised as a measure of self-awareness in the current study.  
 Cronbach’s alpha was calculated to examine the internal consistency of the CFQ 
for this sample. Linearity of the association between self- and observer-reports was 
assessed using a hierarchical multiple regression approach.  
T-tests were conducted to look at sex differences for the CFQ, N, and related 
measures. Cohen’s d was used to examine effect sizes for sex differences, and effect 
sizes were considered in line with Cohen’s (1988) classification: trivial (Cohen's d ≤ .2), 







Correlations were calculated to examine relationships between variables, and the 
self and observer scores. Separate correlations were calculated for groups at different 
levels of neuroticism and self-awareness. A mean split was conducted on neuroticism 
scores to enable comparison of CFQ self-observer correspondence for those at either 
extreme of the neuroticism continuum; those with higher than average vs. lower than 
average levels of neuroticism. Additionally, r-to-Z transformations were conducted to 
enable comparison of groups for differences on these via an ANOVA.  A regression 
analysis was utilised to determine whether magnitude of discrepancy in neuroticism 
scores predicted discrepancy in cognitive failures scores. Partial correlations were also 
conducted to confirm these findings by controlling for the effects of neuroticism and 
self-awareness on the self-observer CFQ relationship, and Z-scores were calculated to 
enable comparison of the magnitude of self-other discrepancy for cognitive failures vs. 
neuroticism.  
6.3. Results 
6.3.1. Descriptive statistics and sex differences  
The 2014 cohort of participants included 133 students (24.06% males) with mean 
age 22.05 (SD = 5.45); the 2015 cohort 136 students (23.53% males) with mean age 
22.94 (SD = 6.62); and the 2016 cohort 133 students (24.06% males) with mean age 
21.71 (SD = 5.22). There were no significant differences in age or sex between cohorts, 







Internal reliability for both CFQ-self and CFQ-observer were excellent, where 
Cronbach’s alpha was α = .91 for each. T-tests revealed target sex differences on a 
number of variables; see Table 6.1. Supporting the past literature, both CFQ-self and N-
self were higher for women than men. CFQ-observer and N-observer were similarly 
elevated for women, suggesting that heightened failures and neuroticism did not simply 
reflect exaggerations in reporting on the part of women. Effect sizes indicated that most 
of the sex differences were small, although there was a large difference for N-observer 
scores which suggests that informants of female targets notice far more neuroticism 
than do those of male targets. CFQ-disparity scores did not differ according to sex, 
further supporting that sex did not differentially impact propensity to over- or under-
report one’s own cognitive failures. Although absolute disparity scores did not differ, 
men did have a slightly greater positive disparity in neuroticism scores, suggesting that 














Classification of effect sizes: trivial (Cohen's d ≤ .2); * small (Cohen's d > .2); ** moderate (Cohen's d > .5); *** large (Cohen's d > .8); 
**** very large (Cohen's d > 1.3). 
Table 6.1.  
Mean Differences in Ratings Between Male and Female Targets 
 
Variable Male Female 95% CI of the 
difference 
   
 M SD M SD Lower Upper t p  Effect size 
Cohen’s d 
CFQ-self 36.19 13.16 43.33 14.82 -10.48 -3.81 -4.21 <.001 - 0.49* 
CFQ-observer 29.24 14.89 34.87 13.44 -8.81 -2.44 -3.47 .001 - 0.41* 
CFQ-disparity 6.95 15.09 8.46 17.17 -5.37 2.34 -.77 .44 - 0.09 
CFQ-disparity-ab 13.07 10.39 14.64 12.31 -4.09 .95 -1.23 .22 0.14 
N-self 4.74 3.44 6.95 3.42 -3.01 -1.43 -5.51 <.001 - 0.65** 
N-observer 3.06 2.58 6.19 3.54 -3.78 -2.47 -9.37 <.001 - 0.94*** 
N-disparity 1.67 3.05 0.77 3.59 0.10 1.71 2.22 .03 0.26* 







The impact of informant sex on ratings of targets and disparity scores were also 
examined; see Table 6.2. Neither CFQ-observer nor CFQ-disparity showed any 
difference according to whether the informant was male or female. However, there was 
a moderate effect for sex on N-observer, with males rating targets as slightly higher in 
neuroticism than females. There was also a small effect for sex on N-disparity, with 
female informants associated with a larger positive disparity (i.e., self-ratings higher 
than observer-ratings), suggesting that females tend to perceive their close others as less 
neurotic than their close others view themselves. However, absolute magnitude of 














Classification of effect sizes: trivial (Cohen's d ≤ .2); * small (Cohen's d > .2); ** moderate (Cohen's d > .5); *** large (Cohen's d > .8); 
**** very large (Cohen's d > 1.3)
Table 6.2 
Mean Differences in Ratings Between Male and Female Informants 
Variable Male Female 95% CI of the 
difference 
   
 M SD M SD Lower Upper t p  Effect size 
Cohen’s d 
CFQ-observer 33.72 13.56 33.35 14.40 -2.39 3.13 .26 .79 0.03 
CFQ-disparity 8.06 16.96 8.15 16.50 -3.38 3.19 -.06 .96 -0.01 
CFQ-disparity-ab 14.79 11.53 13.76 12.20 -1.30 3.37 .87 .38 0.09 
N-observer 6.18 3.63 4.81 3.44 0.68 2.07 3.89 <.001 0.52** 
N-disparity 0.42 3.37 1.47 3.51 -1.73 -0.38 -3.06 .002 -0.31* 







6.3.2. Correlations between variables  
Linearity of the association between CFQ-self and CFQ-observer was assessed 
using a hierarchical multiple regression approach. While the linear model was 
significant (F(1,400) = 47.22, p < .001), adding a quadratic component to the CFQ self-
observer relationship did not result in a change in R2 (F(1,399) = .10, p = .75). This 
confirmed the relationship to be linear rather than quadratic.  
Associations between cognitive failures and neuroticism, and observer and self-
reports were examined, with descriptive statistics for the entire sample displayed in 
Table 6.3. Correlation coefficients differed for male and female targets, however as 
differences were slight and correlations remained significant at the same level, data is 
presented only for the combined group. Separate tables for each sex are included in 
Appendix B. As expected, cognitive failures and neuroticism were significantly related, 
and there were also significant associations between observer and self-reports of both 
variables. CFQ-self was moderately positively correlated with N-self (r = .40, p < .001) 
and with CFQ-observer (r = .33, p < .01), and more weakly with N-observer (r = .19, p 
< .001). Similarly, CFQ-observer was weakly positively correlated with N-observer (r = 
.23, p <.001) and N-self (r = .10, p < .05). The largest correlation evident in this study 
was between N-self and N-observer (r = .52, p < .01).  
CFQ-disparity and N-disparity were also positively correlated (r = .30, p <.01), as 
were the absolute scores (r = .23, p <.01). This relationship was linear (F(1,400) = 







which was not significant (F(1,399) = 0.2, p = .90). It appears that these new variables 
behave in the same way as the raw CFQ and N variables.    
To enable further comparison of the discrepancies between self- and observer-
reports, Z-scores were calculated for CFQ- and N-disparity relative to the sample’s 
average standard deviation. Although both were positive rather than negative in 
direction, CFQ-disparity scores were significantly larger (M = 0.24, SD = 0.50) than N-
disparity scores (M = 0.14, SD = 0.50; t(401) = 3.42, p =.001), This suggests that 
cognitive failures are either slightly more difficult to self-report or alternatively for 
others to observe than neuroticism; however the size of deviation remains relatively 
small. 
Table 6.3  
Descriptive Statistics for Self, Observer, and Disparity Scores for All Target 
Participants 
Variable Mean S.D. 
CFQ-self 41.63 14.73 
CFQ-observer 33.55 13.97 
CFQ-disparity 8.11 16.69 
CFQ-disparity-ab 14.24 11.89 
N-self 6.43 3.55 
N-observer 5.44 3.59 
N-disparity 0.99 3.48 








6.3.3. Effects of neuroticism on the relationship between self and observer ratings 
of CFQ 
 The effect of neuroticism (self-rated) on the correlation between CFQ-self and 
CFQ-observer was explored via a mean split of participants into high and low 
neuroticism groups. Mean N for the high group was 9.45 (SD = 1.96) and for the low 
3.35 (SD = 1.96); these differed significantly (t(400) = -33.89, p < .05). Correlations 
between CFQ self and observer were r = .34 for the high group and r = .31 for the low; 
both were significant at p < .01. A Fisher’s r-to-Z transformation was performed to 
enable comparison of these correlation coefficients. There was no statistically 
significant difference between groups, (z = 0.11, p = .46), suggesting that the 
relationship between observer and self-ratings of cognitive failures is not altered by 
being high on neuroticism. 
 Given that neuroticism is correlated with both self and observer ratings of CFQ, 
partial correlations were also run to confirm that controlling for self-rated neuroticism 
did not result in a reduction in self-observer correlations. There was a moderate positive 
correlation between CFQ-self and CFQ-observer when controlling for neuroticism 
which was statistically significant (r = .31, p < .001). This differed little from the zero-
order correlation between CFQ-self and CFQ-observer, supporting that neuroticism had 







6.3.4. Effect of self-awareness on relationship between CFQ self and observer 
ratings 
6.3.4.1. Direction of discrepancy in self vs. observer-reports 
An ANOVA was also conducted to examine whether the relationship between self 
and observer CFQ ratings was impacted by self-awareness, as measured by N-disparity 
which compared self and observer ratings of neuroticism. Participants were split into 
three groups: 1) those with a positive disparity score (i.e., self-rated as higher on 
neuroticism than observed; n = 210); 2) those with a disparity score of zero (i.e., self-
rated as having the same neuroticism as observed, n = 68); and 3) those with a negative 
disparity score (i.e., self-rated as having lower neuroticism than observed; n = 124). The 
demographic makeup of these groups was as follows: 1) 26.67% male, age M = 22.43, 
SD = 6.12; 2) 26.47% male, age M = 20.40, SD = 1.43; 3) 17.74% male, M = 21.94, SD 
= 4.98. No differences were evident in participant sex (χ(1) = 3.72, p = .16) or age (F(2, 
401) = .80, p = .45) between these groups, suggesting that there are no clear differences 
in self-awareness whether male or female, younger or older. 
Correlations between CFQ-self and CFQ-observer were altered slightly for each 
group but all remained in the moderate range. For the positive disparity group, r = .32; 
no disparity group, r = .46; and negative disparity group, r = .33. For all groups, this 
relationship remained significant at p < .01. In addition, a Fisher’s r-to-Z transformation 
indicated there were no statistically significant differences between the no disparity vs. 







groups (z = 1.01, p = .16), or the positive vs. negative groups (z = -0.10, p = .46).  This 
suggests that direction of self-awareness (i.e., heightened or lowered) did not 
differentially impact the relationship between observed and self-ratings of cognitive 
failures. Partial correlations were also examined to confirm that the relationship 
between self and informant ratings of CFQ remained unchanged when controlling for 
self-awareness. There was again a moderate positive correlation between CFQ-self and 
CFQ-observer when controlling for N-disparity which was statistically significant (r = 
.37, p < .001). This differed little from the zero-order correlation between CFQ-self and 
CFQ-observer, further supporting that self-awareness had little influence in the 
relationship. 
6.3.4.2. Magnitude of discrepancy in self vs. observer-reports 
As above, a partial correlation of CFQ-self and CFQ-other controlling for N-
disparity-ab produced similar results to the original zero-order correlation (r = .33, p < 
.001). Instead of a group analysis, a simple linear regression analysis was conducted to 
determine whether magnitude of discrepancy in self vs. observer-reports of neuroticism 
(i.e., N-disparity-ab) predicted discrepancy in self vs. observer-reports of cognitive 
failures. This was significant, F(1, 400) = 22.90, p = < .001. However,  R2 was 
relatively small (.05). Although self-awareness does shape the magnitude to which self-









6.3.5. Effects of relationship type on relationship between CFQ self and observer 
ratings 
 The final analysis sought to determine whether the type of relationship between 
target and informant had any impact on the CFQ self-observer relationship. The base 
rate of couple participants (i.e., those whose informants specified themselves as being 
either partner or spouse to their target) was biased in comparison to other informants, 
with 39.55% compared to the next highest being parents at 22.89% (refer to methods in 
section 6.2.1 for detailed breakdown). As such, we conducted a partial correlation 
controlling for type of relationship using a dummy coded variable specifying whether 
the informant was a partner or non-partner to the target. The partial correlation produced 
was moderate (r = .33, p <.001), and was identical to the zero-order correlation between 
CFQ-self and CFQ-observer. This suggests that different types of informants did not 
differentially influence the relationship between self and observer ratings. 
6.4. Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to extend previous research regarding the 
relationship between cognitive failures and neuroticism. Of interest was whether self-
reported cognitive failures are best understood as a measure of real world cognitive 
slips, or rather, as a tool distorted by self-awareness and primarily reflecting propensity 







Supporting previous findings, being high on neuroticism was associated with an 
increased level of self-reported cognitive failures (Broadbent et al., 1982; Merckelbach 
et al., 1996; Wilhelm et al., 2010). In addition, observer ratings were moderately 
correlated with self-reports of failures. This suggests that the behavioural consequences 
of cognitive failures are relatively observable to other people, or at least those who 
spend a substantial amount of time in close proximity. However, whilst an association 
between self-reported and observed cognitive failures is clear, it is by no means strong. 
Additionally, overall, the magnitude of discrepancy between self-observer CFQ scores 
was higher than that seen for neuroticism. Although this difference was small, it might 
suggest that cognitive failures are less easy to objectively observe than behaviour 
associated with neuroticism. The nature of many cognitive failures is such that they are 
subtle, and not readily noticed by others. As such, one would not expect a perfect 
correlation between proneness to failures as perceived by the subject and those noted by 
another person, even a significant or close other. Neurotic behaviours may hold more 
valence than cognitive failures due to their potential for a negative emotional impact on 
both the self and other, therefore making them slightly more memorable. Whilst the two 
previous studies utilising informants  (Broadbent et al., 1982; Mahoney et al., 1998) 
tried to address this problem by using the adjusted CFQ-For-Others, including only a 
few items deemed observable, it is interesting to note that the current use of the entire 
CFQ yielded similar results. Although failures may vary widely in their form and 







perceived and reported on by other people. Thus, this finding lends some support to the 
idea that self-reported failures reflect actual problems with cognition in everyday life, 
rather than an indication of self-perceptions. 
 Further combatting the complaint hypothesis of self-reported cognitive failures, 
being high or low on neuroticism did not differentially impact the relationship between 
self or observer rated cognitive failures. People higher on neuroticism do not seem to be 
more likely to inflate reports of problems than those lower in neuroticism, which would 
have been reflected by a larger disparity with observer ratings.  In addition, there was no 
clear change in the relationship between observed and self-reported cognitive failures 
according to level of self-awareness of behavioural patterns associated with 
neuroticism. Individuals who rated their own neuroticism at the same level as that 
observed by their informant did not demonstrate significantly higher self-observer CFQ 
correlations than those who tended to either exaggerate or minimise their neuroticism 
compared with observer ratings.  
In summary, whilst it would be illogical to argue that any self-report measure is 
in no way impacted by self-awareness, in the case of cognitive failures, reporting does 
not seem to be significantly “contaminated” by this, as per Wilhelm et al.’s concerns 
(2010). Rather, self-reported cognitive failures seem to reflect vulnerability to 
committing actual (rather than imagined) cognitive slips, with the resultant behavioural 







that people higher on neuroticism genuinely experience more problems with cognition 
in their day-to-day lives.  
6.4.1. Limitations 
Although psychological research informants are widely treated as providing a 
more objective means of measuring aspects of real world personality and functioning 
than self-reports, there are certainly limitations to this approach that must be considered. 
For example, the term “complaint” implies that neurotic individuals may vocalise 
concerns about their cognition, not only in the context of direct questioning via the 
CFQ, but perhaps also more generally to those close to them. Hence, rather than 
providing observations of the outcomes of failures, informants may be unduly 
influenced by their significant others’ perceptions of themselves. This has implications 
for the use of self-observer disparity scores as a measure of self-awareness. Setting 
observer information as the bar against which self-observations are deemed as either 
reflective of reality or not has the potential to be very flawed. However, it is not yet 
clear what other methods may yield a more objective (and practicable) measure of 
cognitive functioning as it occurs in the course of daily life. 
In addition, it is possible that the personalities of informants might influence the 
way in which they perceive others. Sticking with the theme at hand, a neurotic 
informant may be more likely to view their target in an unrealistically favourable light 
due to comparisons based on their own negative self-view (Buunk, Van der Zee, & 







with female informants – known to be higher on neuroticism than males - tending to 
rate their targets as less neurotic than targets viewed themselves. However, males 
comprised only a quarter of the sample of targets; hence whilst findings regarding sex 
differences were in the expected direction given past research into cognitive failures and 
neuroticism, they must be taken with caution. Another limitation of the current research 
is that it did not collect self-reports of informant personalities alongside their 
observations of targets, and therefore cannot rule these potential biases in or out. We 
can only assume that observer reports represent somewhat “pure” observations of their 
targets’ behaviour; an assumption that is widely held by the large portion of 
psychological research that relies on informant ratings of behaviour (Simms, Zelazny, 
Yam, & Gros, 2010). Future studies that capture both target and informant 
characteristics are required to critically evaluate these assumptions. 
It has been suggested that in dyadic research, married couples tend to have more 
similar observer and self-ratings than other types of dyads (Watson, Hubbard, & Wiese, 
2000). The current mixed sample could have resulted in a lowering of self-observer 
correlations for cognitive failures. Nevertheless, the level of association identified here 
was very similar to that identified in Broadbent et al.’s (1982) original study of married 
couples, which produced correlations of r = .32 for male and r = .36 for female spouses. 
The similarity between the current findings and those of Broadbent et al. suggest type of 
relationship is unlikely to pose a large problem for this approach to researching 







healthy population also used a mixed sample, and in that case a slightly higher 
correlation of r = .50 was observed (Mahoney et al., 1998). Further supporting this, no 
differences were evident in the relationship between self and observer-reported 
cognitive failures when controlling for whether informants were romantic partners of 
targets or non-targets. Future studies would ideally capture more information about the 
types and nature of relationships between targets and informants (e.g., whether living 
together, length of relationship), to determine the extent to which this may impact 
apparent observability. 
Finally, the sample used in the current study was essentially one of convenience. 
Subjects were all undergraduate psychology students, and informants were all 
significant people close to students; as such both groups of participants may have 
differed significantly to other groups in the general population. For example, 
surprisingly given the known cognitive decline with age, older adults tend to report 
equivalent or even fewer cognitive slips compared with younger people (Kramer et al., 
1994; Mecacci & Righi, 2006). It has been suggested that this may reflect a reduced 
ability to self-monitor (Harty et al., 2013), and indeed a greater disparity between self 
and observer-rated cognitive failures has been reported for older vs. younger adults 
(Harty et al., 2013).  As such, generalisation of the current findings to the broader 
population requires caution, and future studies comparing different groups based on age 
and other factors is required. Nevertheless, the current use of students as subjects was a 







was required from pairs of people, and which therefore meant that recruitment was to 
some extent reliant on participants.  
6.4.2. Implications and directions for future research 
The current findings suggest that self-reported cognitive failures provide a useful 
indication of vulnerability to cognitive errors in everyday life. Although measures like 
the CFQ may not correlate highly with neuropsychological assessments of cognitive 
ability (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a), the behavioural outcomes of cognitive failures are 
evident to other people. This lends support to our previous conceptualisation of self-
reported cognitive failures as measuring something other than the maximal ability 
usually assessed in the lab; rather, they provide an indication of how this translates into 
capacity for thinking in day-to-day contexts (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a).  
Alongside refining the current conceptualisation of cognitive failures, these 
findings highlight the everyday experience of people high on neuroticism as one that 
involves frequent disruptions to and lapses in cognition. At the upper end of the 
neuroticism spectrum, this may be to the extent that failures reduce quality of life, as 
failures have the ability to contribute to serious failings including car accidents (Larson 
& Merritt, 1991). Following on from this, the link between neuroticism and 
psychopathology such as anxiety and depression raises the question: does the 
experience of cognitive failures play any role in facilitating movement along the 
spectrum of risk from health to disorder? One proposal made by Carriere, Cheyne, and 







to slips and failures in thinking – plays a causal role in the development of depression 
by reducing the ability to connect with the external world.  
It is beyond the scope of the current study to elucidate the mechanism through 
which neuroticism and failures may be related. However, it is possible that heightened 
emotional reactivity means that the multitude of emotions and stressors faced in 
everyday life lead to frequent disruptions to cognition. Several existing findings support 
this. People high on neuroticism experience more stressors in daily life and react with 
more extreme emotions (Suls & Martin, 2005), and an experience sampling study found 
that they also experience more memory failures on days in which they face stressors 
(Neupert et al., 2008). The next step in research into cognitive failures will therefore be 
to further explore whether negative affect and emotional reactivity contribute to the 
mechanism through which individuals with neuroticism and related personality traits are 
more prone to slips.  
6.4.3. Conclusions 
The current study supports a view of self-reported cognitive failures as a useful 
measure of tendency to experience disruptions to cognition in everyday life. Whilst 
increased neuroticism is consistently associated with increased reports of failures, it 
does not weaken the relationship between self-reported and observed cognitive failure 
scores. As such, people high on neuroticism appear to genuinely be more prone to 
problems with cognition in their daily lives, and are not just providing exaggerated 







Further study is required to determine which factors contribute to the mechanism by 
which some people tend to experience more slips and failures, with aspects of 
neuroticism which may disrupt everyday cognition, such as negative affect and 
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7.1.1. Cognitive failures in schizotypy 
Schizotypy is a cluster of personality features found along the psychosis 
continuum, which proposes a theoretical, psychological, and biological link between 
psychotic phenomena in the general population and diagnosed psychotic disorders. The 
psychosis continuum refers to a theoretical spectrum of risk for schizophrenia and 
related psychotic disorders, along which individuals, both healthy or with a clinical 
diagnosis, are distributed. Individuals at the upper end of the spectrum are highest in 
psychosis-proneness, and, therefore, are at greatest theoretical risk of developing mental 
health disorders such as schizotypal personality disorder and schizophrenia (Johns & 
van Os, 2001). Schizotypy is one construct useful for examining this continuum. Meehl 
(Meehl, 1962, 1990) conceptualised schizotypy as a personality structure characterised 
by social dysfunction, unusual perceptual experiences, and cognitive disorganisation. 
This is thought to reflect an anomalous neurological makeup which may or may not 
result in a psychotic disorder. Later conceptualisations have been more clinical in 
nature, focusing on attenuated psychotic symptoms (Claridge, 1997) which are state-
based. An updated understanding of the schizotypy construct incorporates both stable 
personality features and propensity for psychosis-like symptoms that may fluctuate 
according to changes in environment. Supporting its utility in examining the psychosis 
continuum, schizotypy appears to be fully-dimensional, being normally distributed 







Phillips, 2013). In addition, a shared genetic component for schizotypy and psychosis 
has also been identified (Moreno Samaniego et al., 2011; Vollema et al., 2002). These 
data collectively point to an overlap between schizotypy and vulnerability for 
schizophrenia, therefore consideration of symptom expression in schizotypy will 
contribute towards our understanding of the factors underpinning vulnerability for 
psychotic disorders.  
Schizotypy is broader in scope than other psychosis continuum constructs such 
as at-risk mental states (ARMS) groups (Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015), which 
captures only those at imminent clinical risk of transitioning into psychosis (Simon et 
al., 2007) as opposed to the psychosis vulnerability present in the entire population. As 
such, only a relatively small subsection of people high on schizotypy will functionally 
decompensate and go on to seek help for their experiences (Debbané et al., 2015; 
Kwapil et al., 2013). It is proposed that a combination of psychological, biological and 
environmental factors act against the backdrop of endogenous vulnerability (i.e., high 
schizotypy) to push people along the psychosis continuum, so some individuals at the 
upper end of the continuum may go on to develop schizophrenia-spectrum disorders if 
sufficient stressors are encountered. In this way, schizotypy research may help to 
identify adverse factors which may act as triggers for illness onset, as well as exploring 
developmental trajectories in very early phases of risk and illness, even prior to a 







Another key benefit of schizotypy research is the identification of possible 
markers of risk such as biological anomalies and issues with emotion regulation, with 
difficulties with cognition being one of the most widely studied (Debbané et al., 2015; 
Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015).  Rather than focusing only on laboratory assessed 
cognitive performance, increasingly clinicians are interested in measures of cognitive 
capacity with relevance to an everyday setting. Cognitive failures or cognitive slips are 
interruptions to normal cognitive functioning that occur in the flow of everyday life. 
They include errors in thought or action, such as missing an appointment or forgetting 
what item you went to the supermarket to purchase. Importantly, cognitive failures are a 
normal experience that happen to everyone from time to time; they occur during tasks 
that are usually completed without incident and so do not reflect any underlying deficit 
of ability. Cognitive failures are often subtle, and at times may be detectable only to the 
person experiencing them. As such, failures are typically measured via self-report. 
Similar to schizophrenia patients (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016b), healthy individuals high 
in schizotypy, or “high schizotypes,” consistently report experiencing more cognitive 
failures than those low in schizotypy (Corcoran et al., 2013; Giesbrecht et al., 2007; 
Pfeifer et al., 2009). Along the psychosis continuum, such subjective complaints are 
made even in the absence of detectable objective neuropsychological deficits (Chan et 
al., 2011; Laws et al., 2008), which suggests that cognitive failures may be a marker of 
psychosis risk present prior to the onset of more marked, objectively-detectable 







exacerbating a vulnerability to cognitive failures in schizotypy remain largely 
unexamined. It is possible that negative affect may be one such factor. 
7.1.2. Negative affect in schizotypy 
A general pattern of high negative and low positive affect is evident in 
schizophrenia, familial, and psychometric schizotypy (Horan et al., 2008; David 
Watson, Clark, & Carey, 1988), contributing to a heightened subjective level of distress 
for these groups. As such, high schizotypes are thought to possess increased negative 
affectivity, a temperament-based predisposition (Horan et al., 2008) towards 
experiencing negative mood states such as fear, anxiety, disgust, sadness, and loneliness 
(Watson et al., 1988). Negative affectivity predicts anxiety and mood disorders, 
although in and of itself does not constitute a mental illness (Watson et al., 1988). On 
this background of generally high negative affect (or perhaps contributing to it), high 
schizotypes are also known to exhibit greater reactivity in response to emotional events 
and stimuli (Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, et al., 2003). High schizotypes with greater 
affective reactivity may be considered to have a low stress threshold, therefore negative 
affect may be more intensely and readily experienced. This may contribute to their 
movement along the psychosis continuum, possibly even from healthy into pre-morbid, 
or pre-morbid into illness states (Horan et al., 2008).  
Cognitive failures are also linked to affective reactivity (van den Bosch et al., 
1993). They are associated with a range of negative affects including anxiety at the level 







(Payne & Schnapp, 2014), stress (Boals & Banks, 2012), sub-clinical depression (Farrin 
et al., 2003), and guilt (Payne & Schnapp, 2014).  Given the shared link between 
negative affect and both schizotypy and cognitive failures, it may be that negative affect 
is a key contributor to high schizotypes’ experience of cognitive failures in their 
everyday lives. Cognitive failures and negative affect within schizotypy could be related 
to one another in two different ways. First, heightened failures reported by high 
schizotypes could result from their affective reactivity; a cognitive consequence of poor 
management of their responses to emotional stimuli. Conversely, it could also be argued 
that affective reactivity is itself caused by cognitive failures due to disruptions to 
processes involved in the effective regulation of emotion. It is difficult to ascertain 
which phenomenon precedes the other; indeed low mood, reduced stress tolerance, and 
mild cognitive complaints are all considered to be basic symptoms of psychosis-
proneness evident in pre-clinical individuals (Schultze-Lutter, 2009). However, periods 
of exposure to stressful environments have been found to lead to increased reporting of 
cognitive failures (Broadbent et al., 1982), suggesting that negative affective 
experiences may precede increases in everyday failures. Therefore, the approach taken 
in this paper is that negative affectivity in schizotypy more likely determines cognitive 
performance in daily life. 
7.1.3. Current study 
Despite the well-established relationship of both schizotypy and negative affect to 







stresses and demands experienced during the course of daily life have the potential to 
trigger both negative emotions and failures in cognition. High schizotypes’ greater 
negative affectivity and affective reactivity may increase the likelihood that emotional 
experiences will disrupt cognition in daily life, relative to other groups. As cognitive 
failures are thought to represent a marker of risk for psychosis, an understanding of if 
and how negative affect might exacerbate such problems could provide new direction 
for approaches in early intervention, such as cognitive remediation.  
 Within this study, an exploratory approach was taken to determine whether 
affect has a mediating or moderating effect on the relationship between schizotypy and 
cognitive failures. We focused on a young adult population, as this group is at 
heightened risk for the onset of mental illnesses (Kessler et al., 2007), and also tend to 
report higher levels of schizotypy than older adults (Bora & Baysan Arabaci, 2009). 
As per past findings, we expected that self-report schizotypy and cognitive 
failures would be moderately positively correlated at similar levels to those seen in 
other studies comparing the two constructs (e.g., r = .53, Giesbrecht, et al., 2007). We 
also expected that negative affect would positively correlate with both schizotypy and 
cognitive failures. As noted earlier, being high on schizotypy is associated with the 
experience of a greater level of negative affectivity. Similarly, negative affect also 
forms part of the symptomatology of schizophrenia (Horan et al., 2008). Given that both 







hypothesis was that negative affect would mediate the relationship between schizotypy 
and cognitive failures.  
An alternative, but we believed less likely hypothesis, was that negative affect 
would moderate the relationship between schizotypy and cognitive failures. Given that 
emotional reactivity is also a feature of schizotypy, perhaps the presence of negative 
affect is a requirement for heightened failures to be experienced by individuals high in 
schizotypy. That is, only people high in schizotypy and also experiencing high negative 
affect report increased cognitive failures.  
7.2. Methods 
7.2.1. Participants 
 An online survey comprising several questionnaires was administered to test 
these hypotheses. 863 young adults (251 male) aged between 18 and 25 years (M = 
19.5, SD = 1.87) completed the survey. Participants were primarily recruited from an 
undergraduate course in psychology, with some drawn from the broader community in 
New South Wales, Australia. Around one third of Australians in this age group attend a 
higher education institution (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008), and many of the 
papers within schizotypy research have utilised student populations (Corcoran et al., 
2013; Giesbrecht et al., 2007). As such, this sample is appropriate for this study that 
aims to expand our understanding of relationships between variables as identified in 







participants were to be excluded only on the basis of a psychotic or neurological 
disorder as indicated by self-report questionnaire (as per other personality research, e.g., 
Ettinger et al., 2005). As no participants indicated any such disorder, none were 
removed from the analyses. 
7.2.2. Instruments 
7.2.2.1. Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire 
The Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) (Raine, 1991) is a 74-item self-
report scale designed to screen non-psychiatric populations for schizotypy with strong 
internal (.90 - .91) and test-retest (.82) reliability. The SPQ has three dimensions 
measuring cognitive-perceptual, interpersonal, and disorganised aspects of schizotypy. 
Participants are asked to provide a yes/no response to questions such as, “Do you often 
feel nervous when you are in a group of unfamiliar people?” Responses are summed to 
determine subscale scores, and an overall score is determined by summing endorsed 
items, for a maximum score of 74. Although the multiple dimensions of schizotypy 
mean it is a heterogeneous construct, all dimensions are closely associated with each 
other (Raine et al., 1994) such that possession of one feature (e.g., unusual cognitive-
perceptual experiences) increases the likelihood of possessing the other features. As 
such, total SPQ score provides a reflection of the extent to which one exhibits a 
schizotypal personality structure.  
 Whilst there are several schizotypy measures in existence, the SPQ has been 







attenuated psychotic symptoms such as ideas of reference, and personality-based 
features of schizotypy such as social anxiety and odd behaviour, and as such is useful 
for both clinical and non-clinical populations (Raine, 1991). As a measure of 
schizotypy, it is thought to be representative of the psychosis continuum, and its normal 
distribution (Johns & van Os, 2001) means that individuals with higher SPQ scores can 
usefully be considered to be higher along the psychosis continuum. It has been widely 
used as such in a variety of previous studies (e.g., Barrantes-Vidal et al., 2015; Koychev 
et al., 2012; Noguchi, Hori, & Kunugi, 2008).  
7.2.2.2. Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 
 The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982) is a 25-item 
self-report inventory of errors in cognition experienced in the course of everyday life. 
The CFQ asks participants to indicate the perceived frequency with which they have 
experienced a list of common failures of memory, perception, and action over the past 
six months; for example, “Do you fail to hear people speaking to you when you are 
doing something else?” The response format is a 5-point Likert-type scale (0 = Never, 
and 4 = Very Often). Possible scores range from 0 to 100, with a higher score indicative 
of a greater propensity towards experiencing failures during daily life. Cronbach's alpha 
for the CFQ in the initial study was found to be .89 (Broadbent et al., 1982).  
It is important to note that the factor structure of the CFQ has been a source of 
ongoing debate within the literature, with authors arguing alternatively for a 







Wilhelm et al., 2010) approach. The primary focus of this study was total CFQ score, 
however the subscales associated with Wallace et al.’s (2002) widely used four-factor 
model were also analysed. Depression Anxiety Stress Scale  
          The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS; S. Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
comprise three subscales that measure negative affectivity. The measure allows for 
differentiation between symptoms of depression and anxiety, as well as capturing more 
general tension and coping via the stress subscale. Participants are asked to what extent 
each statement applied to them over the week using a 4 point Likert-type scale (0 = Did 
not apply to me at all, and 3 = Applied to me very much, or most of the time). The 
DASS has good internal consistency as indexed by Cronbach’s alpha in both clinical 
samples, α = .88 - .96 (Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997) and non-clinical 
samples, α = .81- .91 (P. Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). As depression, anxiety, and 
stress all tend to predict increased cognitive failures, we chose to utilize the DASS-21 
total score (maximum = 63) instead of the subscales. This total score has previously 
been used as a reliable measure of negative affect/general psychological distress (Henry 
& Crawford, 2005). 
7.2.3. Procedure  
The study was approved by the institution’s human research ethics committee. 
Participants were invited to complete the study via the undergraduate research 
participation scheme website, flyers, emails, and word of mouth. A website address was 







completion of the questionnaires. Student participants were offered a small amount of 
course credit for their participation (i.e., 0.5 of 3 credits required for the semester, 
representing half an hour of survey completion). 
7.2.4. Data analysis 
Key variables in the analyses were the three SPQ dimensions as well as total 
SPQ score as a measure of overall schizotypy, negative affect as indicated by total 
DASS score, and cognitive failures as per total CFQ score. Correlations were examined 
first. To test the prediction that negative affect mediates the relationship between 
schizotypy and cognitive failures, hierarchical regression analyses of total effect (c), 
direct effect (c’), and bootstrapped bias corrected 95% confidence intervals of the 
indirect effect (ab) were computed using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2012) in SPSS 
with 5000 bootstrapped samples as per Hayes (Hayes, 2013). Continuous variables were 
not mean-centred as this provides no additional benefit in terms of reducing 
multicollinearity (Hayes, 2013), and in this preliminary research we were simply 
interested in the presence or absence of a mediation/moderation relationship. 
7.3. Results 
Sample descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations are presented in Table 7.1. 
Schizotypy, negative affect, and cognitive failures were all moderately positively 
correlated with each other. As would be expected, the SPQ dimensions were all strongly 







CFQ and the remaining SPQ and affective variables were also calculated (see Appendix 
C). As these were all highly correlated with each other and were associated with other 
variables in a similar fashion to total CFQ, these were not examined in further 
moderation and mediation analyses. 
Sex differences were apparent for negative affect (t(861) = -.269, p = .007) and 
cognitive failures (t(861) = - 6.41, p <.001), with females reporting both greater 
negative affect (M = 16.22, SD = 11.77; versus M = 13.90, SD = 10.66 for males) and 
more frequent cognitive failures (M = 49.06, SD = 15.59; versus M = 41.69, SD = 14.67 
for males). There were no sex differences for overall schizotypy, (t(436.50) = -1.42, p = 
.16), however of the SPQ dimensions females reported more cognitive-perceptual 
disturbances (females M = 9.96, SD = 7.04; males M = 8.59, SD = 7.06; t(1012) = -3.07, 
p = .002). Based on these findings, an analysis was carried out to determine whether sex 
moderates the association between negative affect and cognitive failures. No 
moderation effect was evident, and as such, sex was excluded from the main analyses. 
It is possible that there is some overlap between the CFQ and dimensions of the 
SPQ such as disorganised thinking. Specifically, the subscale of odd speech contains 
items reflecting cognitive failures, such as “I sometimes forget what I am trying to say.” 
We conducted a correlation analysis to examine whether other SPQ subscales also 
related to the CFQ, including total SPQ score minus the odd speech subscale. This 
supported that the SPQ is associated with increased cognitive failures separate to 








Table 7.1       
Pearson Correlations Among Study Variables 
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Schizotypy total 23.43 14.51 -      
2. Cog-perceptual  9.56 7.07 .88** -     
3. Interpersonal 8.43 6.06 .83** .52** -    
4. Disorganisation 5.44 4.10 .81** .61** .55** -   
5. Negative affect 15.54 11.50 .51** .45** .44** .36** -  
6. Cog failures 46.92 15.68 .50** .42** .39** .47** .45** - 
Note: ** p < .01    
 
Negative affect did not moderate the relationship between schizotypy and 
cognitive failures (using PROCESS model 1, basic moderation) for total schizotypy (p = 
.82), nor any of the subscales of the SPQ.  
However, as illustrated in Figure 7.1, negative affect did partially mediate the 
relationship between schizotypy and cognitive failures (using PROCESS model 4, basic 
mediation). A partial mediation is used to refer to a situation where the path between the 
independent and dependent variables is reduced in size by the introduction of a mediator 







not fully account for the mechanism through which schizotypy leads to increased 
failures, but that it does contribute to this mechanism. The pattern of results held with 
coefficients differing only slightly between SPQ dimensions and effect sizes equivalent, 
hence only the analysis of total schizotypy scores is presented here. As can be seen in 
Figure 7.1, a bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect (ab = 
.15) did not cross zero (.110 to .195), supporting a significant partial mediating effect. 
There was therefore an indirect effect of schizotypy on cognitive failures through 
negative affect (κ2 = .14, 95% CI [.10, .17]), and although there is ongoing debate in the 
literature as to how to interpret the size of this effect, it can be considered as being of 
medium size (Preacher & Kelley, 2011). The direct effect between schizotypy and 










Note: ** p<.001 
Figure 7.1. Mediation of schizotypy and cognitive failures by negative affect. 
7.4. Discussion 
 In this study, a large sample of healthy young people was utilised to examine the 
role of negative affect in high schizotypes’ experience of cognitive failures in everyday 
life. Moderation and mediation analyses were performed to determine whether negative 
affect needs to be present in addition to high schizotypy to result in cognitive failures 
(moderation), or alternatively, whether the negative affectivity characteristic of 







7.4.1. Key findings 
 Total mean schizotypy within this sample (23.43 out of 74) was comparable to 
the levels seen in other young adult cohorts (e.g., 26.6, Raine, 1991: 19.6, Langdon & 
Coltheart, 2004). In line with the past literature, cognitive failures, negative affect, and 
schizotypy were all positively related to each other. As expected, negative affect 
partially mediated the relationship between schizotypy and cognitive failures, 
supporting that negative affect contributes to the mechanism through which individuals 
who express schizotypal traits experience increased cognitive failures during everyday 
life. However, it is important to note that this was only a partial mediation, therefore 
negative affect does not solely account for cognitive failures in schizotypy – variance in 
the path between schizotypy and cognitive failures therefore reflects other factors, as 
well. This suggests that other aspects of schizotypy also shape increased cognitive 
failures in high schizotypes, and there are a range of features of schizotypy which may 
be relevant. For example, high schizotypes’ unusual perceptual experiences might result 
in errors of misinterpretation or division of attentional capacity (which may be already 
compromised), whilst suspiciousness could cause cognitive failures via increased 
cognitive load. The current finding that all three subscales of the SPQ demonstrate the 
same pattern of negative affect partially mediating between schizotypy and cognitive 
failures does not enable any speculation of which of these may be most relevant. 
Nevertheless, whatever the key factors might be, cognitive failures cannot be said to be 







have a distinct relationship with each other which is not purely reflective of the impact 
of negative affect. 
 The lack of support for a moderating effect of negative affect suggests 
schizotypy and negative affect do not interact to predict cognitive failures. This is at 
odds with the moderation hypothesis that affective reactivity in high schizotypes leads 
to exaggerated cognitive failures only when faced with negative affect. These findings 
run counter to research concerning neuropsychological performance, where it is 
proposed high schizotypes exhibit deficits only when faced with the additional load of 
stress (Smith & Lenzenweger, 2010). This discrepancy with existing 
neuropsychological findings perhaps supports the idea that there are differing 
mechanisms of challenge behind objective versus subjective cognition. Overall, the lack 
of a moderating effect is consistent with the finding that affect acts (instead) as a partial 
mediator in this relationship. Negative affectivity is an inherent characteristic of 
schizotypal personality structures which, alongside other characteristics, shapes 
cognitive failures but does not necessarily need to be active (i.e., as evidenced by 
current negative affective states) in order for failures to occur in those scoring highly on 
schizotypy.  
7.4.2. Limitations 
 There are some limitations to be considered in the current study, most of which 
relate to the CFQ. First, there is ongoing debate in the literature concerning whether 







neuropsychological outcomes, some researchers argue that measures such as the CFQ 
may be distorted by respondents’ poor self-awareness (Chan et al., 2011; Wilhelm et al., 
2010). As the CFQ does, however, relate to reports made by significant others 
(Broadbent et al., 1982; Carrigan & Barkus, submitted; Mahoney et al., 1998) and 
outcomes such as being the at-fault driver in a car accident (Larson & Merritt, 1991), 
we argue that it does show validity as a measure of real life cognitive capacity; 
providing separate and useful information to that captured by neuropsychological 
assessments of ability.  
        Another possible limitation of this study was its use of the DASS to tap negative 
affect. Factor analyses support the total score as a measure of general psychological 
distress (Henry & Crawford, 2005), which is also a feature of schizotypy (Horan, et al., 
2008). However, the negative affect and distress captured by the DASS is specific to 
stress, anxiety, and depression. Further, it may be more transient than trait-like, given 
the wording of the questionnaire (e.g., “Over the past week: I found it hard to wind 
down”). Future studies utilising different measurement tools will uncover whether 
differential patterns emerge. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) is one tool which can be used to tap trait affect, and 
may serve to tap a broader range of negative affect states. Extending further, a measure 
directly focused on emotional reactivity, such as the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation 
Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) may be used to look more specifically at the 







An additional limitation of this paper was its use of a predominantly student 
participant pool. Whilst the current paper was interested in young adults, a large 
proportion of which are studying at university, future research would ideally incorporate 
samples from the broader student population (i.e., beyond primarily psychology), and 
more importantly to the rest of the community. As such, despite the large sample size, 
caution must be taken when attempting to generalise the current findings to a broader 
population. 
7.4.3. Implications and directions for future research 
 The finding that schizotypy and negative affect overlap, although not 
completely, in their associations with increased problems with cognition in everyday 
life in young adults has implications for how we conceptualise cognitive failures. A 
mixture of trait (i.e., schizotypy) and state (i.e., affect) factors both seem be important in 
shaping individuals’ experiences of cognition (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016b), and thus 
both need to be considered in research concerning cognitive failures. This is perhaps the 
defining feature characterising the study of everyday failures as distinct from more 
traditional research focusing on cognitive ability (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a). Research 
seeking to make further sense of the gap between self-reported and objective cognition 
in schizotypy, for example by examining whether the introduction of emotional stimuli 
reduces performance in the lab as in the “real world,” is required.         
As the significance of state factors in everyday cognitive failures is becoming 







measures of cognitive failures. One way to achieve this would be by incorporating 
further measures of environmental factors which may influence the relationship, such as 
daily life stressors. However, a more effective means of improving cognitive failures 
research may be to capture them in vivo, via experience sampling approaches. This 
would facilitate more accurate reporting, as well as allowing for the capture of 
additional relevant state factors which may interact with trait vulnerability, such as 
recent stressors or substance use.  One of very few existing experience sampling study 
of cognitive failures captured stressor reactions on a daily basis over the course of two 
weeks, and found that stressor occurrence coincided with cognitive failures in more 
reactive individuals (Palder, Ode, Liu, & Robinson, 2013). However, this study still 
allowed only for examination of daily correlations. Ideally, future research would assess 
multiple epochs each day to explore how affect at one time point predicts cognition in 
the next. Such research may also tell us more about a possible cyclical relationship 
between stress and cognitive failures, and whether this plays a role in potentiating 
upward movement along the psychosis continuum.  
The close link between schizotypy and failures also lends support to previous 
assertions that cognitive failures may represent an indicator of psychosis risk (Laws et 
al., 2008), at least in this young adult age group. Whilst this study examined cognitive 
failures in healthy subclinical schizotypes, further research examining whether the 
mediating effect of negative affect holds for ARMS and patient groups are necessary to 







shaped by affectivity. In addition, such studies could build on the basic model explored 
here to help identify other key contributors to cognitive failures in schizotypy (e.g., 
social deficits, paranoia, perceptual aberrations), which may then serve as targets for 
early intervention for young adults at-risk of developing first episode psychosis. 
Looking even further ahead, the experience sampling methodology described above 
may assist in identifying environmental factors that increase the likelihood of cognitive 
failures, and subsequently transition to psychosis, for ARMS groups.  
Importantly, the finding that problematic slips and errors in the flow of daily life in 
schizotypy are not entirely dependent on affect highlights that, whilst likely playing an 
important role, simply reducing psychological distress will not be a sufficient treatment 
for reducing cognitive failures for at-risk individuals. Rather, strategies aiming to 
ameliorate cognitive concerns will need to simultaneously target other as yet unknown 
contributing features. For example, a suite of cognitive therapy techniques might 
address multiple issues: distress management skills to cope with negative affect; 
mindfulness techniques to disengage from suspicious cognitions and re-direct attention 
to the task at hand; social skills training to reduce anxiety in situations of perceived 
social pressure. The current findings support that improving mood is vital, but will need 
to be combined with cognitive remediation and other psychological strategies aimed at 








In summary, both schizotypy and negative affect are important in shaping the 
likelihood of experiencing everyday cognitive failures, however negative affect does not 
need to be present in those scoring highly on schizotypy for cognitive failures to occur. 
Whilst affect does play a role in the mechanism by which high schizotypy and increased 
cognitive failures are related, it cannot fully account for this relationship. Other 
pertinent facets of schizotypy or coinciding with this personality constellation need to 
be identified. This research highlights the need to focus on improving our understanding 
of the role of emotion in real world vs. lab-based cognition, as well as increasing the 
ecological validity in the study of cognition in order to better understand the role of both 
inter- and intra-individual factors in real life functioning. This has the potential to 
improve identification of, and targeted interventions for, young people prone to 














8. Do complaints of everyday cognitive failures in high schizotypy relate to 








This chapter is based on a paper published in Comprehensive Psychiatry. 
 
Carrigan, N., Barkus, E., Ong, A. & Wei, M. (2017). Do complaints of everyday 
cognitive failures in high schizotypy relate to emotional working memory deficits in the 








8.1.1. Schizotypy and cognition 
Schizotypy refers to a set of personality traits and attenuated symptoms of 
psychosis thought to reflect increased risk for developing a psychotic disorder 
(Claridge, 1997; Meehl, 1990). Features include perceptual aberrations (e.g., unusual 
spiritual experiences), interpersonal problems (e.g., lack of close friends), and 
disorganised thinking (e.g., odd beliefs). All healthy individuals possess trait schizotypy 
to some degree; it is normally distributed throughout the general population and is 
thought to represent a continuum of risk for psychosis (Johns & van Os, 2001). At the 
extreme end of this continuum are people with schizophrenia and related psychotic 
disorders, whilst in the subclinical range are healthy individuals high on schizotypy. 
The majority of subclinical “high schizotypes” will never seek help in their lifetimes 
(Kaymaz et al., 2012), and in fact many report relishing some of their unusual 
experiences and characteristics (Brod, 1997; McCreery & Claridge, 2002). This group is 
important for the potential for revealing early risk, as well as protective factors for 
psychosis. 
One potential risk factor for psychosis is reduced cognitive functioning (Cornblatt, 
2002; Cornblatt et al., 2003). A profile of cognitive deficits in those with schizophrenia 
is documented across multiple domains including attention, working memory, and 
executive function (Fioravanti, Carlone, Vitale, Cinti, & Clare, 2005). A cognitive 







other psychotic symptomatology (Rapoport, Giedd, & Gogtay, 2012), and are central to 
risk for psychosis.  There have also been a range of studies identifying attenuated or 
mild impairments in the same domains in healthy high schizotypes (e.g., Gooding, 
Kwapil, & Tallent, 1999; Lenzenweger, Cornblatt, & Putnick, 1991). High schizotypes 
are therefore an intermediary group between individuals with schizophrenia and those in 
the general population with average schizotypy scores who have efficient cognitive 
functioning. However, several studies have failed to identify cognitive impairments in 
high schizotypes relative to controls (e.g., Daly, Afroz, & Walder, 2012; Noguchi, Hori, 
& Kunugi, 2008). As such, a characteristic neuropsychological profile has not yet been 
clarified for schizotypy, although working memory characteristics will be explored in 
further detail below. There is some evidence that sufficient load needs to be present 
before high schizotypes exhibit cognitive deficits compared to average schizotypes 
(e.g., Braunstein-Bercovitz, Hen, & Lubow, 2004; Koychev et al., 2016). This increased 
load could be referring to the cognitive demands of the task or the nature of the stimuli 
being presented, such as emotional valence. 
Despite the inconsistency in reports of laboratory-based, objectively measured 
cognition, individuals high in schizotypy do consistently self-report increased levels of 
cognitive failures (Carrigan & Barkus, 2017; Corcoran et al., 2013; Giesbrecht et al., 
2007; Pfeifer et al., 2009). Cognitive failures are subtle and relatively common slips in 
memory, attention, and action that occur during the course of daily activities (Broadbent 







familiar word incorrectly. Importantly, cognitive failures are errors that arise whilst 
carrying out tasks in which one is usually competent: they do not reflect any underlying 
deficit of ability, but rather a break in routine action and are therefore about the capacity 
to think sequentially within a given context. Nevertheless, there has been much research 
exploring how self-reported cognitive failures relate to underlying neurocognitive 
ability. The majority of research has focused on the link between failures and 
objectively-assessed attentional control, with some (e.g., Berggren et al., 2011; Tipper 
& Baylis, 1987), but not all (e.g., Broadbent et al., 1982;  Forster & Lavie, 2007) 
researchers finding a significant relationship. Working memory has also been an area of 
interest (Ishigami & Klein, 2009; McVay & Kane, 2009; Unsworth, 2015), with 
findings of an association with cognitive failures mixed. It is therefore possible that 
cognitive failures account for some of the differences in cognitive performance between 
controls and those high on schizotypy. Indeed, controlling for these subjective 
inefficiencies may begin to account for some of the inconsistent findings in this area.  
There are two possible explanations for the “gap” between objective cognitive 
performance and subjective cognitive failures in schizotypy. The first is that high 
schizotypes potentially have poor self-awareness, inferred from schizophrenia patients’ 
poor cognitive insight (David, Bedford, Wiffen, & Gilleen, 2012). There is ongoing 
debate concerning whether cognitive failures in the absence of objective impairment in 
schizotypy reflects an awareness of subtle cognitive deficits not yet detectable via 







Laws, Patel, & Tyson, 2008). This mirrors a broader debate in the cognitive failures 
literature where an association between neuroticism and failures is thought to suggest 
failures measure complaints about cognition, rather than actual problems with 
functioning (Wilhelm et al., 2010). However, several findings refute this “complaint 
hypothesis.” Observer ratings correlate moderately with self-reported cognitive failures 
(Broadbent et al., 1982; Carrigan & Barkus, submitted; Mahoney, Dalby, & King, 
1998), and importantly, high neuroticism and poor self-awareness do not reduce the 
extent to which self and observer ratings of failures correlate (Carrigan & Barkus, 
2017). In addition, self-reported cognitive failures are associated with real world 
outcomes such as likelihood of being the at-fault driver in an accident (Larson & 
Merritt, 1991), suggesting they tap into aspects of cognition relevant to everyday 
performance. 
Collectively, these findings seem to support a second explanation of the objective-
subjective “gap” in cognition: self-reported failures have utility as a measure of real-
world functioning, reflecting vulnerability for problems with cognitive functioning that 
are different to those usually assessed in the lab. So, this leads to another question: what 
is this difference between lab assessed and real world cognitive functioning? Affect 
appears to be a key factor in cognitive failures (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a). Subclinical 
and clinical depression, anxiety, and stress are all closely associated with cognitive 
failures (e.g., Mahoney et al., 1998; Merckelbach et al., 1996; Sullivan & Payne, 2007). 







effects of emotion regulation on cognition. In relation to schizotypy, there is evidence 
concerning how emotion could interact with cognition to produce normal lab assessed 
cognition but higher rates of cognitive failures. High schizotypy and schizophrenia are 
both closely associated with negative affect (Horan et al., 2008). In addition, high 
schizotypy is linked to heightened physiological, emotional, and behavioural reactions 
in response to emotional experiences (Collip et al., 2013). Given the increased 
likelihood of encountering salient or stressful situations in everyday life relative to the 
lab research environment, perhaps high schizotypes experience problems with cognition 
only in real world settings. Cognitive failures in daily life may reflect schizotypes’ 
emotional reactions interfering with cognition; hence the failure of traditional objective 
cognitive tasks to identify difficulties. Providing preliminary support for this 
hypothesis, negative affect partially mediates the relationship between schizotypy and 
cognitive failures (Carrigan & Barkus, 2017). It seems plausible that cognitive failures 
reflect issues with emotion regulation alongside other cognitive processes, and that the 
affective characteristics of schizotypy contribute to slips during everyday cognition. 
8.1.2. Emotional working memory in schizotypy 
As previously mentioned, impairment in working memory appears to have some 
relationship with both increased cognitive failures (Ishigami & Klein, 2009; McVay & 
Kane, 2009; Unsworth, 2015) and elevated schizotypy (Tallent & Gooding, 1999). 
Effect sizes for working memory deficits in schizophrenia are large (Forbes, Carrick, 







the activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex already evident in first-episode, 
medication-naïve patients (Barch et al., 2001; van Veelen, Vink, Ramsey, & Kahn, 
2010). Given that working memory deficits are detectable in relatives of patients (Snitz, 
Macdonald, & Carter, 2006), high schizotypes (Kerns & Becker, 2008a; Koychev et al., 
2012; Schmidt-Hansen & Honey, 2009a) and first episode patients, this suggests 
working memory problems are part of the pathogenesis of the disorder. However, high 
schizotypes do not share the same profile as patients with schizophrenia in their reduced 
cognitive performance since in other areas of cognition findings have been mixed, with 
some authors finding no differences between the performance of high schizotypes and 
controls (e.g., Lenzenweger & Gold, 2000). A recent meta-analysis supported that 
healthy high schizotypes generally exhibit working memory impairment at a level 
attenuated to that seen in schizophrenia (Siddi, Petretto, & Preti, 2017). 
Emotion processing is another area of apparent cognitive dysfunction in 
schizotypy which mirrors schizophrenia. Problems are evident with perception of 
emotion and heightened emotional reactivity, mentioned earlier (Phillips & Seidman, 
2008). High schizotypes exhibit alexithymia, poor perception and expression of speech 
prosody, and reduced facial emotion recognition (Giakoumaki, 2012). If the emotion 
processing and regulation difficulties experienced by schizotypes are reflected in their 
cognitive failures as we have suggested, there is a need to understand how emotional 
processing difficulties may also be reflected in their objective working memory 







consistently report cognitive failures, given that affect is interlinked with cognitive 
performance in an everyday setting much of the time. 
As yet, very few studies of working memory in schizotypy have incorporated 
emotion, however the existing literature will be briefly reviewed. In the general 
population, the inclusion of emotional content has mixed effects on objective working 
memory performance. Some studies have noted an enhancing effect of emotional 
stimuli (Lindström & Bohlin, 2011), whilst in others emotional stimuli reduced 
performance relative to neutral stimuli (e.g., Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Mather et al., 
2006). Although studies are limited, schizotypy appears to be related to consistently 
poorer performance in response to the presence of emotional stimuli. The positive and 
disorganised dimensions of schizotypy are associated with poorer performance on tasks 
such as the Stroop and n-back working memory tasks when faced with emotional versus 
neutral stimuli (Kerns & Becker, 2008a; Mohanty et al., 2008). Most studies have 
focused on the impact of stimuli of negative valence, and in some tasks only the most 
threatening stimuli (i.e., angry voices) have induced poor performance (Papousek et al., 
2014). However, when using emotional film clips as a distractor alongside neutral 
stimuli in a backward digit span task, films of both negative and positive valence 
resulted in lowered performance in high schizotypy (Karcher & Shean, 2012). This 
suggests emotional arousal per se rather than the valence itself is confounding to high 







deficits for emotional stimuli in schizotypy may reflect an underlying deficit in 
emotional processing, leading to heightened reactivity to emotional events and stimuli.  
8.1.3. Current study 
There is a need to explore the relationship between emotion and cognition in 
schizotypy, and to consider whether emotion disrupts cognition in the lab as it appears 
to in the real world. High versus low schizotypes’ self-reported cognitive failures will 
therefore be compared within the current study, and the impact of emotional stimuli on 
performance in an objective affective working memory task. It is anticipated that this 
research will make several contributions. Firstly, this will further our understanding of 
how cognitive ability (measured in the lab) translates into cognitive capacity (as it is 
enacted in real life). Traditional approaches to studying cognition have focused almost 
solely on maximum ability as demonstrated in idealised settings, to the detriment of our 
understanding of cognition as it occurs in the milieu of everyday life. By introducing 
more emotive elements into the lab, it may be possible to identify ways in which the 
ecological validity of lab-based tasks in general may be enhanced. The second 
important reason for this research is to continue the ongoing work of pinpointing 
cognitive indicators or markers of risk for psychosis. Identifying specific profiles of 
cognition in schizotypy – for example, a relative deficit of emotional working memory 
– would help to identify those at highest risk, and would also provide further direction 
for early intervention. 







1) Do high schizotypes exhibit i.e., poorer working memory performance in 
response to emotional versus neutral stimuli?  
2) If so, which type of emotional stimuli has the biggest impact, and how does 
emotion interact with different levels of task difficulty? 
A secondary aim of this study will be to explore the relationship between self-reported 
cognitive failures and objective working memory performance outcomes. 
It is difficult to formulate clear hypotheses regarding these aims due to the 
dearth of existing studies. However, it is hypothesized that high schizotypy will be 
associated with increased vulnerability for cognitive failures. It is thought that 
presentation of emotional stimuli will have a greater detrimental effect on high 
schizotypes’ affective working memory performance than neutral stimuli, and that low 
schizotypes will have a less exaggerated response to emotional stimuli. Stimuli of both 
negative and positive valence will be utilised, but it is not yet clear whether positive 
stimuli will impact working memory in the same way as negative stimuli. Cognitive 
failures will be included in the analyses as a covariate for the group differences in 
affective working memory performance for high vs. low schizotypes. This will 
determine whether vulnerability to failures accounts for any patterns evident in 









There were 129 participants recruited from an undergraduate student course and 
the general community. There were 34 males, with mean age 21.87 (min = 18, max = 
50, SD = 5.25). Inclusion criteria were open, with participants excluded only on the 
basis of having a psychotic or neurological disorder by self-report questionnaire (as per 
other personality research, e.g., Ettinger et al., 2005). No participants were excluded on 
this basis, however two were not included as they were unable to understand the n-back 
working memory task. This left the final participant sample as 127. 
8.2.2. Instruments 
8.2.2.1. Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire 
The Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ; Raine, 1991) is a 74-item self-
report scale designed to screen community populations for schizotypy with strong 
internal (.90 - .91) and test-retest (.82) reliability (Raine, 1991). Participants are asked to 
provide a yes/no response to questions such as, “Do you often feel nervous when you 
are in a group of unfamiliar people?” The current study utilised total SPQ score as an 
indication of overall level of schizotypy within individuals in a healthy sample, so that 
comparisons could be made between those higher vs. lower in trait schizotypy. 
Although schizotypy is not a homogeneous construct, all dimensions are closely 
associated with each other (Raine et al., 1994) such that possession of one increases the 







reflection of the extent to which one exhibits a schizotypal personality structure. This 
overall score is determined by summing endorsed items, for a maximum score of 74.   
In the existing schizotypy literature, there are two key approaches to analysis: 
group (e.g., Henry et al., 2009; Koychev et al., 2011) and continuous (Mohanty et al., 
2008). Although schizotypy is conceptualised as a continuum, it is still useful to 
conduct group analyses comparing “high” with “low” subclinical schizotypes. This 
approach enables exploration of whether variables behave in the same way for 
individuals at both the upper and lower ends of the spectrum. Although a continuous 
approach was also possible, the purpose of the current study was to examine whether 
level of schizotypy determines differential affective working memory functioning; 
hence we decided to take a group approach. Clinical cut-offs for the SPQ are not 
available, therefore individuals were allocated to the high or low schizotypy on the basis 
of being 0.5 SD above or below the mean.  
8.2.2.2. Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 
The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982) is a self-
report inventory of slips in cognition experienced in everyday life. The CFQ asks 
participants to indicate the perceived frequency with which they have experienced a list 
of 25 common failures of memory, perception, and action over the past six months; for 
example, “Do you find you confuse right and left when giving directions?” The 
response format is a 5-point Likert-type scale (0 = Never, and 4 = Very Often). Possible 







towards experiencing failures during daily life. Cronbach's alpha for the CFQ in the 
initial study was .89 (Broadbent et al., 1982).  
There is ongoing debate regarding the factor structure of the CFQ. Some authors 
argue strongly for a multidimensional approach to the CFQ, with large samples 
producing evidence of up to seven factors (Wilhelm et al., 2010). Nevertheless, several 
other authors have argued that the small number of items and consistent evidence of a 
large general factor support the use of the total CFQ score to examine the frequency of 
failures overall (Larson et al., 1997; Wallace, 2004). It was decided that the CFQ total 
score alone would be analysed to enable a study of emotion, schizotypy, and general 
problems with day-to-day cognition. 
8.2.2.3. National Adult Reading Test 
The National Adult Reading Test (NART; Neslon & O’Connell, 1991) was used 
to assess verbal intelligence. Participants are required to read aloud a standardized list of 
50 irregularly spelt words (e.g., “chord”), and are scored on the number of correctly 
pronounced words.  In keeping with the original use of this test, the discontinuation rule 
was not used.  
8.2.2.4. Verbal fluency task 
A verbal fluency (VF) task assessed verbal ability, executive control, and speed 
of information processing. Participants are asked to verbally produce as many words as 







The current study included a letter/phonological VF task requiring participants to list 
words beginning with a letter (F, A, and S), and a category/semantic VF task requiring 
production of words beginning to a certain category (vegetables and animals).  In a third 
category switching task, participants were instructed to alternate between two categories 
(fruit and furniture). Participants are scored on the number of appropriate words 
produced for each of the letter, category, and category switching tasks, and the number 
of correct alternations between categories in the category switching task.   
NART and the VF outcomes were used to examine basic cognitive performance 
separate to the key domain of interest, working memory.  
8.2.2.5. Emotional n-back working memory task 
Participants completed a computerised visual affective n-back working memory 
task developed and presented using Paradigm Stimulus Presentation software 
(Perception Research Systems, 2007). Participants were asked to monitor a series of 
images and to respond when the current stimulus is the same as the one presented n 
trials ago. Trials included images with neutral, happy, fearful, or sad. These images 
were drawn from International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2008).  
Twelve images were selected for each emotion; the IAPS numbers of these are 
listed in Appendix E. We categorised images into the neutral, happy, fearful, or sad 







recorded in IAPS, both of which are on scales from 1 (negative valence/low arousal) to 
10 (positive valence/high arousal). Neutral stimuli selected from IAPS had average 
valence and arousal ratings (M = 5.32, SD = 1.29; M = 3.56, SD = 2.05); happy stimuli 
higher valence rating and only slightly higher arousal than neutral (M = 7.52, SD = 
1.56; M = 5.37, SD = 2.27). Sad and fearful were both of a lower valence (M = 2.53, SD 
= 1.58 and M = 2.43, SD = 1.61, respectively), however fearful had a higher arousal 
rating (M = 6.21, SD = 2.20) than sad stimuli (M = 4.91, SD = 2.18). ANOVAs revealed 
that there were significant differences between the emotions for valence, F(3, 44) = 
1276.15, p < .001. Post hoc Tukey analyses revealed that all emotions differed on 
valence (p < .001) apart from fearful and sad stimuli. Arousal also differed significantly 
by emotion, F(3, 44) = 34.42, p < .001. Neutral had a significantly lower arousal rating 
than all other emotions (p < .001) and happy was also significantly lower than fearful (p 
< .02), however sad and happy did not differ on valence, (p = .32).  
There were four levels of difficulty presented within this task: 0-back, 1-back, 2-
back, and 3-back. Examples of image sequences are depicted in Figure 8.1. Instructions 
were displayed at the start of each block to alert the participant to the rule they needed 
to adhere to (i.e., which level of n-back). They were not informed of the emotional 
valence of stimuli. In the 0-back blocks, participants were shown one image on the 
instruction slide which identified the target, and they were required to key press 
whenever the target image was displayed. For each of the 1, 2, and 3-back blocks, 







the screen was the same as the image displayed either 1, 2, or 3 images ago. Thus, the n-
back task assesses working memory by requiring participants to continually update 
information held in mind. Stimuli were presented for 1000 millisecond (during which 
participants could respond at any time) with a 300 millisecond gap between each 
stimulus. The same 48 images were used throughout the task to ensure responses were 
not based purely on image familiarity. Blocks were randomised across the whole 
presentation. 
Each block contained images from only one emotional valence group. There 
were three versions of each emotion at each level of difficulty. For example, there were 
three each of neutral, positive, fearful, and sad 1-back blocks. In this way, we sought to 
explore how response accuracy and reaction times differed for emotional stimuli and 
difficulty, and how these interacted.  
Lures were not included in blocks of trials – for example, there were no 1-back 
“lure” trials presented within a 3-black block. This is in keeping with a number of 
studies which have used the task of image updating to assess working memory in 
schizotypy (e.g., Schmidt-Hansen & Honey, 2009; Koychev et al., 2016). Concerns 
have been raised as to the validity of the n-back task without lures as a measure of 
working memory. False alarms are increased when lures are introduced, suggesting that 
the original n-back task assesses recognition rather than memory (Kane, Conway, Miura 
& Colflesh, 2007). However, two aspects of the current study were thought to warrant 







stimuli, which were presented repeatedly. Presentation was counterbalanced across 
participants, with the order of blocks randomised. This approach was thought to 
minimise familiarity effects overall. Secondly, the addition of emotional valence to this 
visual n-back task was conceptualised as adding cognitive load to the existing working 
memory task of updating stored stimuli. Hence, the addition of lures was deemed 
unnecessary to tap working memory processes.   
The task took about 25 minutes to complete. Prior to commencing the task, 
participants were shown a demonstration and practiced each difficulty level. Pilot 
testing indicated that task instructions were clear and understandable for participants, 
















Figure 8.1.  Example of image sequence for 1-back, 2-back, and 3-back responses. 




Participants were recruited from psychology undergraduate students as well as 
the general community via posters, emails, and word-of-mouth – the “snowball” 
technique (Solowij, Hall & Lee, 1992). Student participants were offered course credit 
for participation. Approval was obtained from the institution’s Human Research Ethics 
Committee prior to commencement of the study. The sample utilised in this study was a 
subset of a larger one described in a previous article (Carrigan & Barkus, 2017a). All 







were then invited to attend additional assessment; those who did so are included in the 
current research. Informed consent was obtained from participants verbally and in 
writing for each stage of the study.  
In the initial stage of the study, participants completed an online survey which 
collected demographic data as well as the questionnaires of interest (CFQ and SPQ). 
This survey took approximately 30 minutes to complete. The second stage required 
participants to attend a laboratory testing session. In this stage, participants first 
completed cognitive screening tests, the NART and verbal fluency task, to ensure that 
no participants demonstrating signs of neurological impairment were included in the 
study. Participants then completed the computerised affective n-back working memory 
task. In total, each testing session took about 40 minutes. The testing session took place 
in a quiet environment where there was an absence of emotionally laden materials on 
the walls. 
8.2.4. Statistical analyses  
Independent variables of interest were schizotypy, and task emotion and load (i.e., 
difficulty). Dependent variables explored in the analyses included n-back outcomes of 
accuracy (hits and correct rejections). Hits were averaged across trials according to 
emotion and difficulty of trial, to give a score out of a maximum possible three (i.e., 
three target stimuli presented per 14 trial block), whilst correct rejections could have a 
maximum of 11 (i.e., 11 non-target stimuli presented per 14 trial block), although much 







Signal detection measures were also examined to determine whether accuracy 
outcomes reflected ability to detect signals. Sensitivity (d’) and response bias (c) were 
calculated according to formulae presented by Macmillan and Creelman (2004). 
Adjustments were made for perfect scores. d' was calculated as z(hits – false alarms), 
whilst c was calculated as –-z(hits – false alarms)/2. A higher d’ score indicates a better 
ability to discriminate between target and non-targets. A higher c score indicates a more 
conservative response bias, such that participants are less willing to respond positively 
that a target is present. Lower c scores indicate a more liberal approach to responding.  
Trials across all non-neutral emotion groups were collapsed to allow analysis of 
the impact of emotional vs. neutral stimuli overall. The aim of this was to address the 
overarching hypothesis that schizotypes demonstrate more impairment when faced with 
emotive stimuli. 2 x 2 ANOVAs included schizotypy as the between subjects factor, 
with emotion (neutral vs. emotional) as the within subjects factor. These examined the 
outcomes of hits, correct rejections, sensitivity, and bias.      
2 x 3 x 4 ANOVAs were also conducted to look at effects of each type of 
emotional stimuli. These were also applied to each of the n-back performance data (hits, 
correct rejections, sensitivity, bias). This included one between subjects factor 
(schizotypy x 2 levels), and two within subjects factors (cognitive load x 3 levels; 
valence x 4 levels). 0-back was not included in the analyses since there were no 
differences in performance at this level which was included to capture attentional 







interindividual differences in cognitive failures accounted for differences in objective 
performance. This was deemed necessary given that the high and low schizotypy groups 
differed in mean CFQ scores (see section 8.3.1, below). Comparison of F, p-value, and 
partial eta squared (ηp
2 ). Pairwise comparisons were examined for significant main 
effects, whilst simple main effects were planned for any significant interactions. 
Bonferroni adjustments made for multiple comparisons, and 2-tailed p-values were 
considered. 
Please note that an alternative analysis of the data collected within this study is 
contained in Appendix F. This includes findings pertaining to hits and false alarms (i.e., 
incorrect identifications of non-target stimuli as targets). 
8.3. Results 
8.3.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 Participants who contributed to this second phase of the study (i.e., completing 
the laboratory tasks in addition to online questionnaires) did not differ on age (t(1084)  
= -1.81, p = .71), or SPQ score (t(1084) = 0.28, p = .78). Both groups contained around 
27% males. However, they did report slightly higher CFQ scores (t(1084) = 2.06, p = 
.04).  
The mean SPQ score for the sample was 22.63 (SD = 12.99). Participants were 
split into high and low schizotypy groups, with participants within 0.5 standard 







high group was 38.21 (n = 39, SD = 6.49), and for the low group was 9.58 (n = 48, SD = 
5.21); the two groups did not differ significantly in age or sex.  
The mean CFQ score for the entire sample was 43.46 (SD = 14.66). The two 
schizotypy groups differed significantly on mean CFQ (t(85) = 4.92, p < .001), with the 
high group reporting correspondingly more cognitive failures (M = 51.10, SD = 14.56) 
than the low group (M = 36.25, SD = 13.49). Similar to previous research, for the entire 
sample, SPQ and CFQ scores were moderately correlated (r = .48, p < .01). CFQ was 
not correlated with either hits or false alarms for the n-back task, at any level of task 
difficulty or for any type of emotion.  
It is possible that there is some overlap between the CFQ and dimensions of the 
SPQ such as disorganised thinking. Specifically, the subscale of odd speech contains 
items reflecting cognitive failures, such as “I sometimes forget what I am trying to say.” 
We conducted a correlation analysis to examine whether other SPQ subscales also 
related to the CFQ, including total SPQ score minus the odd speech subscale. This 
supported that the SPQ is associated with increased cognitive failures separate to 
overlapping items. See Appendix D, Table D.2 for the correlations. 
Performance on the NART and VF tasks were examined for group differences. 
Due to researcher error, data on these tasks were not collected for a number of 
participants, leaving some data missing at random. Thus, the high schizotypy group was 







schizotypy group had a mean score of 21.76 (SD = 6.89) correctly pronounced words 
and the low group 23.72 (SD = 5.89); these scores did not differ (t(71) = -1.31, p = .10).  
For the VF tasks, group differences were similarly apparent only at the trend level on 
the letter task (t(71) = -1.56, p = .06) with the high group producing a mean of 34.62 
words (SD = 8.54) and the low group 37.92 words (SD = 9.47). The category task did 
produce differences, with the high group producing fewer words (M = 30.71, SD = 5.90) 
than the low group (M = 35.05, SD = 7.24; t(70) = -2.77, p < .001). However, for the 
category switching task, the number of words produced by high schizotypes (M = 13.44, 
SD = 2.67) did not differ to low schizotypes (M = 13.82, SD = 3.11; t(71) = -.56, p = 
.29). Additionally, the number of correct category switches in this task did not differ 
between high (M = 12.59, SD = 2.68) and low schizotypes (M = 13.05, SD = 3.18; t(71) 








8.3.2. Emotional vs. neutral stimuli and n-back working memory performance 
8.3.2.1. Accuracy 
8.3.2.1.1. Hits 
There was a significant main effect of emotion (F(1, 85) = 6.89, p = .01, ηp
2= 
.08) but no main effect of schizotypy group (F(1, 85) = 0.62, p = .43, ηp
2= .01). There 
were also no significant interactions between emotion and schizotypy (F(1, 85) = 3.28, 
p = .07, ηp
2= .04). Main effects analyses revealed that emotional stimuli were associated 
with a lower hit rate (M = 2.60, SE = .03) than neutral stimuli (M = 2.65, SE = .03). 
8.3.2.1.2. Correct rejections 
Again, there was a significant main effect of emotion (F(1, 85) = 34.88, p < 
.001, ηp
2= .29) but no main effect of schizotypy group (F(1, 85) = 0.53, p = .47, ηp
2= 
.01). There were also no significant interactions between emotion and schizotypy (F(1, 
85) = .02, p = .90, ηp
2= < .001). Main effects analyses revealed that emotional stimuli 
was associated with a lower correct rejection rate (M = 10.77, SE = .02) than neutral 
stimuli (M = 10.84, SE = .02). 
8.3.2.2. Sensitivity 
8.3.2.2.1. d'- sensitivity 
There was a significant main effect of emotion (F(1, 85) = 23.11, p = < .001, 
ηp
2= .21), and again, no main effect of schizotypy group (F(1, 85) = 0.47, p = .50, ηp
2= 







85) = 0.36 p = .55, ηp
2= .004). Main effects analyses revealed that neutral stimuli 
elicited higher sensitivity (M = 3.50, SE = .07) than emotional stimuli (M = 3.50, SE = 
.07). 
8.3.2.2.2. c – bias 
There was no significant main effect of emotion for bias (F(1, 85) = 3.08, p = 
.08, ηp
2= .04), nor a main effect of schizotypy group (F(1, 85) = 0.41, p = .84, ηp
2< 
.001). There were also no significant interactions between emotion and schizotypy (F(1, 
85) = 2.57 p = .11, ηp
2= .03). Main effects analyses revealed that neutral stimuli were 
associated with a more conservative response bias (M = .49, SE = .03) than emotional 
stimuli (M = .46, SE = .02). 
In summary, overall emotional stimuli reduce accuracy, with hit rates and 
correct rejections decreased relative to neutral stimuli. Similarly, sensitivity was 
reduced when faced with emotional vs. neutral stimuli. Interestingly, neutral stimuli 
were associated with a more conservative responding style, with participants appearing 
to employ a more liberal approach for emotional stimuli. Overall, high schizotypes did 







8.3.3. Types of emotion and emotional working memory n-back task performance 
8.3.3.1. Accuracy 
8.3.3.1.1. Hits 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the 
main effect of load (χ2(2) = 14.99, p < .01); this was also evident for the intercept of 
load and emotion (χ2(20) = 45.95, p < .01). Huynh-Feldt corrections were therefore 
applied to relevant data. The CFQ was included as a covariate and was significant (F(1, 
84) = 5.33, p = .02, ηp
2= .06). 
The analysis showed a significant main effect of load (F(1.79, 144.18) = 19.14, 
p < .001, ηp
2= .19). There was no linear main effect of emotion (F(3, 252) = 2.24, p = 
.08, ηp
2= .03). However, the within-subjects contrasts suggested a quadratic relationship 
was present (F(1, 84) = 6.82, p = .01, ηp
2= .08). A quadratic rather than linear 
relationship makes sense given emotion groups were not ordered in a sequential 
manner, as was possible with load. Contrasts were therefore considered in assessing the 
significance of interactions involving emotions; see below. There was also a main effect 
of schizotypy group (F(1, 84) = 5.02, p = .03, ηp
2= .06).  
There were no interactions between load and emotion (F(1, 84) = 0.43, p =.51, 
ηp
2= .01), load and schizotypy (F(1, 84) = 1.71, p =.46, ηp
2= .01), or emotion and 
schizotypy (F(1, 84) = 1.93, p = .17, ηp
2= .02). Additionally, no three way interaction 








 Simple effects analyses indicated that as expected, hits declined as task 
difficulty increased – see Figure 8.2 a) below. All loads differed significantly from each 
other, p < .001 for all comparisons. For emotion, neutral and sad stimuli did not differ 
(p = .66), nor did neutral and fearful (p = .10), nor fearful and happy (p = .09). All other 
combinations differed at p < .05, with happy stimuli eliciting the lowest hit rate; see 
Figure 8.2 b) High schizotypes had lower estimated mean hit rates (M = 2.48, SE = 
0.04) than low schizotypes (M = 2.61, SE = .04; p = .03, 95% CI [.012, .25]).  
           
a)       b) 
Figure 8.2. a) Mean hit estimates for different stimuli emotion types and b) levels of n-
back load. 
8.3.3.1.2. Correct rejections 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the 







load and emotion (χ2(20) = 85.04, p < .01). Huynh-Feldt corrections were therefore 
applied to relevant data. Again, the CFQ was included as a covariate but was not 
significant for correct rejections (F(1, 84) = 2.13, p = .15, ηp
2= .03). 
Similar to hits, there was a significant main effect of load (F(1.78, 14.51) = 
10.64, p < .001, ηp
2= .11), however there was no significant quadratic main effect of 
emotion (F(1, 84) = 1.18, p= .28, ηp
2= .01) nor a main effect of schizotypy group (F(1, 
84) = 2.13, p = .15, ηp
2= .03). 
With regards to interactions, there was none present between emotion and load 
(F(1, 84) = 2.14, p = .15, ηp
2= .03), load and schizotypy (F(1, 84) = 1.73, p = .49, ηp
2= 
.02), or emotion and schizotypy (F(1, 84) = 1.31, p = .26, ηp
2= .02). There was also no 
evidence of a three-way interaction between the three factors (F(1, 84) = 3.36, p = .07, 
ηp
2= .04). 
Simple effects analyses indicated that n-back load impacted performance in the 
expected directory, with correct rejections decreasing as load increased, p < .001 for all 








Figure 8.3. Mean estimates for correct rejections by level of n-back load. 
8.3.3.2. Sensitivity 
8.3.3.2.1. d’ – sensitivity 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was not violated for 
any of the factors. Again, the CFQ was included as a covariate for sensitivity and was 
significant (F(1, 84) = 6.67, p = .01, ηp
2= .06).  
There was a significant main effect of load (F(2, 168) = 27.05, p < .001, ηp
2= 
.24), a significant quadratic main effect of emotion (F(1, 84) = 5.67, p= .02, ηp
2= .06) 
and a main effect of schizotypy group (F(1, 84) = 5.75, p = .02, ηp
2= .06). 
There were no interactions between emotion and load (F(1, 84) = 1.04, p = .31, 
ηp
2= .01), load and schizotypy (F(2, 168) = 0.95, p = .39, ηp
2= .01), or emotion and 
schizotypy (F(1, 84) = 2.17, p = .14, ηp
2= .03). There was also no evidence of a three-








In line with accuracy outcomes, simple effects analyses showed that sensitivity 
decreased with load, p < .001 for all comparisons, see Figure 8.4 a). Sensitivity for each 
emotion is also depicted in Figure 8.4 b).  Fearful stimuli were associated with lower 
sensitivity than neutral (p < 01) and sad stimuli (p < .001), but not happy stimuli (p = 
1.00). Neutral stimuli were associated with higher sensitivity than happy (p = .01) but 
did not differ from sad stimuli (p = 1.00). Participants were more sensitive to sad than 
happy stimuli (p < .001). High schizotypes had a lower mean estimated d’ score (M = 
2.97, SE = .06) than low schizotypes (M = 3.16, SE = .05; p = .02, 95% CI [.03, .34]), 
indicating that high schizotypes had more difficulty discriminating targets from non-
targets.  
 
a)       b) 
Figure 8.4. a) Mean sensitivity estimates for different stimuli emotion types and b) 







8.3.3.2.2. c – bias  
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the 
main effect of load (χ2(2) = 14.18, p = .001); this was also evident for the intercept of 
load and emotion (χ2(20) = 61.89, p < .01). Huynh-Feldt corrections were therefore 
applied to relevant data. The CFQ was included as a covariate but was not significant 
(F(1, 84) = 2.36, p = .13, ηp
2= .03) 
There was a significant main effect of load (F(2, 168) = 6.57, p = .003, ηp
2= .7), 
a significant linear main effect of emotion (F(3, 252) = 2.74, p= .04, ηp
2= .03) but no 
quadratic effect (F(1, 84) = 3.90, p= .05, ηp
2= .04). There was also no main effect of 
schizotypy group (F(1, 84) = 2.36, p = .13, ηp
2= .03). 
There were no significant interactions between emotion and load (F(5.46, 
418.20) = 1.36, p = .24, ηp
2= .02), load and schizotypy (F(2, 84) = 0.78, p = .44, ηp
2= 
.01), or emotion and schizotypy (F(3, 84) = 0.78, p = .51, ηp
2= .01). There was also no 
evidence of a three-way interaction between the three factors (F(5.46, 458.30) = 0.28, p 
= .94, ηp
2= .01). 
Simple effects analyses showed that the criterion increased with load as per 
Figure 8.5 a), p < .001 for all comparisons, meaning that responding became more 
conservative with higher loads. Happy stimuli had the highest criterion which was 
significantly larger than all other types of emotion at p = < .001; see Figure 8.5 b). No 







Overall, accuracy outcomes suggest high schizotypes are impaired in detecting 
signal/target stimuli from noise/non-target stimuli, as evidenced by their decreased hits 
rates but no difference in correct rejections. Findings around sensitivity and bias 
demonstrate that high schizotypes have poorer sensitivity than low schizotypes 
regardless of load/emotion, and overall increasing load impairs sensitivity. In addition, 
both happy and fearful stimuli appear to impair sensitivity. Interestingly, participants 
were more liberal when faced with higher cognitive loads, and with happy as opposed to 
other types of emotion. Also of note is the finding that the CFQ was a significant 
covariate for hits and d’ , but not correct rejections or c.  
  
a)       b) 








8.3.4. Role of cognitive failures in accounting working memory performance  
CFQ score did not correlate with overall hit rates (r = .14), correct rejections (r = 
.06), sensitivity (r = .16), or bias (r = .10), suggesting that everyday cognitive failures 
have little relationship to emotional working memory performance. In order to ascertain 
this, changes in F-values for main effects and interactions for the above ANOVAs are 
presented in Tables 8.1 (hits and correct rejections) and 8.2 (sensitivity and bias) below. 
For both hits and sensitivity, the inclusion of the CFQ as a covariate led to the main 
effect of schizotypy group becoming significant. Additionally, inclusion of the CFQ as 

















Changes in F Value for Hits and Correct Rejections According to Addition of Cognitive 
Failures as a Covariate 
  F p-value ηp
2 
Hits Load 117.57 <.001 .58 
 Load [CFQ] 19.14 <.001 .19 
 Emotion 17.60 <.001 .17 
 Emotion [CFQ] 6.82 .01 .08 
 Schizotypy group 1.63 .11 .02 
 Schizotypy group [CFQ] 5.02 .01 .06 
 Load x emotion 2.42 .12 .16 
 Load x emotion [CFQ] 0.43 .51 .01 
 Load x schizotypy 0.14 .85 .002 
 Load x schizotypy [CFQ] 0.74 .47 .01 
 Emotion x schizotypy 1.97 .16 .02 
 Emotion x schizotypy [CFQ] 1.93 .17 .02 
 Load x emotion x schizotypy .86 .52 .01 
 Load x emotion x schizotypy [CFQ] .34 .91 .004 
CR Load 75.49 <.001 .47 
 Load [CFQ] 10.64 <.001 .11 
 Emotion 0.40 .53 .01 
 Emotion [CFQ] 1.17 .28 .01 
 Schizotypy group 0.75 .40 .01 
 Schizotypy group [CFQ] 2.13 .15 .03 
 Load x emotion 0.73 .40 .01 
 Load x emotion [CFQ] 2.14 .15 .03 
 Load x schizotypy 1.39 .25 .02 







  F p-value ηp
2 
 Emotion x schizotypy 0.63 .43 .01 
 Emotion x schizotypy [CFQ] 1.31 .26 .02 
 Load x emotion x schizotypy  1.20 .28 .01 
 Load x emotion x schizotypy [CFQ] 3.36 .07 .04 




















Changes in F Value for Sensitivity and Bias According to Addition of Cognitive 
Failures as a Covariate 
  F p-value ηp
2 
d'  Load 175.58 <.001 .67 
 Load [CFQ] 27.05 <.001 .24 
 Emotion 35.57 <.001 .30 
 Emotion [CFQ] 5.70 .02 .06 
 Schizotypy group 1.68 .20 .02 
 Schizotypy group [CFQ] 5.75 .02 .06 
 Load x emotion 0.76 .39 .01 
 Load x emotion [CFQ] 1.04 .31 .01 
 Load x schizotypy 0.11 .90 .001 
 Load x schizotypy [CFQ] 0.95 .39 .01 
 Emotion x schizotypy 1.81 .18 .02 
 Emotion x schizotypy [CFQ] 2.17 .14 .03 
 Load x emotion x schizotypy 0.76 .39 .01 
 Load x emotion x schizotypy [CFQ] 1.48 .23 .02 
c  Load 43.79 <.001 .34 
 Load [CFQ] 6.57 .003 .08 
 Emotion 26.52 <.001 .24 
 Emotion [CFQ] 2.74 .04 .03 
 Schizotypy group 0.75 .39 .01 
 Schizotypy group [CFQ] 2.36 .13 .03 
 Load x emotion 12.48 <.001 .13 
 Load x emotion [CFQ] 1.36 .24 .02 







  F p-value ηp
2 
 Load x schizotypy [CFQ] 0.80 .44 .01 
 Emotion x schizotypy 0.66 .57 .01 
 Emotion x schizotypy [CFQ] 0.78 .50 .01 
 Load x emotion x schizotypy  0.75 .59 .01 
 Load x emotion x schizotypy [CFQ] 0.28 .94 .01 
 Note. [CFQ] denotes CFQ added to the model as a covariate 
8.4. Discussion 
This study sought to explore further the role of emotion in cognitive 
performance in schizotypes. High and low schizotype participants were compared for 
differences in self-reported cognitive failures, as well as differences in processing of 
emotional vs. neutral stimuli in an objective working memory task. In addition, we 
considered whether the inclusion of cognitive failures as a covariate could account for 
working memory performance differences on emotionally valanced stimuli. 
8.4.1. Key findings 
The current findings are similar to previous studies which have identified a strong 
link between schizotypy and cognitive failures (Corcoran et al., 2013; Giesbrecht et al., 
2007; Pfeifer et al., 2009), with individuals high on schizotypy reporting more failures 
than those low on schizotypy. High schizotypes demonstrated significantly reduced 
semantic but not phonological verbal fluency. This reflects patterns of performance 







although it is interesting that the current study found no evidence of deficits on the more 
complex category switching task in schizotypy.  
With regards to the core tasks of interest, high schizotypes did not exhibit any 
impairment on the lab-based emotional 0-back task, a simple visual attention-based task 
with a low cognitive load. However, high schizotypes exhibited impaired working 
memory across increased loads of 1-back, 2-back, and 3-back. Contrary to our 
hypotheses, emotional stimuli elicited a relative deficit compared with neutral stimuli 
for all participants, regardless of level of schizotypy. Further analyses accounting for 
differing levels of load and type of emotion also failed to identify a specific emotional 
working memory deficit in schizotypy. Although heightened sensitivity and therefore 
reactivity of response to emotion is well documented in schizotypy (Collip et al., 2013), 
it seems that, in a laboratory environment at least, this does not translate to a reduction 
in working memory when faced with stimuli of either positive or negative valence. 
This research also revealed that, across all levels of load and emotion, high 
schizotypes achieve lower hit rates and have more difficulty discriminating target from 
non-target stimuli, but did not differ on their bias in responding or response criterion. 
These findings are suggestive that high schizotypes have difficulties in accuracy of 
perception of information to be stored, rather than systematically applying a flawed 
style of responding. That is, working memory issues in schizotypy appear to be due to a 
problem of ability rather than approach. A deficit of ability is in line with a number of 







(Kerns & Becker, 2008a; Koychev et al., 2012; Schmidt-Hansen & Honey, 2009a).   
However, only a handful of papers have examined measures of sensitivity in addition to 
accuracy in n-back performance in schizotypy, and these findings add to incoherence in 
the literature. Schmidt-Hansen & Honey’s (2009) found that low levels of negative 
schizotypy were associated with a conservative response bias, but that unusual 
experiences in schizotypy had no impact on bias. Another study identified a more 
liberal style of responding in people who have experienced psychotic-like experiences 
(Rossi, et al., 2016), and suggested this may relate to problems in reality testing in 
schizophrenia (Brebion et al., 2007). As these previous studies considering sensitivity 
have not included emotionally salient stimuli, comparison may not be particularly 
meaningful.  
An unexpected finding was that happy stimuli elicited the lowest hit rate of all 
emotions, eliciting poorer sensitivity and a more conservative response bias across all 
participants. Fearful stimuli also elicited poorer sensitivity, although to a lower degree 
than happy. Given our fearful stimuli were of negative valence and high arousal, and the 
happy were of positive valence and mid arousal, it is difficult to interpret these findings. 
Kensinger and Corkin (2003) found increased reaction times for fearful vs. neutral 
stimuli in conditions of higher n-back load, and suggested that activation of emotional 
networks acts as an additional drain on resources alongside n load. From an 
evolutionary perspective, the emotional activation associated with the fight/flight 







more robust findings regarding happy stimuli in the current study are more difficult to 
interpret. Previous research has found that, within a delayed recognition memory 
paradigm, positive emotional valence was generally associated with more liberal 
responding, however in this study discriminability was actually enhanced by positive 
valence (Bowen, et al., 2016). Perhaps from an evolutionary perspective, happy or 
positive stimuli in our environment carry no threat potential and therefore afford the 
perceiver more time for careful consideration. Less obviously “safe” and potentially 
threat-laden stimuli, such as of fearful, or even sad or neutral valence, require a more 
immediate response, and therefore encourage a more “trigger-happy” or liberal 
approach to responding. Clearly, further research is required into the role of both 
valence and arousal in disrupting or facilitating working memory function in 
schizotypes.  
A secondary aim of this study was to explore the relationship between self-
reported cognition in daily life and objective neuropsychological performance. First, 
cognitive failures appeared to be significant as a covariate for hits and sensitivity, but 
not correct rejections or response bias. This finding aligns with previous studies, which 
found an association between accuracy of working memory and self-reported failures 
(e.g., Ishigami & Klein, 2009; McVay & Kane, 2009). Further to these issues, no 
correlation between any of the measures of objective working memory performance and 
self-reported cognitive failures was identified. It remains the case that the addition of 







capturing the same cognitive difficulties experienced by schizotypes in their everyday 
lives. Why is this? As suggested above, the source of high schizotypes’ poor accuracy 
on the n-back task appeared to be ability rather than a style of approach. Cognitive 
failures, meanwhile, are thought of as reflecting an inadequate cognitive management 
style (Larson & Merritt, 1991). The dissociation between n-back and CFQ outcomes 
makes sense in that they may be accessing very different features of functioning. High 
schizotypes therefore experience impairment in both pure ability and capacity for 
cognition in real world contexts. 
Also pertinent to the dissociation between working memory and cognitive failures 
may be the task design. Although our goal was to maximise ecological validity by 
introducing an emotional component to the working memory task, use of evocative 
stimuli is perhaps not enough. The stimuli, whilst selected to activate emotional 
processing networks, lacked the personal relevance which is tied in with most of the 
emotional stimuli we encounter in daily life. Imaging studies have identified cortical 
midline structures as areas of brain activation specific to self-referential content 
(Northoff, et al., 2006). Therefore, enriching the current n-back paradigm with 
participant-generated emotionally salient stimuli has potential for improved mimicking 
of real world emotional cognition. At this point, our previous assertion that cognitive 
failures access facets of cognition separate to those that are the focus of traditional, 
objective measurements of cognition, is supported (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016a). Given 







ecologically valid experimental paradigms or constructs are needed to improve our 
ability to assess cognitive capacity. 
8.4.2. Limitations 
There are several limitations to be considered for the current study. A number of 
these relate to the sample. A larger sample size is needed to improve power and clarify 
findings. In addition, many of the demographic features of the sample were not 
measured (e.g., previous education, smoking status), and those that were suggest the 
sample was relatively restricted. Participants were primarily female undergraduate 
students; therefore, the current results are limited in their generalisability and future 
studies would ideally capture more demographic information and cast a wider net to 
capture a better balance of sexes. Of particular interest would be individuals in their late 
adulthood, as the research into schizotypy in older populations is as yet very limited. 
There is emerging evidence that whilst the factor structure is stable over the lifespan, 
overall schizotypy tends to decrease with age (Badcock & Dragović, 2006; Bora & 
Baysan Arabaci, 2009). Of interest is whether deficits in emotional processing and 
cognition as well as problems with everyday failures may become less pronounced with 
the development of compensatory strategies through life experience.  
There was also some evidence of a self-selection bias, with participants who chose 
to take part in this second study reporting more frequent cognitive failures than the rest 
of the sample that completed online surveys only. It would make sense that some 







completing tests of objective ability, perhaps due to concern or anxiety. Nevertheless, 
this difference was small (difference of three points out of a possible score of 100 on the 
CFQ), and larger studies may be able to avoid such a problem.     
In terms of the group analysis of schizotypy, it is possible that the low group could 
be anomalous in their performance and response to emotions as the high group; research 
around these individuals is as yet very limited. Idealistically, in future people would be 
pre-selected from a large sample to be +/- 1 standard deviation from the mean for high 
and low respectively as well as a control group scoring +/- 0.5 standard deviations from 
the mean. In this way we would have three groups who did not overlap in their 
schizotypy score. Unfortunately, there was not a sufficiently large sample for this 
approach in the current study. Whilst utilisation of the low schizotypy group still 
achieves the aims of this study, future studies would ideally include a larger sample size 
to enable comparison between low and average schizotypes. 
Another issue not considered in the current study may be the mediating role of 
depression and anxiety symptoms in subjective cognition. Heightened subjective 
cognitive complaints associated with physical illness in the absence of objective 
cognitive deficits appear to be associated with low mood or distress, for example in 
individuals with epilepsy (Marino et al., 2009) and cancer (Hutchinson et al., 2012). 
Depression and anxiety symptoms are also prevalent within schizotypy (Lewandowski 
et al., 2006), and negative affect acts as a partial mediator in the relationship between 







as to whether this reflects negative cognitive biases in self-reporting, or whether 
objective assessment tasks may fail to capture subtle cognitive failures as experienced in 
daily life (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016b). Future studies would therefore benefit from 
inclusion of measures of depression and anxiety, to assess the extent to which these 
factors specifically impact the relationship between objective and subjective cognition 
in schizotypy. 
 This study used dimensional ratings of IAPS images to produce categories of 
emotional images. Whilst both valence and arousal were taken into account in formation 
of these categories, of interest may be how arousal uniquely shapes performance.  An 
fMRI study found that, in healthy people, images of only medium to high arousal levels 
had an impact on working memory, potentially through drawing more attention and 
disrupting the memory process (Mather et al., 2006). Hence, future studies should 
incorporate emotional stimuli with differing arousal levels to determine whether there is 
a threshold at which it interferes with working memory performance, and whether this 
threshold is lower for those scoring highly on schizotypy.  
Previous studies of the impact of emotion on cognition in schizotypy have tended 
to focus on social cues, such as facial expressions (e.g., Leitman et al., 2007; Phillips et 
al., 2011). Interestingly, people with schizophrenia demonstrate heightened memory for 
faces, despite difficulty interpreting expressions (Mano & Brown, 2013). The IAPS 
images selected for the current study did include a majority depicting people or social 







is likely quite difficult to identify images of strong arousal and valence that do not 
include interpersonal cues. Nonetheless, if future studies could consider social vs. non-
social stimuli, further clarification could be sought as to whether social information has 
a specific impact on cognition. 
8.4.3. Clinical implications and directions for future research 
This research provided further evidence that working memory deficits and 
everyday cognitive failures are evident even in healthy high schizotypes, and may 
constitute early markers of risk for psychosis. Given these two aspects of cognition 
seem to be distinct, further consideration is required in how clinicians approach 
treatment of cognitive dysfunction in daily life.  
Although a relative deficit for emotional vs. neutral stimuli was evident across all 
participants, the current findings nevertheless suggest that emotionally salient 
experiences have the capacity to further interfere with cognition across the psychosis 
continuum, particularly as task difficulty increases from simple attention to demands on 
working memory. Early intervention programs incorporating general cognitive 
components are already in development (Piskulic, Barbato, Liu, & Addington, 2015), 
with the aim being to help manage cognitive difficulties which can be a source of stress 
and possibly contribute to potentiation of illness in prodromal individuals. However, the 
current findings suggest that cognitive remediation programs may benefit from targeting 
emotion processing. Additionally, other aspects of schizotypy that may contribute to 







cognition – may also need to be addressed in early intervention training programs. A 
study with healthy individuals has found that “brain training” using working memory 
tasks incorporating emotive elements demonstrates transferability to other types of 
training tasks that also include emotion (Schweizer, Hampshire, & Dalgleish, 2011). Of 
course, the ultimate transferability of these popular interventions – from computer-
based tasks to the real world – is yet to be established. 
Cognitive behavioural therapy could also be used to develop distress tolerance 
skills, which would help further reduce the impact of negative emotions on cognition.  
In addition, there is a need for therapists to be sensitive to the cognitive features of 
schizotypes, should they seek help. For example, most psychotherapies focus on 
discussion of emotive topics, and many even aim to engender intense emotional states 
within the session (e.g., emotion-focused therapy; Greenberg, 2004). It is possible that 
emotional content could disrupt schizotypes’ ability to retain information during 
session; hence, therapists may need to consider how information is “chunked” across 
the period of a session to maximise treatment effectiveness.   
8.4.4. Conclusions 
This study supported previous findings of a working memory deficit in schizotypy, 
as well as our previous findings that self-reported cognitive failures are also heightened 
in schizotypy (Carrigan & Barkus, 2017a). Objective working memory deficits and 
failures in daily life may therefore hold utility as early markers of risk for 







when faced with emotional stimuli were evident across all participants rather than being 
exaggerated in high schizotypes. Whilst problems are evident in both cognitive ability 
and capacity in schizotypy, the two aspects of cognition were not associated. It may be 
that the ecological validity of the n-back emotional working memory paradigm could be 
further improved by addition of content that is self-referential for individual 
participants, given the personalised nature of emotionally salient events in everyday life. 
Clinically, cognitive remediation programs that target both working memory and 
















9. General Discussion 
9.1. Summary of findings  
Collectively, the series of studies within this thesis provide for a clearer 
understanding of the determinants of vulnerability to cognitive failures. They also 
highlight the role of emotion in shaping cognition within schizotypy as a trait reflecting 
psychosis proneness. In addressing the broad hypotheses presented in Chapter 1 and the 
more specific hypotheses presented in Chapter 5, the current research has revealed that:  
1. Self-reported cognitive failures measure capacity for cognitive functioning in the 
real world, and reflect both trait vulnerability and the impact of state factors that 
may shape cognition on a momentary basis (Chapter 2). 
2. Individuals with a range of psychological disorders report increased cognitive 
failures relative to healthy populations, and substance use may also increase 
susceptibility to failures (Chapter 3). 
3. Self-reported cognitive failures are not distorted by problems of self-awareness 
associated with neuroticism, and thus are useful as a measure of real world 
cognition rather than purely reflecting poor or excessive self-monitoring 
(Chapter 6). 
4. Subclinical high schizotypes do consistently report increased cognitive failures 







5. High schizotypes’ negative affectivity does appear to contribute to their 
experience of increased cognitive failures in daily life. Specifically: 
a. Negative affect partially mediates the relationship between schizotypy 
and cognitive failures, which suggests it contributes to but does not fully 
explain the mechanism through which high schizotypes experience 
heightened failures (Chapter 7).  
(Chapter 8). 
6. High schizotypes exhibit a deficit in objectively-assessed working memory, but 
this deficit of ability is dissociated from problems with capacity for functioning 
in daily life as indicated by heightened cognitive failures. 
The reviews included in this thesis supported a view of cognitive failures as 
reflecting capacity for successful cognition within day-to-day contexts, distinct to 
objective cognitive performance which is assessed at its optimal level in the lab or 
clinic. In healthy populations, vulnerability to slips appears to be determined by 
personality traits including neuroticism and schizotypy, whilst fluctuations in aspects of 
state including time of day, mood, activity, and boredom also increase the likelihood of 
a failure occurring (Chapter 2). In addition, the review of failures in populations with a 
psychological disorder highlighted that slips tend to occur at an increased frequency in 
mental illness, with individuals with depression, PTSD, schizophrenia, and a range of 








Whilst these systematic reviews drew together existing research to develop a 
more holistic conceptualisation of cognitive failures, they also served to highlight 
questions about the impact of self-awareness. In particular, key concerns regarding the 
relationship between failures and neuroticism, and the potential for self-awareness to 
distort self-reports of cognition became clear. Hence, this thesis initially explored the 
extent to which self-ratings of cognitive failures are corroborated by observers; a 
relatively novel approach in this area. The findings presented in Chapter 6 did not 
support the complaint hypothesis of cognitive failures, where concerns with cognition 
are thought to reflect negativistic biases associated with neuroticism (Wilhelm et al., 
2010). Rather, self and observer ratings of cognitive failures were moderately 
correlated, and neuroticism did not alter this relationship. Additionally, poor self-
awareness – as assessed via disparity between self and observer ratings of neuroticism – 
also did not reduce correlation between self and observer ratings of cognitive failures. 
Thus, self-reported cognitive failures are observable to both self and others. The 
remaining program of research was therefore designed to attempt to determine which 
features of everyday life result in cognitive failures in schizotypy, given the gap 
between subjectively-perceived and objectively-observed cognition in this group. 
In Chapters 7 and 8, the role of emotion in schizotypes’ cognitive problems was 
explored. The results of Chapter 7 identified a mediating role for negative affect in the 
relationship between schizotypy and cognitive failures. This supports the theory that 







this group. However, as this was only a partial mediation, it is likely that other aspects 
of schizotypy also contribute to everyday cognitive failures.  
Given the apparent role of affect in everyday failures in schizotypy, it was 
hypothesized that introducing an emotional element into an objective working memory 
task might elicit a clearer deficit in performance in high schizotypes, thereby enabling 
closer comparison of self-reported and objective cognition (Chapter 8). Although low 
schizotypes demonstrated poorer working memory overall, emotional stimuli did not 
exacerbate performance issues relative to neutral stimuli. Self-reported cognitive 
failures were also more frequent in schizotypy, but still did not correlate with objective 
performance outcomes, even with emotion accounted for. The relationship between 
cognitive performance and self-reported cognitive failures remains far from clear cut.  
9.2. Conceptual and research implications  
The conceptual and clinical implications of this thesis are each considered with 
regards to two key components of the research findings: 1) the cognitive failures 
construct, and 2) cognitive failures and cognition in schizotypy. 
9.2.1. Cognitive failures construct 
A key outcome of this thesis was the clarification of a definition of the cognitive 
failures construct. Self-reports of cognitive failures appear to give an indication of an 
individual’s tendency to demonstrate either high or low cognitive capacity in the 







failures, differs from ability in that it does not capture maximum cognitive potential 
given ideal circumstances. Rather, it reflects cognitive functioning as it must occur in 
everyday life; as one copes with encountering different emotions, stressors, levels of 
task interest and challenge, environments, substances, and times of day. Although 
capacity for modulating the effects of such factors on cognition may be linked to stable 
personality traits and biology, the fluctuating nature of these factors means that capacity 
shifts over time in a fluid manner. Hence, cognitive failures are a distinct construct 
within cognition in that they capture factors relevant to cognitive functioning in 
everyday contexts, beyond pure ability in certain domains.  
This thesis echoed previous studies in failing to identify a correlation between 
failures and objective neurocognitive outcomes (e.g., Forster & Lavie, 2007; Kane et al., 
2007a; Roche et al., 2005). With the definition of cognitive failures as measuring 
dynamic cognitive capacity vs. neurocognition as measuring stable optimal ability, 
these findings become expected rather than confusing. Further, they emphasise the 
significance of subjective experiences of cognition as a separate area for research. 
Although self-reports of any psychological phenomenon do need to be looked upon 
with caution for potential bias, ignoring them altogether in favour of “gold-standard” 
approaches that involve strict control mechanisms is problematic. The trade-off for the 
control afforded by gold-standard measures is knowledge around daily life processes 
(Reis, 2012). By valuing self-reports of real world experience, cognitive researchers 







the personality, illness, mood, and environmental determinants of momentary cognition. 
This thesis focused on just one such interaction – that between schizotypy and affect - 
and there are many others of potential interest that warrant further study. Thus, the 
findings contained in this thesis suggest that measuring self-reported cognitive failures 
alongside existing neurocognitive assessment could improve the ecological validity of 
cognitive research. 
But what exactly can self-report failures tell us about real world cognitive 
functioning? Previous findings reviewed in Chapter 2 of this thesis identified a link 
between vulnerability to cognitive failures and outcomes in daily life including 
likelihood of being the at-fault driver in a car accident (Larson & Merritt, 1991) and 
performance on the SAT exams in the U.S. (Unsworth et al., 2012). The study presented 
in Chapter 6, which compared self and informant ratings of cognitive failures, revealed 
that failures result in behavioural slips and errors that are significant enough to be 
reliably observable to others. Together, these results further indicate that self-reported 
failures provide insight into the extent to which one is generally able to successfully 
utilise cognition in the flow of their day-to-day lives, and thus carry out the tasks and 
challenges faced in any given moment.  
9.2.2. Cognitive failures and cognition in schizotypy 
Both cognitive capacity and cognitive ability were also studied in schizotypy, and 
findings point to a need for a separation of the two in future study of psychosis prone 







consistently heightened cognitive failures in individuals high on schizotypy was in line 
with previous research (e.g., Corcoran et al., 2013; Pfeifer et al., 2009). However, a 
novel finding was that negative affect mediates this relationship. Two areas of the 
current findings provide clues as to how schizotypy and affect may interact to shape 
failures. Firstly, Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that previous literature has found a 
strong link between negative affect and cognitive failures in both healthy (e.g., 
Mahoney et al., 1998; Payne & Schnapp, 2014) and clinical populations (e.g., 
MacQueen et al., 2002; Sullivan & Payne, 2007), separate to schizotypy.  
Secondly, Chapter 7 found that negative affect mediates rather than moderates 
the relationship between schizotypy and cognitive failures, suggesting this is a feature 
of schizotypy that is part of the mechanism through which failures occur in everyday 
life. But with affect acting only as a partial mediator, other schizotypal features and 
symptoms also appear to act as determinants of cognitive failures. Together, these 
findings suggest that affect can increase cognitive failures, and despite an overlap with 
affect so too does schizotypy itself. Given the presence of negative affectivity within 
individuals at both subclinical and clinical points of the psychosis continuum (Horan et 
al., 2008), it is, however, likely that the influence of affect on cognitive failures is 
compounded in high schizotypy. That is, schizotypy and affect also interact with each 
other to determine cognitive failures, as depicted in Figure 9.1. Whilst a range of other 







play a particularly large role in shaping failures in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. 
The clinical implications of this will be explored in detail in section 9.3.1.  
 
Figure 9.1. Proposed relationship between schizotypy, affect, and cognitive failures. 
 
The second area of interest in schizotypy within this thesis was the impact of 
emotion on objective cognition. Although previous findings of a working memory 
deficit were supported, there was no additional detrimental effect of emotional stimuli, 
and overall observed deficits were distinct from self-reported cognitive failures. An 
important finding was that high schizotypes’ pure ability is reduced, but so too is their 
separate capacity for transforming this in carrying out day-to-day responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, the question about what causes the “gap” between objective and 
subjective cognition could not be answered.  As per the definition proposed previously, 
cognitive failures likely still do not directly align with objective cognition because they 
ask about cognition in complex situations, which capture a range of dynamic factors 
that are broader still than emotion. For example, within schizotypy, the stress associated 
with ambiguous social situations (Quirk, Subramanian, & Hoerger, 2007) may also 







paradigms as this thesis has done is still necessarily artificial and controlled, and, we 
suspect, failed to ascertain personal salience. Other potentially relevant factors are 
virtually impossible to introduce in some way reminiscent of real life situations. Given 
that subclinical high schizotypes appear to retain the ability to observe and report on 
their own subtle deficits, subjective perceptions of cognition would seem to provide a 
valuable means for researchers to gain insight into their unique pattern of cognitive 
functioning in everyday life, in a way that simply cannot be achieved in the laboratory. 
9.3. Clinical implications 
9.3.1. Cognitive failures construct 
The review in Chapter 3 demonstrated that mild issues with daily cognitive 
function are closely linked to a variety of psychological disorders, including and 
perhaps especially those that tend to be thought of as less “severe” such as depression or 
anxiety, even when neuropsychological deficits are mild or absent (Farrin et al., 2003; 
MacQueen et al., 2002; Preiss et al., 2010). These complaints are present even in 
individuals prone to subclinical levels of distress, including those high on neuroticism 
and trait anxiety (Mahoney et al., 1998; Matthews, Coyle, & Craig, 1990b), suggesting 
that self-perceived cognitive failures may serve as a non-specific marker of declining 
mental health and risk for psychopathology. But a key question is, as a marker, what do 
cognitive failures actually reflect? Potentially increased susceptibility to failures might 
indicate a global inefficiency in cognition, which contributes to the development of 







performance does not provide any support for this theory. Alternatively, the links 
between cognitive failures and affect evidenced in both past literature and the current 
thesis might suggest that failures provide a behavioural window into underlying 
difficulties processing emotion and regulating emotional responses. Such deficits could 
be associated with increased distress, leading to illness onset. 
Cognitive failures may be better conceptualised as a symptom of psychological 
disorder as opposed to a marker of risk. If so, what is the causal relationship between 
cognitive failures and other symptoms? The relationship implied in this thesis is that 
failures occur, at least partially, as a kind of cognitive consequence of negative affect in 
individuals whom struggle to regulate emotions, such as those with high neuroticism 
(Ormel et al., 2013). However, a second possible explanation is that cognitive failures 
lead to negative affect. Carriere et al. (2008b) examined self-reports of attention-related 
errors, a subset of cognitive failures, and found a link with depressive symptoms. They 
suggested that individuals prone to errors are less consciously engaged with their 
environment, which may reflect a tendency towards ruminative thinking. This in turn 
leads to boredom and dysphoric affective states. The current thesis provided some 
support for the former viewpoint, with the finding that affect serves as a partial 
mediating factor determining cognitive failures, at least within subclinical schizotypy. 
However, further research is required to understand this relationship, and indeed it is 
certainly possible that both conceptualisations are true, that is cognitive failures and 







Despite these remaining questions about the role of cognitive failures in 
psychopathology, the current findings have some implications for clinical practice. At 
the first point of contact, clinicians could incorporate items from the CFQ or similar 
measures as part of a general mental health screening process. This may be particularly 
helpful for groups that are less likely to self-report more overt, affectively-based 
symptoms, such as men (Cochran & Rabinowitz, 2003) or older adults (Fiske, 
Wetherell, & Gatz, 2009). Whatever the role of cognitive failures in indicating or 
maintaining psychopathology, intervention may be possible to reduce their impact on 
daily activities. Mindfulness-based therapies, which aim to increase attentional control, 
show success in decreasing both ruminative behaviours and distress in depression (Jain 
et al., 2007). They may also be helpful in reducing cognitive failures in individuals with 
mild to moderate low mood and anxiety. Another treatment option may be “brain 
training” which is generally administered via computerised tasks. Whilst these 
approaches do not consistently improve all domains of cognitive functioning, they do 
appear to reduce the severity of other symptoms and improve daily life functioning 
(Motter et al., 2016). These interventions can now be used with relative ease and low 
cost, with both mindfulness and brain training mobile apps readily accessible. As such, 
these would seem to be feasible self-help options for groups at the lower end of clinical 
severity. Further research is required examining whether such approaches assist in 







9.3.2. Cognitive failures and cognition in schizotypy 
The intention of this thesis was to explore cognitive failures as they relate to 
schizotypy, a personality trait useful for capturing risk for psychosis. Although the 
preceding evidence would suggest that cognitive failures act as a general marker of 
psychopathology rather than a specific indicator of schizotypy, their heightened 
presence in individuals along the psychosis continuum warrants further consideration. 
Depression and anxiety are highly prevalent in schizotypy (Lewandowski et al., 2006), 
and are experienced alongside multiple other issues likely to maintain dysphoric mood 
states, such as social isolation. It is therefore possible that cognitive failures in 
schizotypy simply reflect the same influence of negative affect and emotion 
dysregulation evident in other types of psychopathology. However, there are a number 
of reasons to consider cognitive failures as they relate distinctly to schizotypy. First, 
schizotypy and its affective features are by definition a stable state of being (Horan et 
al., 2008), rather than the distinct affective episodes usually experienced in disorders 
like depression. Hence, cognitive failures are of separate interest in this group as a likely 
more enduring experience. In addition, unlike clinical groups, the majority of healthy 
high schizotypes will not go onto receive a psychosis diagnosis (Kaymaz et al., 2012). 
The role of cognitive failures in schizotypy as a proxy for psychosis risk is thus of 
investigative significance due to the fact they may interact with protective factors to 







If cognitive failures do represent a specific marker of risk along the psychosis 
continuum, there are two ways they may function. First, as suggested elsewhere in this 
thesis, they may be a cognitive basic symptom – a subtle reduction in functioning self-
perceived by the individual just before onset or relapse of illness, and prior to 
objectively-detectable decline (Schultze-Lutter, Ruhrmann, Picker, & Klosterkotter, 
2006). If cognitive failures are a basic symptom, it would be expected that people high 
on schizotypy would only complain of them when decompensating in their 
psychological functioning. Alternatively, cognitive failures may be conceptualised as a 
trait-based vulnerability present alongside high schizotypy, regardless of clinical status. 
In this case, cognitive failures may still fluctuate according to co-occurrence of other 
relevant state and trait factors. This allows for potential increases in the frequency of 
failure in illness stages, occurring due to factors like high stress or medication use, but 
also accounts for high failures in healthy high schizotypes who never seek help. This 
second view of how cognitive failures function as a risk marker has greater support 
from the current findings, in that our healthy sample reported high failures and a 
mediating effect of affect was present. Longitudinal research to confirm the extent to 
which cognitive failures are reported by individuals at different points along the 
psychosis continuum, and at different stages of illness, is necessary to determine its 
utility as a risk marker.  
In terms of objective emotional working memory, the clinical implications of the 







stage of cognitive impairment between healthy individuals with average schizotypy and 
those with a diagnosed schizophrenia-spectrum disorder. Objectively, difficulties only 
become apparent once a certain level of cognitive load is surpassed, for example when 
demands are placed on working memory rather than a more simple attentional task. A 
cognitive model of schizophrenia posits that underlying cognitive deficits contribute to 
pathology (Rapoport et al., 2012), hence factors that place excessive stress on cognition 
may increase the likelihood of illness onset for high schizotypes. Cognitive load may 
therefore relate to schizotypy and psychosis risk in a stress-vulnerability manner: high 
cognitive load may itself act as a stressor that reduces functioning and increases risk in 
schizotypy. 
Whilst not all high schizotypes will go on to develop a psychotic disorder, all 
individuals who develop ARMS are high on schizotypy (Debbané et al., 2015). Hence, 
this research can be used to inform approaches to assessment and treatment of 
individuals at-risk of transitioning from non-clinical to clinical status along the 
psychosis continuum. With the many questions that remain about the nature of cognitive 
failures and cognition in schizotypy, it seems that the focus on detecting deficits in 
objective cognition has been to the detriment of answering questions about real world 
cognitive functioning (Chun, Minor, & Cohen, 2013). This also applies to those with 
schizophrenia: although objective deficits are evident in this group, focusing purely on 
neurocognition limits our ability to understand how cognitive patterns in schizophrenia 







(2000) highlight the need to identify mediators between neurocognition and functional 
outcomes in order to design cognitive interventions that can have a transformative effect 
on cognition in everyday life. For example, within schizophrenia patients, mediators 
such as learning potential (Green et al., 2000) and social cognition (Kee, Kern, & 
Green, 1998) have been found to determine the extent to which neurocognitive deficits 
impact real world cognitive functioning. Thus, these need to be addressed when 
attempting to improve daily life outcomes. Although less is known about similar 
patterns in schizotypy, the current findings reiterate the dissociation between ability and 
capacity in the real world, and the need to explore factors other than emotion that act as 
mediators between the two.  
In the translation of these ideas into clinical practice, there are a number of 
existing cognitive early interventions for psychosis that could be quite simply altered 
for potentially significant improvements in outcomes. Cognitive remediation techniques 
use graded training in tasks in specific domains of cognition (e.g., attention, working 
memory) to improve function through practice (Gomar et al., 2015). These are now 
often presented via computer, similar to brain training programs used with healthy 
populations, and show some efficacy in improving cognitive functioning in individuals 
at clinical high risk of psychosis (e.g., Piskulic et al., 2015). One study found ARMS 
patients were able to improve their cognitive performance through  training, and that 
they obtained more benefit than those who had already progressed to schizophrenia 







one problem with this approach is that little is known about how cognitive remediation 
translates to everyday life. There is currently a large trial underway examining the 
efficacy of cognitive remediation for ARMS individuals (the “FOCUS” trial; Glenthøj 
et al., 2015), with general daily functioning as outcome. Whilst the results of this trial 
will be of interest, the current findings point to the importance of interventions for 
which real world cognitive outcomes specifically, such as cognitive failures, are 
measured.  
There are some flaws, however, with using existing cognitive remediation 
approaches to address cognitive failures. The definition of failures is that they occur 
unexpectedly in the flow of daily life, and do not reflect any enduring deficit of ability. 
Training in specific areas of cognition is perhaps the intervention version of traditional 
assessments which target ability only, rather than capacity for cognition in daily life 
contexts. An alternative approach might be interventions that teach individuals to 
understand factors that shape their own cognitive patterns, and develop “life 
management” skills to minimise these. For example, metacognitive training seeks to 
provide psychoeducation about the fallibility of human cognition and metacognition – 
“thinking about thinking” – thereby helping individuals to avoid automatic thought traps 
(Moritz & Woodward, 2007). This approach has had preliminary success with psychosis 
patients; rated as more fun and more useful to daily life than cognitive remediation 
(Moritz & Woodward, 2007). This could perhaps be adapted to help psychosis-prone 







educated on the factors that contribute to everyday failures, such as high cognitive load 
or negative affect. At-risk individuals could also learn about other features of psychosis-
proneness, such as dysfunction in social cognition, which may increase stress and 
secondarily contribute to failures. They could then be provided with strategies to 
minimise the likelihood of failures, such as use of memory aides, social skills training, 
or emotion regulation skills. Very little is currently known about how clinicians might 
intervene in high cognitive failures, and as such future research that 1) examines 
cognitive failures as an outcome for interventions that target contributing factors such a 
mood, and 2) compares different approaches to managing failures, is of foremost 
importance.  
Finally, the current findings also draw attention to the fact that whilst not all 
high schizotypes go on to seek help or receive a clinical diagnosis, they still experience 
some negative consequences of their high schizotypy. Despite appearing minor, 
cognitive failures can have serious, even harmful consequences in occupational and 
daily life settings (Simpson et al., 2005; Weigmann & Shappell, 1997), and may reduce 
quality of life. Non-help-seeking schizotypal college students report subjectively 
reduced quality of life equivalent to that observed in patients with a severe mental 
illness (Chun et al., 2013; A. S. Cohen et al., 2014). There are mixed findings as to 
whether objective markers of quality of life are similarly reduced (A. S. Cohen et al., 
2014) or demonstrate no difference relative to people low on schizotypy (Chun et al., 







dissatisfaction with life, even in those schizotypes who never go on to decompensate. 
The fact that the vast majority of schizotypal individuals will never seek help is 
inherently limiting, however, perhaps mental health literacy programs could be 
improved to encourage help-seeking. This could achieve improved awareness that 
minor issues in cognition might a) relate to a more serious issue, but more importantly 
b) be amenable to treatment.  
9.4. Limitations and further directions for research 
While limitations specific to each study are discussed within the relevant 
chapters, there are a few issues that affect the thesis as a whole. One concern is the 
limited generalisability of the samples utilised, with the majority of participants 
undergraduate students aged in their early twenties. However, schizotypy research in 
groups beyond early to mid-adulthood is very limited. It appears that the SPQ three-
factor structure holds up similarly in older adults, although schizotypal experiences are 
less frequent than in younger groups (Badcock & Dragović, 2006). This make sense 
given the median age for an initial psychotic episode is between 19-25 years (Ronald C 
Kessler et al., 2007), therefore high schizotypes who do go on to develop psychosis are 
removed from the sample pool after this age. Additionally, high schizotypes who do not 
decompensate may develop adaptive strategies that reduce the expression of schizotypal 
traits through life experience. As it stands, the majority of schizotypy studies utilise 
student populations, and it has been argued that meaningful variance exists in this group 







in the context of this thesis it was decided that it would be most beneficial to focus on a 
younger population in an attempt to answer some preliminary questions about cognitive 
failures and their relationship to schizotypy. Future research examining whether the key 
determinants of cognitive failures identified in the current thesis hold across older age 
groups will be of great interest. 
In Chapter 2 it was proposed that the state and trait factors known to influence 
cognitive failures likely interact to determine outcomes. Whilst the empirical studies 
within this thesis began to explore this relationship, more ecologically valid approaches 
to examining relevant state factors will be required to provide clearer answers. 
Experience sampling (ES) is a methodology of interest for psychological phenomena in 
everyday life mentioned previously in this thesis. This approach can capture self-reports 
of different experiences as they occur within daily life contexts via diary measurements 
at multiple time points each day. ES approaches have benefits such as reducing recall 
bias, and are of significance for understanding the way in which trait and state factors 
co-occur to shape outcomes such as cognition (Myin-Germeys et al., 2009). Whilst the 
cognitive failures research thus far has focused on the role of static factors at individual 
points in time, ES research enables examination of the dynamic interplay of trait 
vulnerability and exacerbating or protective factors in shaping cognitive failures over 
time. Per the findings of this thesis, the temporal relationship between fluctuations in 
mood and the occurrence of cognitive failures is significant for understanding the causal 







mood at one time point co-occur with cognitive failures in the same time point, or does 
it predict failures in the next time point? Very few studies thus far have utilised such an 
approach to examine cognition in daily life.  Two studies have found a link between 
stressors and memory and attention slips at the day level (Neupert et al., 2008; Palder et 
al., 2013), however further studies are needed examining multiple time points 
throughout the day for more detailed temporal analysis. Ongoing advances in mobile 
technology and associated reductions in cost will likely enable researchers to look at the 
whole range of state factors already known to shape failures on a momentary basis, such 
as challenge vs. ease of activity being engaged in (Kane et al., 2007a) or tiredness 
(Wilkerson et al., 2011). The current thesis has established the utility of self-reports of 
cognition, and has pinpointed key areas of personality (schizotypy and neuroticism) and 
daily life (affect) for this next step in the research to explore.  
Chapter 3 identified substance use and substance use disorders as potential 
confounds for cognitive failures research in both healthy and clinical populations. It was 
beyond the scope of the current thesis to address this, however it is possible that 
substance use patterns may have impacted the results. Future research would benefit 
from a closer consideration of how intoxication, withdrawal, and use shape cognitive 
failures. In particular, ES studies might explore whether substance use at one time point 
relates to increased failures at the next, or even later points (e.g., the morning after). 
Researchers examining cognitive failures in schizotypy will need to focus on cannabis 







like and unpleasant experiences following use (Barkus, Stirling, Hopkins, & Lewis, 
2006) which may exacerbate drug-related disruptions to everyday cognition.  
A related issue identified in Chapter 3 was the lack of consideration for 
comorbidity in psychiatric disorders. This mirrors (and co-occurs with) substance use as 
a potential confound for findings around cognitive failures. Schizotypy itself is 
associated with increased prevalence of psychiatric disorders beyond the schizophrenia-
spectrum; schizotypal personality disorder is associated with increased risk of PTSD, 
bipolar, and anxiety disorders (Pulay et al., 2009). However, again, this issue was not 
accounted for in this thesis’ focus on analogue samples. Both substance use and 
psychiatric comorbidity warrant that methodological approaches within the field are 
improved.  
Looking beyond the focus of this thesis, future research could also examine the 
possible application of the current findings to understanding cognition in other clinical 
populations. Particular cognitive deficits, and difficulty processing and regulating affect 
are noted in a number of other psychological disorders, but the direct impact of emotion 
on cognition is rarely studied. For example, one area of interest would be substance use 
disorders, in which cognitive impairment is evident even after detoxification is 
completed (e.g., Fein, Torres, Price, & Di Sclafani, 2006; McCann et al., 2008). 
Negative emotions are seen as one of the key drivers behind problematic substance use 
patterns (Cooper, Frone, Russell, & Mudar, 1995; Verdejo-García, Bechara, Recknor, & 







of emotion may negatively impact decision-making processes, leading to maladaptive 
behaviour including further substance use. Research examining whether the cognition of 
individuals with substance abuse (and other) disorders is reduced when dealing with 
emotional vs. neutral stimuli in the same way as in schizotypy will help to expand the 
reach of the current findings into other important areas of clinical and non-clinical 
psychology.  
9.5. Conclusions 
This thesis has addressed major conceptual limitations in an area of human 
cognition that has rarely been examined in depth. The results provide a clearer 
definition of self-reported cognitive failures as a valid measure of capacity for cognitive 
functioning in real world contexts, shaped by a range of trait and state-based factors. 
Importantly, self-perceived cognitive failures capture aspects of cognition separate to 
those measured by traditional approaches such as objective neurocognitive assessment. 
The findings also highlight the significance of heightened cognitive failures as a feature 
common to psychological disorders, which may represent a marker of impaired emotion 
processing and regulation. Further, this thesis has underscored the role of negative affect 
in subjective cognitive complaints in schizotypy, alongside other as yet unknown facets 
of this trait reflecting risk for psychosis. Collectively, these findings support the use of 
self-reported cognitive failures as a meaningful measure of everyday cognition in 
healthy, clinical, and at-risk groups. Clinically, the findings indicate a need to assess 







emotional regulation and emotion processing difficulties as a key barrier to successful 
day-to-day cognitive functioning in psychosis-prone populations. There is likely a 
detrimental effect on quality of life for the broad range of individuals who experience 
persistently high levels of everyday cognitive failures, emphasising the ongoing 








Aas, M., Dazzan, P., Mondelli, V., Toulopoulou, T., Reichenberg, A., Di Forti, M., … 
Pariante, C. M. (2011). Abnormal cortisol awakening response predicts worse 
cognitive function in patients with first-episode psychosis. Psychological 
Medicine, 41(3), 463–76. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291710001170 
Addington, J., van Mastrigt, S., Hutchinson, J., & Addington, D. (2002). Pathways to 
care: Help seeking behaviour in first episode psychosis. Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandinavica, 106(5), 358–364. https://doi.org/10.1034/j.1600-0447.2002.02004.x 
Adityanjee, Aderibigbe, Y. A., Theodoridis, D., & Vieweg, W. V. R. (1999). Dementia 
praecox to schizophrenia: The first 100 years. Psychiatry and Clinical 
Neurosciences, 53(4), 437–448. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1440-1819.1999.00584.x 
Aldinger, M., Stopsack, M., Ulrich, I., Appel, K., Reinelt, E., Wolff, S., … Barnow, S. 
(2014). Neuroticism developmental courses - implications for depression, anxiety 
and everyday emotional experience; a prospective study from adolescence to 
young adulthood. BMC Psychiatry, 14(1), 210. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12888-
014-0210-2 
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders (5th ed.). Washington, DC. 
Andreasen, N. C., Flaum, M., Swayze, V., O’Leary, D. S., Alliger, R., Cohen, G., … 







American Journal of Psychiatry, 150(1), 130–134. 
https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.150.1.130 
Aron, A. R. (2007). The neural basis of inhibition in cognitive control. The 
Neuroscientist, 13(3), 214–228. 
Aubin, G., Stip, E., Gélinas, I., Rainville, C., & Chapparo, C. (2009). Daily activities, 
cognition and community functioning in persons with schizophrenia. 
Schizophrenia Research, 107(2), 313–318. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2008.08.002 
Australian Bureau of Statistics: Australian Social Trends: education across Australia. 
(2008). 
Badcock, J. C., & Dragović, M. (2006). Schizotypal personality in mature adults. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 40(1), 77–85. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2005.06.015 
Baddeley, A. (2010). Working memory. Current Biology, 20(4), R136–R140. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2009.12.014 
Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., Braver, T. S., Sabb, F. W., MacDonald,  rd A., Noll, D. C., 
& Cohen, J. D. (2001). Selective deficits in prefrontal cortex function in 
medication-naive patients with schizophrenia. Archives of General Psychiatry, 
58(3), 280–288. https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.58.3.280 







schizotypy. Clínica Y Salud, 21(1), 3–8. https://doi.org/10.5093/cl2010v21n1a1 
Barkus, E., Stirling, J., Hopkins, R. S., & Lewis, S. (2006). Cannabis-induced 
psychosis-like experiences are associated with high schizotypy. Psychopathology, 
39(4), 175–178. https://doi.org/10.1159/000092678 
Barrantes-Vidal, N., Chun, C. A., Myin-Germeys, I., & Kwapil, T. R. (2013). 
Psychometric schizotypy predicts psychotic-like, paranoid, and negative symptoms 
in daily life. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 122(4), 1077–87. 
Barrantes-Vidal, N., Grant, P., & Kwapil, T. R. (2015). The role of schizotypy in the 
study of the etiology of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 
41(Suppl 2), S408–S416. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbu191 
Barratt, E. S. (1995). History of personality and intelligence theory and research: the 
challenge. In D. H. Saklofske & M. Zeidner (Eds.), International Handbook of 
Personality and Intelligence: Perspectives on Individual Differences (pp. 3–13). 
New York and London: Plenum Press. 
Beck, A. T., & Haigh, E. A. P. (2014). Advances in cognitive theory and therapy: The 
generic cognitive model. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 10(1), 1–24. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-032813-153734 
Beck, A. T., & Rector, N. A. (2005). Cognitive approaches to schizophrenia: theory and 








Berggren, N., Hutton, S. B., & Derakshan, N. (2011). The effects of self-report 
cognitive failures and cognitive load on antisaccade performance. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 2, 280. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00280 
Bergman, A., O’Brien, J., Osgood, G., & Cornblatt, B. (1995). Distractibility in 
schizophrenia. Psychiatry Research, 57(2), 131–140. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-
1781(95)02590-S 
Bilder, R. M., Reiter, G., Bates, J., Lencz, T., Szeszko, P., Goldman, R. S., … Kane, J. 
M. (2006). Cognitive development in schizophrenia: Follow-back from the first 
episode. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 28(2), 270–282. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13803390500360554 
Boals, A. (2008). Intrusive thoughts and everyday cognitive failures in Holocaust 
survivors. Stress and Health, 24(5), 401–405. https://doi.org/10.1002/smi.1191 
Boals, A., & Banks, J. B. (2012). Effects of traumatic stress and perceived stress on 
everyday cognitive functioning. Cognition & Emotion, 26(7), 1335–43. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2011.651100 
Boomsma, D. I. (1998). Genetic analysis of cognitive failures (CFQ): a study of Dutch 
adolescent twins and their parents. European Journal of Personality, 12(5), 321–
330. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0984(1998090)12:5<321::AID-
PER334>3.0.CO;2-5 







personality traits in the normal population. Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 
63(5), 663–9. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1440-1819.2009.02011.x 
Bora, E., Yücel, M., & Pantelis, C. (2010). Cognitive impairment in schizophrenia and 
affective psychoses: Implications for DSM-V criteria and beyond. Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 36(1), 36–42. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbp094 
Borenstein, M., Hedges, L. V., Higgins, J. P. T., & Rothstein, H. R. (2009). 
Introduction to Meta-Analysis. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Bowen, H. J., Spaniol, J., Patel, R., & Voss, A. (2016). A diffusion model analysis of 
decision biases affecting delayed recognition of emotional stimuli. PLoS ONE, 
11(1). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0146769 
Bratko, D., Chamorro-Premuzic, T., & Saks, Z. (2006). Personality and school 
performance: Incremental validity of self- and peer-ratings over intelligence. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 41(1), 131–142. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2005.12.015 
Braunstein-Bercovitz, H., Hen, I., & Lubow, R. E. (2004). Masking task load modulates 
latent inhibition: Support for a distraction model of irrelevant information 
processing by high schizotypy participants. Cognition & Emotion, 18(8), 1135–
1144. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930441000058 
Brebion, G., David, A. S., Ohlsen, R., Jones, H. M., Pilowsky, L. S., Brebion, G., … 







auditory and visual hallucinations. Journal of the International 
Neuropsychological Society, 13(5), 832-828. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S135561770707107X 
Broadbent, D. ., Broadbent, M. H. ., & Jones, J. . (1986). Performance correlates of self-
reported cognitive failure and of obsessionality. British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 25(4), 285–299. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8260.1986.tb00708.x 
Broadbent, D. E., Cooper, P. F., FitzGerald, P., & Parkes, K. R. (1982). The Cognitive 
Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) and its correlates. British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 21(1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8260.1982.tb01421.x 
Brod, J. H. (1997). Creativity and schizotypy. In G. S. Claridge (Ed.), Schizotypy: 
Implications for Illness and Health (pp. 274–298). New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Brown, T. A., Chorpita, B. F., Korotitsch, W., & Barlow, D. H. (1997). Psychometric 
properties of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) in clinical samples. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35(1), 79–89. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0005-
7967(96)00068-X 
Bruce, A. S., Ray, W. J., & Carlson, R. A. (2007). Understanding cognitive failures: 
What’s dissociation got to do with it? American Journal of Psychology, 120(4), 
553–563. https://doi.org/10.2307/20445425 







bipolar disorder: are self-reports valid? Psychiatry Research, 136(1), 43–50. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2004.12.009 
Burgess, P. W., Alderman, N., Wilson, B. A., Evans, J. J., & Emslie, H. (1996). The 
Dysexecutive Questionnaire. In Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive 
Syndrome. Bury St. Edmunds, UK: Thames Valley Test Company. 
Buunk, B. P., Van der Zee, K., & VanYperen, N. W. (2001). Neuroticism and social 
comparison orientation as moderators of affective responses to social comparison 
at work. Journal of Personality, 69(5), 745–763. 
Canizares, S., Torres, X., Boget, T., Rumia, J., Elices, E., & Arroyo, S. (2000). Does 
neuroticism influence cognitive self-assessment after epilepsy surgery? Epilepsia, 
41(10), 1303–1309. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-1157.2000.tb04609.x 
Carlson, G. A., & Kashani, J. H. (1988). Phenomenology of major depression from 
childhood through adulthood: Analysis of three studies. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 145(10), 1222–1225. 
Carriere, J. S. A., Cheyne, J. A., & Smilek, D. (2008a). Everyday attention lapses and 
memory failures: The affective consequences of mindlessness. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 17(3), 835–847. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2007.04.008 
Carriere, J. S. A., Cheyne, J. A., & Smilek, D. (2008b). Everyday attention lapses and 
memory failures: the affective consequences of mindlessness. Consciousness and 







Carrigan, N., & Barkus, E. (2016a). A systematic review of cognitive failures in daily 
life: Healthy populations. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 63, 29–42. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.01.010 
Carrigan, N., & Barkus, E. (2016b). A systematic review of the relationship between 
psychological disorders or substance use and self-reported cognitive failures. 
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 21(6), 539–564. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13546805.2016.1250620 
Carrigan, N., & Barkus, E. (2017). Schizotypy and cognitive failures: a mediating role 
for affect. Psychopathology, 50(3), 195–202. https://doi.org/10.1159/000464106 
Carrigan, N., Barkus, E., Ong, A., & Wei, M. (2017). Do complaints of everyday 
cognitive failures in high schizotypy relate to emotional working memory deficits 
in the lab? Comprehensive Psychiatry, 78, 115–129. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comppsych.2017.06.016 
Chan, R. C. K., Yan, C., Qing, Y.-H., Wang, Y.-N., Wang, Y., Ma, Z., … Yu, X. 
(2011). Subjective awareness of everyday dysexecutive behavior precedes 
“objective” executive problems in schizotypy: A replication and extension study. 
Psychiatry Research, 185(3), 340–346. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2010.06.009 
Chapman, L. J., Chapman, J. P., & Raulin, M. L. (1976). Scales for physical and social 







Cheyne, J. A., Carriere, J. S. A., & Smilek, D. (2006). Absent-mindedness: Lapses of 
conscious awareness and everyday cognitive failures. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 15(3), 578–592. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2005.11.009 
Chun, C. A., Minor, K. S., & Cohen, A. S. (2013). Neurocognition in psychometrically 
defined college schizotypy samples: we are not measuring the “right stuff.” 
Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 19, 324–337. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S135561771200152X 
Claridge, G. (1997). Schizotypy: Implications for Illness and Health. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Clark, A. J., Parakh, R., Smilek, D., & Roy, E. A. (2011). The Slip Induction Task: 
Creating a window into cognitive control failures. Behavior Research Methods, 
44(2), 558–74. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-011-0154-0 
Cochran, S. V., & Rabinowitz, F. E. (2003). Gender-sensitive recommendations for 
assessment and treatment of depression in men. Professional Psychology: 
Research and Practice, 34(2), 132–140. https://doi.org/10.1037/0735-
7028.34.2.132 
Cohen, A. S., Auster, T. L., MacAulay, R. K., & McGovern, J. E. (2014). The paradox 
of schizotypy: Resemblance to prolonged severe mental illness in subjective but 








Cohen, A. S., Morrison, S. C., Brown, L. A., & Minor, K. S. (2012). Towards a 
cognitive resource limitations model of diminished expression in schizotypy. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 121(1), 109–118. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023599 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. Statistical 
Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1234/12345678 
Cohen, N., Mor, N., & Henik, A. (2015). Linking executive control and emotional 
response: A training procedure to reduce rumination. Clinical Psychological 
Science, 3(1), 15–25. https://doi.org/10.1177/2167702614530114 
Collip, D., Wigman, J. T. W., Myin-Germeys, I., Jacobs, N., Derom, C., Thiery, E., … 
van Os, J. (2013). From epidemiology to daily life: Linking daily life stress 
reactivity to persistence of psychotic experiences in a longitudinal general 
population study. PloS ONE, 8(4), e62688. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0062688 
Cooper, M. L., Frone, M. R., Russell, M., & Mudar, P. (1995). Drinking to regulate 
positive and negative emotions: A motivational model of alcohol use. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 69(5), 990–1005. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.69.5.990 
Corcoran, R., Devan, K., Durrant, S., & Liddle, P. (2013). The relationship between 
schizotypal ideation and subjective cognition reflects more than just cognitive 







Neuropsychiatry, 18(6), 491–514. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546805.2012.747431 
Cornblatt, B. A. (2002). The New York high risk project to the Hillside recognition and 
prevention (RAP) program. American Journal of Medical Genetics, 114(8), 956–
966. https://doi.org/10.1002/ajmg.b.10520 
Cornblatt, B. A., Lencz, T., Smith, C. W., Correll, C. U., Auther, A. M., & Nakayama, 
E. (2003). The schizophrenia prodrome revisited: A neurodevelopmental 
perspective. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 29(4), 633–51. 
Costa, P. T., Terracciano, A., & McCrae, R. R. (2001). Gender differences in 
personality traits across cultures: Robust and surprising findings. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 81(2), 322–331. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-
3514.81.2.322 
Croft, R. J., Mackay, A. J., Mills, A. T. D., & Gruzelier, J. G. H. (2001). The relative 
contributions of ecstasy and cannabis to cognitive impairment. 
Psychopharmacology, 153(3), 373–379. https://doi.org/10.1007/s002130000591 
Cuttler, C., Graf, P., Pawluski, J. L., & Galea, L. A. M. (2011). Everyday life memory 
deficits in pregnant women. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 65(1), 
27–37. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022844 
Daly, M. P., Afroz, S., & Walder, D. J. (2012). Schizotypal traits and neurocognitive 








David, A. S., Bedford, N., Wiffen, B., & Gilleen, J. (2012). Failures of metacognition 
and lack of insight in neuropsychiatric disorders. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 367(1594), 1379–1390. 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2012.0002 
David, A. S., Zammit, S., Lewis, G., Dalman, C., & Allebeck, P. (2008). Impairments in 
cognition across the spectrum of psychiatric disorders: Evidence from a Swedish 
conscript cohort. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 34(6), 1035–1041. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbn028 
Davies, G., Tenesa, A., Payton, A., Yang, J., Harris, S. E., Liewald, D., … Deary, I. J. 
(2011). Genome-wide association studies establish that human intelligence is 
highly heritable and polygenic. Molecular Psychiatry, 16(10), 996–1005. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/mp.2011.85 
De La Torre, R., Farré, M., Ortuño, J., Mas, M., Brenneisen, R., Roset, P. N., … Cami, 
J. (2000). Non-linear pharmacokinetics of MDMA ( “ecstasy”) in humans. British 
Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, 49(2), 104–109. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-
2125.2000.00121.x 
de Leede-Smith, S., & Barkus, E. (2013). A comprehensive review of auditory verbal 
hallucinations: lifetime prevalence, correlates and mechanisms in healthy and 
clinical individuals. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 367. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00367 







(2015). Developing psychosis and its risk states through the lens of schizotypy. 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 41(Suppl. no. 2), S396–S407. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbu176 
DeRosse, P., & Karlsgodt, K. H. (2015). Examining the psychosis continuum. Current 
Behavioral Neuroscience Reports, 2(2), 80–89. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40473-
015-0040-7 
DeYoung, C. (2011). Intelligence and personality. In R. J. Sternber & S. B. Kaufman 
(Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence (pp. 711–737). New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Dickerson, F., Boronow, J. J., Ringel, N., & Parente, F. (1996). Neurocognitive deficits 
and social functioning in outpatients with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 
21(2), 75–83. https://doi.org/10.1016/0920-9964(96)00040-0 
Diwadkar, V. A., Montrose, D. M., Dworakowski, D., Sweeney, J. A., & Keshavan, M. 
S. (2006). Genetically predisposed offspring with schizotypal features: An ultra 
high-risk group for schizophrenia? Progress in Neuropsychopharmacology & 
Biological Psychiatry, 30(2), 230–238. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pnpbp.2005.10.019 
Dmitrieva, N. O., Almeida, D. M., Dmitrieva, J., Loken, E., & Pieper, C. F. (2013). A 
day-centered approach to modeling cortisol: Diurnal cortisol profiles and their 








Docherty, N. M., St-Hilaire, A., Aakre, J. M., & Seghers, J. P. (2009). Life events and 
high-trait reactivity together predict psychotic symptom increases in schizophrenia. 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 35(3), 638–645. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbn002 
Donohoe, G., Gill, M., Corvin, A. P., Hayden, J., McGlade, N., O’Grada, C., … 
O’Callaghan, E. (2009). Is “clinical” insight the same as “cognitive” insight in 
schizophrenia? Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 15(3), 
471–475. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355617709090559 
Dotson, V. M., Beydoun, M. A., & Zonderman, A. B. (2010). Recurrent depressive 
symptoms and the incidence of dementia and mild cognitive impairment. 
Neurology, 75(1), 27–34. https://doi.org/10.1212/WNL.0b013e3181e62124 
Downey, L. A., King, R., Papafotiou, K., Swann, P., Ogden, E., Boorman, M., & 
Stough, C. (2013). The effects of cannabis and alcohol on simulated driving: 
Influences of dose and experience. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 50, 879–86. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2012.07.016 
Ettinger, U., Kumari, V., Crawford, T. J., Flak, V., Sharma, T., Davis, R. E., & Corr, P. 
J. (2005). Saccadic eye movements, schizotypy, and the role of neuroticism. 
Biological Psychology, 68(1), 61–78. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2004.03.014 
Evans, D. E., & Rothbart, M. K. (2007). Developing a model for adult temperament. 








Evans, D. E., & Rothbart, M. K. (2009). A two-factor model of temperament. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 47(6), 565–570. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2009.05.010 
Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, M. W. (1985). Personality and Individual Differences: A 
Natural Science Approach. New York: Plenum Press. 
Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1994). Manual for the Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire: (EPQ-R Adult). San Diego: Educational Industrial Testing Service. 
Fann, J. R., Bombardier, C. H., Vannoy, S., Dyer, J., Ludman, E., Dikmen, S., … 
Temkin, N. (2015). Telephone and in-person cognitive behavioral therapy for 
major depression after traumatic brain injury: A randomized controlled trial. 
Journal of Neurotrauma, 32(1), 45–57. https://doi.org/10.1089/neu.2014.3423 
Farrin, L., Hull, L., Unwin, C., & Wykes, T. (2003). Effects of depressed mood on 
objective and subjective measures of attention. Journal of Neuropsychiatry and 
Clinical Neurosciences, 15(1), 98–104. 
https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.neuropsych.15.1.98 
Fein, G., Torres, J., Price, L. J., & Di Sclafani, V. (2006). Cognitive performance in 
long-term abstinent alcoholic individuals. Alcoholism, Clinical and Experimental 
Research, 30(9), 1538–44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-0277.2006.00185.x 
Fett, A.-K. J., Viechtbauer, W., Dominguez, M.-G., Penn, D. L., van Os, J., & 







cognition with functional outcomes in schizophrenia: a meta-analysis. 
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 35(3), 573–588. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2010.07.001 
Fioravanti, M., Carlone, O., Vitale, B., Cinti, M. E., & Clare, L. (2005). A meta-
analysis of cognitive deficits in adults with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
Neuropsychology Review, 15(2), 73–95. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11065-005-6254-
9 
Fisk, J. E., & Montgomery, C. (2008). Real-world memory and executive processes in 
cannabis users and non-users. Journal of Psychopharmacology, 22(7), 727–736. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0269881107084000 
Fiske, A., Wetherell, J. L., & Gatz, M. (2009). Depression in older adults. Annual 
Review of Clinical Psychology, 5, 363–89. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.032408.153621 
Fleming, J. M., Strong, J., & Ashton, R. (1996). Self-awareness of deficits in adults 
with traumatic brain injury: How best to measure? Brain Injury, 10(1), 1–15. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/026990596124674 
Forbes, N. F., Carrick, L. A., McIntosh, A. M., & Lawrie, S. M. (2009). Working 
memory in schizophrenia: a meta-analysis. Psychological Medicine, 39(6), 889–
905. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0033291708004558 







Eliminating individual differences in distractibility with load. Psychological 
Science, 18(5), 377–381. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01908.x 
Frey, M. C., & Detterman, D. K. (2004). Scholastic assessment or g? The relationship 
between the scholastic assessment test and general cognitive ability. Psychological 
Science, 15(6), 373-378. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00687.x 
Fusar-Poli, P., Bonoldi, I., Yung, A. R., Borgwardt, S., Kempton, M. J., Valmaggia, L., 
… Mcguire, P. (2012). Predicting psychosis: Meta-analysis of transition outcomes 
in individuals at high clinical risk. Archives of General Psychiatry, 69(3), 220–229. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.2011.1472 
Gabryelewicz, T., Styczynska, M., Luczywek, E., Barczak, A., Pfeffer, A., Androsiuk, 
W., … Barcikowska, M. (2007). The rate of conversion of mild cognitive 
impairment to dementia: Predictive role of depression. International Journal of 
Geriatric Psychiatry, 22(6), 563–567. https://doi.org/10.1002/gps.1716 
Gama, C. S., Kunz, M., Magalhães, P. V. S., & Kapczinski, F. (2013). Staging and 
neuroprogression in bipolar disorder: A systematic review of the literature. Revista 
Brasileira de Psiquiatria, 35(1), 70–74. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rbp.2012.09.001 
Giakoumaki, S. G. (2012). Cognitive and prepulse inhibition deficits in 
psychometrically high schizotypal subjects in the general population: relevance to 
schizophrenia research. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society : 







Giesbrecht, T., Merckelbach, H., Kater, M., & Sluis, A. F. (2007). Why dissociation and 
schizotypy overlap: The joint influence of fantasy proneness, cognitive failures, 
and childhood trauma. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 195(10), 812–818. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/NMD.0b013e3181568137 
Glenthøj, L. B., Fagerlund, B., Randers, L., Hjorthøj, C. R., Wenneberg, C., Krakauer, 
K., … Nordentoft, M. (2015). The FOCUS trial: cognitive remediation plus 
standard treatment versus standard treatment for patients at ultra-high risk for 
psychosis: study protocol for a randomised controlled trial. Trials, 16(1), 25. 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s13063-014-0542-8 
Gomà-i-Freixanet, M. (1997). Consensual validity of the EPQ: Self-reports and spouse-
reports. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 13(3), 179–185. 
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1015-5759.13.3.179 
Gomar, J. J., Valls, E., Radua, J., Mareca, C., Tristany, J., del Olmo, F., … Grp, C. R. S. 
(2015). A multisite, randomized controlled clinical trial of computerized cognitive 
remediation therapy for schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 41(6), 1387–1396. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbv059 
González-Blanch, C., Crespo-Facorro, B., Alvarez-Jiménez, M., Rodríguez-Sánchez, J. 
M., Pelayo-Terán, J. M., Pérez-Iglesias, R., & Vázquez-Barquero, J. L. (2007). 
Cognitive dimensions in first-episode schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Journal of 








Gooding, D. C., Kwapil, T. R., & Tallent, K. A. (1999). Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
deficits in schizotypic individuals. Schizophrenia Research, 40(3), 201–209. 
Gooding, D. C., Tallent, K. A., & Hegyi, J. V. (2001). Cognitive slippage in schizotypic 
individuals. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 189(11), 750–756. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/00005053-200111000-00004 
Gottfredson, L. S. (1997). Mainstream science on intelligence: An editorial with 52 
signatories, history, and bibliography. Intelligence, 24(1), 13–23. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0160-2896(97)90011-8 
Goulding, A. (2004). Schizotypy models in relation to subjective health and paranormal 
beliefs and experiences. Personality and Individual Differences, 37(1), 157–167. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2003.08.008 
Gratz, K. L., & Roemer, L. (2004). Multidimensional assessment of emotion Regulation 
and dysregulation: Development, factor structure, and initial validation of the 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale. Journal of Psychopathology and 
Behavioral Assessment, 26(1), 41-54. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JOBA.0000007455.08539.94 
Green, M. F., Kern, R. S., Braff, D. L., & Mintz, J. (2000). Neurocognitive deficits and 
functional outcome in schizophrenia: are we measuring the “right stuff”? 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 26(1), 119–136. 







Psychotherapy, 11(1), 3–16. https://doi.org/10.1002/cpp.388 
Grisham, J. R., Norberg, M. M., Williams, A. D., Certoma, S. P., & Kadib, R. (2010). 
Categorization and cognitive deficits in compulsive hoarding. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 48(9), 866–72. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2010.05.011 
Gross, G. M., Mellin, J., Silvia, P. J., Barrantes-Vidal, N., & Kwapil, T. R. (2014). 
Comparing the factor structure of the Wisconsin Schizotypy Scales and the 
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire. Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, 
and Treatment, 5(4), 397–405. https://doi.org/10.1037/per0000090 
Gunthert, K. C., Cohen, L. H., & Armeli, S. (1999). The role of neuroticism in daily 
stress and coping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(5), 1087–
1100. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.5.1087 
Hanninen, T., Koivisto, K., Reinikainen, K. J., Helkala, E. L., Soininen, H., Mykkänen, 
L., … Riekkinen, P. J. (1996). Prevalence of ageing-associated cognitive decline in 
an elderly population. Age Ageing, 25(3), 201–205. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ageing/25.3.201 
Hartmann, J. A., Yuen, H. P., McGorry, P. D., Yung, A. R., Lin, A., Wood, S. J., … 
Nelson, B. (2016). Declining transition rates to psychotic disorder in “ultra-high 
risk” clients: Investigation of a dilution effect. Schizophrenia Research, 170(1), 
130–136. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2015.11.026 







diminished awareness of errors in the laboratory and daily life. Psychology and 
Aging, 28(4), 1032–1041. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033567 
Harvey, P. D. (2010). Cognitive functioning and disability in schizophrenia. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 19(4), 249–254. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721410378033 
Hayes, A. (2012). PROCESS [Macro]. 
Hayes, A. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process 
analysis. New York: Guilford Press. https://doi.org/978-1-60918-230-4 
Heffernan, T. M., Jarvis, H., Rodgers, J., Scholey, A. B., & Ling, J. (2001). Prospective 
memory, everyday cognitive failure and central executive function in recreational 
users of Ecstasy. Human Psychopharmacology, 16(8), 607–612. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/hup.349 
Heishman, S. J., Kleykamp, B. A., & Singleton, E. G. (2010). Meta-analysis of the 
acute effects of nicotine and smoking on human performance. 
Psychopharmacology, 210(4), 453–469. https://doi.org/10.1002/jts.2490050305 
Hengartner, M. P., Ajdacic-Gross, V., Wyss, C., Angst, J., & Rössler, W. (2016). 
Relationship between personality and psychopathology in a longitudinal 
community study: A test of the predisposition model. Psychological Medicine, 
46(8), 1693–1705. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291716000210 







Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS-21): Construct Validity and normative data in a large 
non-clinical sample. The British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 44(Pt 2), 227–39. 
https://doi.org/10.1348/014466505X29657 
Henry, J. D., Green, M. J., Restuccia, C., de Lucia, A., Rendell, P. G., McDonald, S., & 
Grisham, J. R. (2009). Emotion dysregulation and schizotypy. Psychiatry 
Research, 166(2–3), 116–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2008.01.007 
Henry, J. D., & Rendell, P. G. (2007). A review of the impact of pregnancy on memory 
function. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 29(8), 793–803. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13803390701612209 
Herrmann, D. J. (1982). Know thy memory: The use of questionnaires to assess and 
study memory. Psychological Bulletin, 92(2), 434–452. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.92.2.434 
Hildebrandt, H., Fink, F., Kastrup, A., Haupts, M., & Eling, P. (2013). Cognitive 
profiles of patients with mild cognitive impairment or dementia in Alzheimer’s or 
Parkinson’s disease. Dementia and Geriatric Cognitive Disorders Extra, 3(1), 
102–112. https://doi.org/10.1159/000348350 
Hohman, T. J. 1, Beason-Held, L. L., Lamar, M., & Resnick, S. M. (2011). Subjective 
cognitive complaints and longitudinal changes in memory and brain function. 
Neuropsychology, 25(1), 125–130. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020859 







schizophrenia and schizotypy. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 34(5), 856–74. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbn083 
Horn, J. L. (1972). State, trait and change dimensions of intelligence. British Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 42(2), 159–185. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-
8279.1972.tb00709.x 
Horwitz, A. V. (2007). Distinguishing distress from disorder as psychological outcomes 
of stressful social arrangements. Health:: An Interdisciplinary Journal for the 
Social Study of Health, Illness and Medicine. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1363459307077541 
Hutchinson, A. D., Hosking, J. R., Kichenadasse, G., Mattiske, J. K., & Wilson, C. 
(2012). Objective and subjective cognitive impairment following chemotherapy for 
cancer: A systematic review. Cancer Treatment Reviews, 38(7), 926–34. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ctrv.2012.05.002 
Ishigami, Y., & Klein, R. M. (2009). Are individual differences in absentmindedness 
correlated with individual differences in attention? Journal of Individual 
Differences, 30(4), 220–237. https://doi.org/10.1027/1614-0001.30.4.220 
Jain, S., Shapiro, S. L., Swanick, S., Roesch, S. C., Mills, P. J., Bell, I., & Schwartz, G. 
E. R. (2007). A randomized controlled trial of mindfulness meditation versus 
relaxation training: Effects on distress, positive states of mind, rumination, and 








Johns, L. C., & van Os, J. (2001). The continuity of psychotic experiences in the general 
population . Clinical Psychology Review, 21(8), 1125–1141. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0272-7358(01)00103-9 
Johnson, M. K., Nolde, S. F., & De Leonardis, D. M. (1996). Emotional focus and 
source monitoring. Journal of Memory and Language, 35(2), 135–156. 
https://doi.org/10.1006/jmla.1996.0008 
Jónsdóttir, M. K., Adólfsdóttir, S., Cortez, R. D., Gunnarsdóttir, M., & Gústafsdóttir, A. 
H. (2007). A diary study of action slips in healthy individuals. The Clinical 
Neuropsychologist, 21(6), 875–883. https://doi.org/10.1080/13854040701220044 
Juhasz, B. J., Chambers, D., Shesler, L. W., Haber, A., & Kurtz, M. M. (2012). 
Evaluating lexical characteristics of verbal fluency output in schizophrenia. 
Psychiatry Research, 200(2–3), 177–83. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2012.06.035 
Kamiya, S. (2014). Relationship between frequency of involuntary autobiographical 
memories and cognitive failure. Memory, 22(7), 839–851. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2013.838630 
Kanai, R., Dong, M. Y., Bahrami, B., & Rees, G. (2011). Distractibility in daily life is 
reflected in the structure and function of human parietal cortex. Journal of 








Kane, M. J., Brown, L. H., McVay, J. C., Silvia, P. J., Myin-Germeys, I., & Kwapil, T. 
R. (2007a). For whom the mind wanders, and when: An experience-sampling study 
of working memory and executive control in daily life. Psychological Science, 
18(7), 614–621. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01948.x 
Kane, M. J., Conway, A. R. A., Miura, T. K., & Colflesh, G. J. H. (2007). Working 
memory, attention control, and the n-back task: A question of construct validity. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33(3), 
615–622. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.33.3.615 
Kane, M. J., Hasher, L., Stoltzfus, E. R., Zacks, R. T., & Connelly, S. L. (1994). 
Inhibitory Attentional Mechanisms and Aging. Psychology & Aging, 9(1), 103–
112. 
Karcher, N., & Shean, G. (2012). Magical ideation, schizotypy and the impact of 
emotions. Psychiatry Research, 197(1–2), 36–40. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2011.12.033 
Kaymaz, N., Drukker, M., Lieb, R., Wittchen, H.-U., Werbeloff, N., Weiser, M., … van 
Os, J. (2012). Do subthreshold psychotic experiences predict clinical outcomes in 
unselected non-help-seeking population-based samples? A systematic review and 
meta-analysis, enriched with new results. Psychological Medicine, 42(11), 2239–
53. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291711002911 
Kee, K. S., Kern, R. S., & Green, M. F. (1998). Perception of emotion and 







81(1), 57–65. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1781(98)00083-3 
Kelly, M. E., Loughrey, D., Lawlor, B. A., & Robertson, I. H. (2014). The impact of 
cognitive training and mental stimulation on cognitive and everyday functioning of 
healthy older adults: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Ageing Research 
Reviews, 15, 28–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.arr.2014.02.004 
Kendler, K. S., Gruenberg, A. M., Strauss, J. S., E, B., E, E.-M., FJ, K., … Tsuang MT, 
Woolson RF, F. J. (1981). An independent analysis of the Copenhagen Sample of 
the Danish Adoption Study of Schizophrenia. Archives of General Psychiatry, 
38(9), 982. https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.1981.01780340034003 
Kendler, K. S., Lieberman, J. A., & Walsh, D. (1989). The Structured Interview for 
Schizotypy (SIS): A preliminary 4eport. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 15(4), 559–571. 
Kendler, K. S., & Walsh, D. (1995). Schizotypal personality disorder in parents and the 
risk for schizophrenia in siblings. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 21(1), 47–52. 
Kensinger, E. A., & Corkin, S. (2003). Effect of negative emotional content on working 
memory and long-term memory. Emotion, 3(4), 378–93. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.3.4.378 
Keogh, E., Cavill, R., Moore, D. J., & Eccleston, C. (2014). The effects of menstrual-
related pain on attentional interference. Pain, 155(4), 821–7. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pain.2014.01.021 







and emotion in people with elevated disorganized schizotypy. Schizophrenia 
Research, 100(1–3), 172–180. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2007.11.005 
Kerns, J. G., & Becker, T. M. (2008b). Communication disturbances, working memory, 
and emotion in people with elevated disorganized schizotypy. Schizophrenia 
Research, 100(1–3), 172–80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2007.11.005 
Kessler, E.-M., Bowen, C. E., Baer, M., Froelich, L., & Wahl, H.-W. (2012). Dementia 
worry: A psychological examination of an unexplored phenomenon. European 
Journal of Ageing, 9(4), 275–284. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10433-012-0242-8 
Kessler, R. C., Amminger, G. P., Aguilar-Gaxiola, S., Alonso, J., Lee, S., & Ustün, T. 
B. (2007). Age of onset of mental disorders: a review of recent literature. Current 
Opinion in Psychiatry, 20(4), 359–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/YCO.0b013e32816ebc8c 
Kessler, R. C., Chiu, W. T., & Demler, O. (2005). Prevalence, severity, and comorbidity 
of 12-month DSM-IV disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication. 
Archives of General Psychiatry, 62(6), 617–627. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.62.6.617 
Kiefer, M. (2012). Executive control over unconscious cognition: attentional 
sensitization of unconscious information processing. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 6, 61. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2012.00061 







Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 7(2), 105–128. 
https://doi.org/10.2190/7K24-G343-MTQW-115V 
Klugman, A., & Gruzelier, J. (2003). Chronic cognitive impairment in users of 
“ecstasy” and cannabis. World Psychiatry, 2(3), 184–190. 
Koso, M., Sarač-Hadzihalilovic, A., & Hansen, S. (2012). Neuropsychological 
performance, psychiatric symptoms, and everyday cognitive failures in Bosnian 
ex-servicemen with posttraumatic stress disorder. Review of Psychology, 19(2), 
131–139. 
Koychev, I., Joyce, D., Barkus, E., Ettinger, U., Schmechtig, A., Dourish, C. T., … 
Deakin, J. F. W. (2016). Cognitive and oculomotor performance in subjects with 
low and high schizotypy: implications for translational drug development studies. 
Translational Psychiatry, 6(5), e811. https://doi.org/10.1038/tp.2016.64 
Koychev, I., McMullen, K., Lees, J., Dadhiwala, R., Grayson, L., Perry, C., … Barkus, 
E. (2011). A validation of cognitive biomarkers for the early identification of 
cognitive enhancing agents in schizotypy: a three-center double-blind placebo-
controlled study. European Neuropsychopharmacology. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroneuro.2011.10.005 [doi] 
Koychev, I., McMullen, K., Lees, J., Dadhiwala, R., Grayson, L., Perry, C., … Barkus, 
E. (2012). A validation of cognitive biomarkers for the early identification of 
cognitive enhancing agents in schizotypy: A three-center double-blind placebo-








Kramer, A. F., Humphrey, D. G., Larish, J. F., Logan, G. D., & Strayer, D. L. (1994). 
Aging and inhibition: Beyond a unitary view of inhibitory processing in attention. 
Psychology and Aging, 9(4), 491–512. 
Kraus, C. A., Seignourel, P., Balasubramanyam, V., Snow, A. L., Wilson, N. L., Kunik, 
M. E., … Stanley, M. A. (2008). Cognitive-behavioral treatment for anxiety in 
patients with dementia: Two case studies. Journal of Psychiatric Practice, 14(3), 
186–92. https://doi.org/10.1097/01.pra.0000320120.68928.e5 
Kwapil, T. R., & Barrantes-Vidal, N. (2015). Schizotypy: Looking back and moving 
forward. In Schizophrenia Bulletin (Vol. 41, pp. S366–S373). Oxford University 
Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbu186 
Kwapil, T. R., Brown, L. H., Silvia, P. J., Myin-Germeys, I., & Barrantes-Vidal, N. 
(2012). The expression of positive and negative schizotypy in daily life: an 
experience sampling study. Psychological Medicine, 42(12), 2555–66. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291712000827 
Kwapil, T. R., Gross, G. M., Silvia, P. J., & Barrantes-Vidal, N. (2013). Prediction of 
psychopathology and functional impairment by positive and negative schizotypy in 
the Chapmans’ ten-year longitudinal study. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
122(3), 807–815. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033759 







(IAPS): Affective ratings of pictures and instruction manual. Technical Report A-8. 
University of Florida. 
Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2004). Recognition of metaphor and irony in young 
adults: The impact of schizotypal personality traits. Psychiatry Research, 125(1), 
9-20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2003.10.005 
Lange, S., & Süß, H.-M. (2014). Measuring slips and lapses when they occur - 
ambulatory assessment in application to cognitive failures. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 24, 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.12.008 
Lara, A. H., & Wallis, J. D. (2014). Executive control processes underlying multi-item 
working memory. Nature Neuroscience, 17(6), 876–883. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.3702 
Larsen, R. J., & Diener, E. (1987). Affect intensity as an individual difference 
characteristic: A review. Journal of Research in Personality, 21(1), 1–39. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0092-6566(87)90023-7 
Larson, G. E., Alderton, D. L., Neideffer, M., & Underhill, E. (1997). Further evidence 
on dimensionality and correlates of the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire. British 
Journal of Psychology, 88(1), 29–38. https://doi.org/0.1111/j.2044-
8295.1997.tb02618.x 
Larson, G. E., & Merritt, C. R. (1991). Can accidents be predicted? An empirical test of 








Launay, G., & Slade, P. (1981). The measurement of hallucinatory predisposition in 
male and female prisoners. Personality and Individual Differences, 2(3), 221–234. 
Laws, K. R., Patel, D. D., & Tyson, P. J. (2008). Awareness of everyday executive 
difficulties precede overt executive dysfunction in schizotypal subjects. Psychiatry 
Research, 160(1), 8–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2007.06.004 
Lee, J., & Park, S. (2005). Working memory impairments in schizophrenia: a meta-
analysis. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 114(4), 599–611. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843x.114.4.599 
Leichsenring, F. (2001). Comparative effects of short-term psychodynamic 
psychotherapy and cognitive-behavioral therapy in depression: A meta-analytic 
approach. Clinical Psychology Review, 21(3), 401–419. 
Leitman, D. I., Loughead, J., Wolf, D. H., Ruparel, K., Kohler, C. G., Elliott, M. A., … 
Gur, R. C. (2007). Abnormal superior temporal connectivity during fear perception 
in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 34(4), 673–678. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbn052 
Lenzenweger, M. F. (1991). Confirming schizotypic personality configurations in 
hypothetically psychosis-prone university students. Psychiatry Research, 37(1), 
81–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1781(91)90108-2 







Meehl’s blueprint for the experimental psychopathology and genetics of 
schizophrenia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 115(2), 195–200. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.115.2.195 
Lenzenweger, M. F. (2006b). Schizotypy: an organizing framework for schizophrenia 
research. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15(4), 162–166. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2006.00428.x 
Lenzenweger, M. F. (2010). Schizotypy and Schizophrenia: The View From 
Experimental Psychology. New York: The Guilford Press. 
Lenzenweger, M. F., Cornblatt, B. A., & Putnick, M. (1991). Schizotypy and sustained 
attention. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100(1), 84–89. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843x.100.1.84 
Lenzenweger, M. F., & Gold, J. M. (2000). Auditory working memory and verbal recall 
memory in schizotypy. Schizophrenia Research, 42(2), 101–110. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0920-9964(99)00121-8 
Lenzenweger, M. F., Maher, B. A., & Manschreck, T. C. (2005). Paul E. Meehl’s 
influence on experimental psychopathology: Fruits of the nexus of schizotypy and 
schizophrenia, neurology, and methodology. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 
61(10), 1295–1315. https://doi.org/10.1002/jclp.20183 
Levens, S. M., & Phelps, E. a. (2008). Emotion processing effects on interference 








Lewandowski, K. E., Barrantes-Vidal, N., Nelson-Gray, R. O., Clancy, C., Kepley, H. 
O., & Kwapil, T. R. (2006). Anxiety and depression symptoms in psychometrically 
identified schizotypy. Schizophrenia Research, 83(2–3), 225–235. 
Liberati, A., Altman, D. G., Tetzlaff, J., Mulrow, C., Gøtzsche, P. C., Ioannidis, J. P. A., 
… Moher, D. (2009). The PRISMA statement for reporting systematic reviews and 
meta-analyses of studies that evaluate healthcare interventions: explanation and 
elaboration. British Medical Journal, 339, b2700. 
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.b2700 
Lindström, B. R., & Bohlin, G. (2011). Emotion processing facilitates working memory 
performance. Cognition & Emotion, 25(7), 1196–1204. 
Ling, J., Heffernan, T. M., Buchanan, T., Rodgers, J., Scholey, A. B., & Parrott, A. C. 
(2003). Effects of alcohol on subjective ratings of prospective and everyday 
memory deficits. Alcoholism, Clinical and Experimental Research, 27(6), 970–4. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/01.ALC.0000071741.63467.CB 
Linscott, R. J., & Cross, F. V. (2009). The burden of awareness of psychometric risk for 
schizophrenia. Psychiatry Research, 166(2–3), 184–91. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2008.03.007 
Lipsey, M. W., & Wilson, D. B. (2001). Practical meta-analysis. (L. Bickman & D. J. 







CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Lovibond, P., & Lovibond, S. (1995). The structure of negative emotional states: 
Comparison of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) with the Beck 
Depression and Anxiety Inventories. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33(3), 
335–343. https://doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(94)00075-U 
Lovibond, S., & Lovibond, P. (1995). Manual for the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales 
(2nd ed.). Sydney: Psychology Foundation. 
Lyvers, M., & Tobias-Webb, J. (2010). Effects of acute alcohol consumption on 
executive cognitive functioning in naturalistic settings. Addictive Behaviors, 
35(11), 1021–1028. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.addbeh.2010.06.022 
Macmillan, N. A., & Creelman, C. D. (2004). Detection theory: A user's guide. 
Cambridge. England: Cambridge University Press. 
MacQueen, G. M., Galway, T. M., Hay, J., Young, L. T., & Joffe, R. T. (2002). 
Recollection memory deficits in patients with major depressive disorder predicted 
by past depressions but not current mood state or treatment status. Psychological 
Medicine, 32(2), 251–258. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291701004834 
Maggioni, E., Bellani, M., Altamura, A. C., & Brambilla, P. (2016). Neuroanatomical 
voxel-based profile of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Epidemiology and 
Psychiatric Sciences, 25(4), 312–6. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045796016000275 







Psychological Reports, 82(3), 1432–1434. https://doi.org/10.2466/PR0.82.3.1432-
1434 
Manning, V., Teo, H. C., Guo, S., Wong, K. E., & Li, T.-K. (2016). Neurocognitive 
functioning and treatment outcome following detoxification among Asian alcohol-
dependent inpatients. Substance Use & Misuse, 51(2), 193–205. 
https://doi.org/10.3109/10826084.2015.1092985 
Mano, Q. R., & Brown, G. G. (2013). Cognition-emotion interactions in schizophrenia: 
Emerging evidence on working memory load and implicit facial-affective 
processing. Cognition & Emotion, 27(5), 875–99. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2012.751360 
Marczinski, C. A., Harrison, E. L. R., & Fillmore, M. T. (2008). Effects of alcohol on 
simulated driving and perceived driving impairment in binge drinkers. Alcoholism, 
Clinical and Experimental Research, 32(7), 1329–37. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-0277.2008.00701.x 
Marino, S. E., Meador, K. J., Loring, D. W., Okun, M. S., Fernandez, H. H., Fessler, A. 
J., … Werz, M. A. (2009). Subjective perception of cognition is related to mood 
and not performance. Epilepsy & Behavior : E&B, 14(3), 459–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.yebeh.2008.12.007 
Markets and Markets. (2014). Cognitive Assessment and Training Market worth 








Mason, O., Claridge, G., & Jackson, M. (1995). New scales for the assessment of 
schizotypy. Personality and Individual Differences, 18(1), 7–13. 
Mather, M., Mitchell, K. J., Raye, C. L., Novak, D. L., Greene, E. J., & Johnson, M. K. 
(2006). Emotional arousal can impair feature binding in working memory. Journal 
of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18(4), 614–25. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2006.18.4.614 
Matthews, G., Coyle, K., & Craig, A. (1990a). Multiple factors of cognitive failure and 
their relationships with stress vulnerability. Journal of Psychopathology and 
Behavioral Assessment, 12(1), 49–65. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00960453 
Matthews, G., Coyle, K., & Craig, A. (1990b). Multiple factors of cognitive failures and 
their relationship with stress vulnerability. Journal of Psychopathology and 
Behavioral Assessment, 12(1), 49–65. 
Matthews, G., & Wells, A. (1988). Relationships between anxiety, self-consciousness, 
and cognitive failure. Cognition & Emotion, 2(2), 123–132. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699938808408069 
Maylor, E. (1990). Age and prospective memory. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 42(3), 471–493. 
McCann, U. D., Kuwabara, H., Kumar, A., Palermo, M., Abbey, R., Brasic, J., … 
Ricaurte, G. A. (2008). Persistent cognitive and dopamine transporter deficits in 








McCreery, C., & Claridge, G. (2002). Healthy schizotypy: The case of out-of-the-body 
experiences. Personality and Individual Differences, 32(1), 141–154. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0191-8869(01)00013-7 
McDaniel, M. a. (2005). Big-brained people are smarter: A meta-analysis of the 
relationship between in vivo brain volume and intelligence. Intelligence, 33(4), 
337–346. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2004.11.005 
McDermott, L. M., & Ebmeier, K. P. (2009). A meta-analysis of depression severity 
and cognitive function. Journal of Affective Disorders, 119(1–3), 1–8. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2009.04.022 
McGorry, P. D., Nelson, B., Goldstone, S., & Yung, A. R. (2010). Clinical staging: A 
heuristic and practical strategy for new research and better health and social 
outcomes for psychotic and related mood disorders. Canadian Journal of 
Psychiatry, 55(8), 486–497. 
McGrath, J., Saha, S., Chant, D., & Welham, J. (2008, November). Schizophrenia: A 
concise overview of incidence, prevalence, and mortality. Epidemiologic Reviews. 
McVay, J. C., & Kane, M. J. (2009). Conducting the train of thought: Working memory 
capacity, goal neglect, and mind wandering in an executive-control task. Journal of 
Experiment Psychology, 35(1), 196–204. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0014104 







the laboratory into everyday life: an experience-sampling study of mind wandering 
across controlled and ecological contexts. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 
16(5), 857–863. https://doi.org/10.3758/PBR.16.5.857 
Mecacci, L., & Righi, S. (2006). Cognitive failures, metacognitive beliefs and aging. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 40(7), 1453–1459. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2005.11.022 
Mecacci, L., Righi, S., & Rocchetti, G. (2004). Cognitive failures and circadian 
typology. Personality and Individual Differences, 37(1), 107–113. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2003.08.004 
Meehl, P. E. (1962). Schizotaxia, schizotypy, schizophrenia. American Psychologist, 
17(12), 827–838. 
Meehl, P. E. (1990). Toward an integrated theory of schizotaxia, schizotypy, and 
schizophrenia. Journal of Personality Disorders, 4(1), 1–99. 
https://doi.org/10.1521/pedi.1990.4.1.1 
Meiran, N., Israeli, A., Levi, H., & Grafi, R. (1994). Individual differences in self 
reported cognitive failures: The attention hypothesis revisited. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 17(6), 727–739. https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-
8869(94)90042-6 
Merckelbach, H., Muris, P., Nijman, H., & de Jong, P. J. (1996). Self-reported cognitive 







20(6), 715–724. https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(96)00024-4 
Merckelbach, H., Muris, P., & Rassin, E. (1999). Fantasy proneness and cognitive 
failures as correlates of dissociative experiences. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 26(5), 961–967. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(98)00193-7 
Miers, T. C., & Raulin, M. L. (1987). Cognitive Slippage Scale. In K. Corcoran & J. 
Fischer (Eds.), Measures for Cinical Practice: A Sourcebook. (pp. 125–127). New 
York: Free Press. 
Miller, A. B., & Lenzenweger, M. F. (2012). Schizotypy, social cognition, and 
interpersonal sensitivity. Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 
3(4), 379–92. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0027955 
Mohanty, A., Heller, W., Koven, N. S., Fisher, J. E., Herrington, J. D., & Miller, G. A. 
(2008). Specificity of emotion-related effects on attentional processing in 
schizotypy. Schizophrenia Research, 103(1–3), 129–37. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2008.03.003 
Montgomery, C., & Fisk, J. E. (2007). Everyday memory deficits in ecstasy-polydrug 
users. Journal of Psychopharmacology, 21(7), 709–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0269881107077220 
Moreno Samaniego, L., Valero Oyarzábal, J., Gaviria Gómez, A. M., Hernández 
Fernández, A., Gutiérrez-Zotes, J. A., & Labad Alquézar, A. (2011). Schizotypy 







Psicothema, 23(1), 80–86. 
Moritz, S., & Woodward, T. S. (2007). Metacognitive training in schizophrenia: from 
basic research to knowledge translation and intervention. Current Opinion in 
Psychiatry, 20(6), 619–625. https://doi.org/10.1097/YCO.0b013e3282f0b8ed 
Motter, J. N., Pimontel, M. A., Rindskopf, D., Devanand, D. P., Doraiswamy, P. M., & 
Sneed, J. R. (2016). Computerized cognitive training and functional recovery in 
major depressive disorder: A meta-analysis. Journal of Affective Disorders, 189, 
184–191. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2015.09.022 
Murphy, S., & Dalton, P. (2014). Ear-catching? Real-world distractibility scores predict 
susceptibility to auditory attentional capture. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 
21(5), 1209–1213. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-014-0596-3 
Myin-Germeys, I., Delespaul, P., & van Os, J. (2003). The experience sampling method 
in psychosis research. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 16, 33–38. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/00001504-200304002-00006 
Myin-Germeys, I., Krabbendam, L., Jolles, J., Delespaul, P., & van Os, J. (2002). Are 
cognitive impairments associated with sensitivity to stress in schizophrenia? An 
experience sampling study. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 159(3), 443–449. 
https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.159.3.443 
Myin-Germeys, I., Krabbendam, L., & van Os, J. (2003). Continuity of psychotic 








Myin-Germeys, I., Oorschot, M., Collip, D., Lataster, J., Delespaul, P., & van Os, J. 
(2009). Experience sampling research in psychopathology: opening the black box 
of daily life. Psychological Medicine, 39(9), 1533–1547. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0033291708004947 
Myin-Germeys, I., van Os, J., Schwartz, J. E., & Stone, A. A. (2001). Emotional 
reactivity to daily life stress in psychosis. Archives of General Psychiatry, 58(12), 
1137–1144. 
Nelson, B., & Rawlings, D. (2010). Relating schizotypy and personality to the 
phenomenology of creativity. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 36(2), 388–99. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbn098 
Nelson, M. T., Seal, M. L., Pantelis, C., & Phillips, L. J. (2013). Evidence of a 
dimensional relationship between schizotypy and schizophrenia: A systematic 
review. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews. 
Neslon, H., & O’Connell, A. (1991). The National Adult Reading Test (NART): Test 
Manual. NFER-Nelson. 
Neubauer, A. C., & Fink, A. (2009). Intelligence and neural efficiency. Neuroscience 
and Biobehavioral Reviews, 33(7), 1004–1023. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2009.04.001 







relation between stressors and memory failures. Psychology and Aging, 23(2), 
287–296. https://doi.org/10.1037/0882-7974.23.2.287 
Ninan, P. T., & Berger, J. (2001). Symptomatic and syndromal anxiety and depression. 
Depression and Anxiety, 14(2), 79–85. 
Nisbett, R. E., Aronson, J., Blair, C., Dickens, W., Flynn, J., Halpern, D. F., & 
Turkheimer, E. (2012). Intelligence: New findings and theoretical developments. 
American Psychologist, 67(2), 130–159. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026699 
Nock, M. K., Wedig, M. M., Holmberg, E. B., & Hooley, J. M. (2008). The emotion 
reactivity scale: Development, evaluation, and relation to self-injurious thoughts 
and behaviors. Behavior Therapy, 39(2), 107–116. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2007.05.005 
Noguchi, H., Hori, H., & Kunugi, H. (2008). Schizotypal traits and cognitive function in 
healthy adults. Psychiatry Research, 161(2), 162–169. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2007.07.023 
Ormel, J., Bastiaansen, A., Riese, H., Bos, E. H., Servaas, M., Ellenbogen, M., … 
Aleman, A. (2013). The biological and psychological basis of neuroticism: Current 
status and future directions. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 37(1), 59–
72. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012.09.004 
Palder, S. L., Ode, S., Liu, T., & Robinson, M. D. (2013). Living large: affect 







life. Cognition & Emotion, 27(3), 453–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2012.724011 
Palmer, B. W., Heaton, R. K., Paulsen, J. S., Kuck, J., Braff, D., Harris, M. J., … Jeste, 
D. V. (1997). Is it possible to be schizophrenic yet neuropsychologically normal? 
Neuropsychology, 11(3), 437–446. https://doi.org/10.1037/0894-4105.11.3.437 
Palmier-Claus, J. E., Dunn, G., Taylor, H., Morrison, A. P., & Lewis, S. W. (2013). 
Cognitive-self consciousness and metacognitive beliefs: Stress sensitization in 
individuals at ultra-high risk of developing psychosis. British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 52(1), 26–41. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8260.2012.02043.x 
Papousek, I., Weiss, E. M., Mosbacher, J. A., Reiser, E. M., Schulter, G., & Fink, A. 
(2014). Affective processing in positive schizotypy: Loose control of social-
emotional information. Brain and Cognition, 92C, 84–91. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2014.10.008 
Parrott, A., & Kaye, F. (1999). Daily uplifts, hassles, stresses and cognitive failures: In 
cigarette smokers, abstaining smokers, and non-smokers. Behavioral 
Pharamacology, 10(6–7), 639–646. 
Payne, T. W., & Schnapp, M. A. (2014). The relationship between negative affect and 
reported cognitive failures. Depression Research and Treatment, 2014, 396195. 
https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/396195 







Peters, E., Joseph, S., Day, S., & Garety, P. (2004). Measuring Delusional Ideation: The 
21-Item Peters et al. Delusions Inventory. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 30(4), 1005–
1022. 
Peterson, J. B., Rothfleisch, J., Zelazo, P. D., & Pihl, R. O. (1990). Acute alcohol 
intoxication and cognitive functioning. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 51(2), 114–
122. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsa.1990.51.114 
Pfeifer, S., van Os, J., Hanssen, M., Delespaul, P., & Krabbendam, L. (2009). 
Subjective experience of cognitive failures as possible risk factor for negative 
symptoms of psychosis in the general population. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 35(4), 
766–74. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbn004 
Phillips, L. K., Giuliano, A. J., Lee, E. H., Faraone, S. V., Tsuang, M. T., & Seidman, L. 
J. (2011). Emotion–cognition interaction in people at familial high risk for 
schizophrenia: The impact of sex differences. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
120(4), 993–998. 
Phillips, L. K., & Seidman, L. J. (2008). Emotion processing in persons at risk for 
schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 34(5), 888–903. 
Piskulic, D., Barbato, M., Liu, L., & Addington, J. (2015). Pilot study of cognitive 
remediation therapy on cognition in young people at clinical high risk of psychosis. 








Plomin, R. (1999). Genetics and general cognitive ability. Nature, 402(6761 Suppl), 
C25–C29. 
Pollina, L. K., Greene, A. L., Tunick, R. H., & Puckett, J. M. (1992). Dimensions of 
everyday memory in young adulthood. British Journal of Psychiatry, 83(3), 305–
21. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8295.1992.tb02443.x 
Preacher, K. J., & Kelley, K. (2011). Effect size measures for mediation models: 
quantitative strategies for communicating indirect effects. Psychological Methods, 
16(2), 93–115. 
Preiss, M., Kramska, L., Dockalova, E., Holubova, M., & Kucerova, H. (2010). 
Attentional networks in euthymic patients with unipolar depression. European 
Psychiatrysychiatry, 25(2), 69–74. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2009.08.007 
Pulay, A. J., Stinson, F. S., Dawson, D. A., Goldstein, R. B., Chou, S. P., Huang, B., … 
Grant, B. F. (2009). Prevalence, correlates, disability, and comorbidity of DSM-IV 
schizotypal personality disorder: results from the wave 2 national epidemiologic 
survey on alcohol and related conditions. Primary Care Companion to the Journal 
of Clinical Psychiatry, 11(2), 53–67. https://doi.org/10.4088/PCC.08m00679 
Quirk, S. W., Subramanian, L., & Hoerger, M. (2007). Effects of situational demand 
upon social enjoyment and preference in schizotypy. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 116(3), 624–631. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843x.116.3.624 







on DSM-III-R criteria. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 17(4), 555–564. 
Raine, A. (2006). Schizotypal personality: Neurodevelopmental and psychosocial 
trajectories. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 2(1), 291–326. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.2.022305.095318 
Raine, A., Reynolds, C., Lencz, T., Scerbo, A., Triphon, N., & Kim, D. (1994). 
Cognitive-perceptual, interpersonal, and disorganized features of schizotypal 
personality. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 20(1), 191–201. 
Rapoport, J. L., Giedd, J. N., & Gogtay, N. (2012). Neurodevelopmental model of 
schizophrenia: update 2012. Molecular Psychiatry, 17(12), 1228–1238. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/mp.2012.23 
Rast, P., Zimprich, D., Van Boxtel, M., & Jolles, J. (2009). Factor structure and 
measurement invariance of the cognitive failures questionnaire across the adult life 
span. Assessment, 16(2), 145–58. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191108324440 
Rauchensteiner, S., Kawohl, W., Ozgurdal, S., Littmann, E., Gudlowski, Y., Witthaus, 
H., … Juckel, G. (2011). Test-performance after cognitive training in persons at 
risk mental state of schizophrenia and patients with schizophrenia. Psychiatry 
Research, 185(3), 334–339. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2009.09.003 
Reason, J. (1979). Actions not as planned: The price of automatization. In G. 
Underwood & R. Stevens (Eds.), Aspects of Consciousness (pp. 67–89). London, 







Reason, J. (1984). Little slips and big disasters. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 9(2), 
179–189. https://doi.org/10.1179/isr.1984.9.2.179 
Reason, J. (1993). Self-report questionnaires in cognitive psychology: have they 
delivered the goods? In A. Baddeley & L. Weiskrantz (Eds.), Attention: Selection, 
Awareness and Control: A tribute to Donald Broadbent (pp. 406–423). New York, 
NY: Calrendon Press/Oxford University Press. 
Reese, C. M., & Cherry, K. E. (2006). Effects of age and ability on self-reported 
memory functioning and knowledge of memory aging. Journal of Genetic 
Psychology, 167(2), 221–240. https://doi.org/10.3200/GNTP.167.2.221-240 
Reichenberg, A. (2010). The assessment of neuropsychological functioning in 
schizophrenia. Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 12(3), 383–92. 
Reichenberg, A., Harvey, P. D., Bowie, C. R., Mojtabai, R., Rabinowitz, J., Heaton, R. 
K., & Bromet, E. (2009). Neuropsychological function and dysfunction in 
schizophrenia and psychotic affective disorders. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 35(5), 
1022–9. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbn044 
Reis, H. T. (2012). Why researchers should think “real-world”: A conceptual rationale. 
In T. Mehl, MR; Connor (Ed.), Handbook of Research Methods for Studying Daily 
Life (pp. 3–21). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Robertson, I. H., Manly, T., Andrade, J., Baddeley, B. T., & Yiend, J. (1997). “Oops!”: 







and normal subjects. Neuropsychologia, 35(6), 747–58. 
Roche, R. A. P., Garavan, H., Foxe, J. J., & O’Mara, S. M. (2005). Individual 
differences discriminate event-related potentials but not performance during 
response inhibition. Experimental Brain Research, 160(1), 60–70. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-004-1985-z 
Rock, P. L., Roiser, J. P., Riedel, W. J., & Blackwell, A. D. (2014). Cognitive 
impairment in depression: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Psychological 
Medicine, 44(10), 2029–40. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291713002535 
Rodgers, J. (2000). Cognitive performance amongst recreational users of “ecstasy.” 
Psychopharmacology, 151(1), 19–24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s002130000467 
Rodriguez, C., Ruggero, C. J., Callahan, J. L., Kilmer, J. N., Boals, A., & Banks, J. B. 
(2013). Does risk for bipolar disorder heighten the disconnect between objective 
and subjective appraisals of cognition? Journal of Affective Disorders, 148(2–3), 
400–5. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2012.06.029 
Roness, A., Mykletun, A., & Dahl, A. A. (2005). Help-seeking behaviour in patients 
with anxiety disorder and depression. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 111(1), 51–
58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-0447.2004.00433.x 
Rönnlund, M., Sundström, A., & Nilsson, L.-G. (2015). Interindividual differences in 
general cognitive ability from age 18 to age 65 years are extremely stable and 








Rossi, R., Zammit, S., Button, K. S., Munafò, M. R., Lewis, G., & David, A. S. (2016). 
Psychotic experiences and working memory: A population-based study using 
signal-detection analysis. PLoS ONE. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0153148 
Sandberg, K., Blicher, J. U., Dong, M. Y., Rees, G., Near, J., & Kanai, R. (2014). 
Occipital GABA correlates with cognitive failures in daily life. NeuroImage, 87, 
55–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.10.059 
Scher, C. D., Ingram, R. E., & Segal, Z. V. (2005). Cognitive reactivity and 
vulnerability: Empirical evaluation of construct activation and cognitive diatheses 
in unipolar depression. Clinical Psychology Review, 25(4), 487–510. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2005.01.005 
Schleicher, H. E., Harris, K. J., Catley, D., & Nazir, N. (2010). The role of depression 
and negative affect regulation expectancies in tobacco smoking among college 
students. Journal of American College Health, 57(5), 507–12. 
https://doi.org/10.3200/JACH.57.5.507-512 
Schmidt-Hansen, M., & Honey, R. C. (2009a). Working memory and multidimensional 
schizotypy: Dissociable influences of the different dimensions. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 26(7), 655–670. https://doi.org/10.1080/02643291003644501 







schizotypy: Dissociable influences of the different dimensions. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 26(7), 655–670. https://doi.org/10.1080/02643291003644501 
Schouws, S., Comijs, H., Stek, M., & Beekman, A. (2012). Self-reported cognitive 
complaints in elderly bipolar patients. American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 
20(8), 700–706. https://doi.org/10.1097/JGP.0b013e31822ccd27 
Schultze-Lutter, F. (2009). Subjective symptoms of schizophrenia in research and the 
clinic: the basic symptom concept. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 35(1), 5–8. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbn139 
Schultze-Lutter, F., Klosterkötter, J., & Ruhrmann, S. (2014). Improving the clinical 
prediction of psychosis by combining ultra-high risk criteria and cognitive basic 
symptoms. Schizophrenia Research, 154(1–3), 100–6. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2014.02.010 
Schultze-Lutter, F., Ruhrmann, S., Berning, J., Maier, W., & Klosterkötter, J. (2010). 
Basic symptoms and ultrahigh risk criteria: Symptom development in the initial 
prodromal state. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 36(1), 182–91. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbn072 
Schultze-Lutter, F., Ruhrmann, S., Fusar-Poli, P., Bechdolf, A., Schimmelmann, B. G., 
& Klosterkötter, J. (2012). Basic symptoms and the prediction of first-episode 
psychosis. Current Pharmaceutical Design, 18(4), 351–7. 







psychosis: The role of subjective cognitive disturbances. SCHIZOPHRENIA 
RESEARCH, 81(S), 270. 
Schweizer, S., Hampshire, A., & Dalgleish, T. (2011). Extending brain-training to the 
affective domain: increasing cognitive and affective executive control through 
emotional working memory training. PloS One, 6(9), e24372. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0024372 
Schweizer, T. A., Vogel-Sprott, M., Danckert, J., Roy, E. A., Skakum, A., & Broderick, 
C. E. (2006). Neuropsychological profile of acute alcohol intoxication during 
ascending and descending blood alcohol concentrations. 
Neuropsychopharmacology, 31(6), 1301–1309. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/sj.npp.1300941 
Sherwin, B. B. (2013). Estrogen and cognitive functioning in women. Endocrine 
Review, 24(2), 133–151. https://doi.org/10.1210/er.2001-0016 
Siddi, S., Petretto, D. R., & Preti, A. (2017). Neuropsychological correlates of 
schizotypy: a systematic review and meta-analysis of cross-sectional studies. 
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546805.2017.1299702 
Simms, L. J., Zelazny, K., Yam, W. H., & Gros, D. F. (2010). Self-informant agreement 
for personality and evaluative person descriptors: Comparing methods for creating 








Simon, A. E., & Umbricht, D. (2010). High remission rates from an initial ultra-high 
risk state for psychosis. Schizophrenia Research, 116(2), 168–172. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2009.10.001 
Simon, A. E., Umbricht, D., Cattapan-Ludewig, K., Zmilacher, S., Arbach, D., Gruber, 
K., … Zimmer, A. (2007). Cognitive functioning in the schizophrenia prodrome. 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 33(3), 761–771. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbm018 
Simpson, S. A., Wadsworth, E. J. K., Moss, S. C., & Smith, A. P. (2005). Minor 
injuries, cognitive failures and accidents at work: incidence and associated 
features. Occupational Medicine, 55(2), 99–108. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/occmed/kqi035 
Singer, J. L. (1975). Navigating the stream of consciousness: Research in daydreaming 
and related inner experience. American Psychologist, 30(7), 727–738. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0076928 
Singer, J. L., & Antrobus, J. S. (1963). A factor-analytic study of daydreaming and 
conceptually-related cognitive and personality variables. Perceptual and Motor 
Skills, 17(7613), 187–209. https://doi.org/10.2466/pms.1963.17.1.187 
Smilek, D., Carriere, J. S. A., & Cheyne, J. A. (2010). Out of mind, out of sight: Eye 
blinking as indicator and embodiment of mind wandering. Psychological Science, 
21(6), 786–789. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797610368063 







students have more everyday cognitive lapses. Memory, 12(2), 174–82. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09658210244000450 
Smith, G., Della Sala, S., Logie, R. H., & Maylor, E. A. (2000). Prospective and 
retrospective memory in normal ageing and dementia: A questionnaire study. 
Memory, 8(5), 311–321. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658210050117735 
Smith, N. T., & Lenzenweger, M. F. (2010). Increased stress responsivity in schizotypy 
leads to diminished spatial working memory performance. Personality Disorders: 
Theory, Research, and Treatment, 4(4), 324–331. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/per0000014 
Snitz, B. E., Macdonald, A. W., & Carter, C. S. (2006). Cognitive deficits in unaffected 
first-degree relatives of schizophrenia patients: a meta-analytic review of putative 
endophenotypes. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32(1), 179–194. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbi048 
Solowij, N., Hall, W., & Lee, N. (1992). Recreational MDMA use in Sydney: a profile 
of “Ecstasy” users and their experiences with the drug. British Journal of 
Addiction, 87(8), 1161–1172. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1360-0443.1992.tb02003.x 
Stratta, P., Daneluzzo, E., Mattei, P., Bustini, M., Casacchia, M., & Rossi, A. (1997). 
No deficit in Wisconsin Card Sorting Test performance of schizophrenic patients’ 








Sullivan, B., & Payne, T. W. (2007). Affective disorders and cognitive failures: A 
comparison of seasonal and nonseasonal depression. The American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 164(11), 1663–7. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2007.06111792 
Suls, J., & Martin, R. (2005). The daily life of the garden-variety neurotic: Reactivity, 
stressor exposure, mood spillover, and maladaptive coping. Journal of Personality, 
73(6), 1485–1509. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2005.00356.x 
Sutton, S. K., Van Rensburg, K. J., Jentink, K. G., Drobes, D. J., & Evans, D. E. (2016). 
Nicotine-induced cortical activation among nonsmokers with moderation by trait 
cognitive control. Psychopharmacology, 233(12), 2301–2308. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-016-4276-z 
Tallent, K. A., & Gooding, D. C. (1999). Working memory and Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test performance in schizotypic individuals: a replication and extension. 
Psychiatry Research, 89(3), 161–170. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-
1781(99)00101-8 
Tipper, S. P., & Baylis, G. C. (1987). Individual differences in selective attention: The 
relation of priming and interference to cognitive failure. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 8(5), 667–675. https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(87)90064-X 
Tokuda, Y., Kishida, N., Konishi, R., & Koizumi, S. (2011). Cognitive error as the most 
frequent contributory factor in cases of medical injury: A study on verdict’s 








Torgersen, S., Onstad, S., Skre, I., Edvardsen, J., & Kringlen, E. (1993). “True” 
schizotypal personality disorder: A study of co-twins and relatives of 
schizophrenic probands. American Journal of Psychiatry, 150(11), 1661–1667. 
https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.150.11.1661 
Unsworth, N. (2015). Consistency of attentional control as an important cognitive trait: 
a latent variable analysis. Intelligence, 49, 110–128. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2015.01.005 
Unsworth, N., Brewer, G. A., & Spillers, G. J. (2012). Variation in cognitive failures: an 
individual differences investigation of everyday attention and memory failures. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 67(1), 1–16. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2011.12.005 
Valenzuela, M., & Sachdev, P. (2009). Can cognitive exercise prevent the onset of 
dementia? Systematic review of randomized clinical trials with longitudinal 
follow-up. American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 17(3), 179–87. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/JGP.0b013e3181953b57 
van den Bosch, R. J., Rombouts, R., & van Asma, M. J. O. (1993). Subjective cognitive 
dysfunction in schizophrenic and depressed patients. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 
34(2), 130–136. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-440X(93)90058-C 








van Os, J., Linscott, R. J., Myin-Germeys, I., Delespaul, P., & Krabbendam, L. (2009). 
A systematic review and meta-analysis of the psychosis continuum: Evidence for a 
psychosis proneness–persistence–impairment model of psychotic disorder. 
Psychological Medicine, 39(2), 179. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291708003814 
van Veelen, N. M. J., Vink, M., Ramsey, N. F., & Kahn, R. S. (2010). Left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex dysfunction in medication-naive schizophrenia. Schizophrenia 
Research, 123(1), 22–29. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2010.07.004 
Vazire, S. (2006). Informant reports: A cheap, fast, and easy method for personality 
assessment. Journal of Research in Personality, 40(5), 472–481. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2005.03.003 
Verdejo-García, A., Bechara, A., Recknor, E. C., & Pérez-García, M. (2007). Negative 
emotion-driven impulsivity predicts substance dependence problems. Drug and 
Alcohol Dependence, 91(2–3), 213–219. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2007.05.025 
Verdoux, H., & van Os, J. (2002). Psychotic symptoms in non-clinical populations and 
the continuum of psychosis. Schizophrenia Research, 54(1), 59–65. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0920-9964(01)00352-8 
Vollema, M. G., Sitskoorn, M. M., Appels, M. C. M., & Kahn, R. S. (2002). Does the 
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire reflect the biological-genetic vulnerability 








Vollema, M. G., & van den Bosch, R. J. (1995). The multidimensionality of schizotypy. 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 21(1), 19–31. 
Walker, E., Kestler, L., Bollini, A., & Hochman, K. M. (2004). Schizophrenia: Etiology 
and course. Annual Review of Psychology, 55(1), 401–430. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.141950 
Wallace, J. C. (2004). Confirmatory factor analysis of the cognitive failures 
questionnaire: evidence for dimensionality and construct validity. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 37(2), 307–324. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2003.09.005 
Wallace, J. C., Kass, S. J., & Stanny, C. J. (2002). The cognitive failures questionnaire 
revisited: Dimensions and correlates. Journal of General Psychology, 129(3), 238–
256. https://doi.org/10.1080/00221300209602098 
Wallace, J. C., Vodanovich, S. J., & Restino, B. M. (2003). Predicting cognitive failures 
from boredom proneness and daytime sleepiness scores : An investigation within 
military and undergraduate samples. Personality and Individual Differences, 34(4), 
635–644. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(02)00050-8 
Walter, E. E., Fernandez, F., Snelling, M., & Barkus, E. (2016). Genetic consideration 
of schizotypal traits: A review. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1769. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01769 
Wan, L., Friedman, B. H., Boutros, N. N., & Crawford, H. J. (2008). Smoking status 







Personality and Individual Differences, 44(2), 425–435. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2007.09.002 
Watkins, E., & Brown, R. G. (2002). Rumination and executive function in depression: 
An experimental study. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, 72(3), 
400–402. https://doi.org/10.1136/jnnp.72.3.400 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Carey, G. (1988). Positive and negative affectivity and their 
relation to anxiety and depressive disorders. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
97(3), 346–353. 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief 
measures of positive and negative affect: the PANAS scales. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 54(6), 1063–1070. 
Watson, D., Hubbard, B., & Wiese, D. (2000). Self-other agreement in personality and 
affectivity: The role of acquaintanceship, trait visibility, and assumed similarity. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(3), 546–58. 
Watts, F. N., & Sharrock, R. (1985). Description and measurement of concentration 
problems in depressed patients. Psychological Medicine, 15(2), 317–326. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S003329170002359X 
Weaver, T., Madden, P., Charles, V., Stimson, G., Renton, A., Tyrer, P., … Ford, C. 
(2003). Comorbidity of substance misuse and mental illness in community mental 








Weigmann, D. A., & Shappell, S. A. (1997). Human factors analysis of postaccident 
data: Applying theoretical taxonomies of human error. International Journal of 
Aviation Psychology, 7(1), 15–36. 
Wells, A. (1995). Meta-cognition and worry: A cognitive model of generalized anxiety 
disorder. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 23(3), 301. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352465800015897 
Wilhelm, O., Witthöft, M., & Schipolowski, S. (2010). Self-reported cognitive failures: 
Competing measurement models and self-report correlates. Journal of Individual 
Differences, 31(1), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1027/1614-0001/a000001 
Wilkerson, A., Boals, A., & Taylor, D. J. (2011). Sharpening our understanding of the 
consequences of insomnia: The relationship between insomnia and everyday 
cognitive failures. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 36(2), 134–139. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10608-011-9418-3 
Wilson, C. M., Christensen, B. K., King, J. P., Li, Q., & Zelazo, P. D. (2008). 
Decomposing perseverative errors among undergraduates scoring high on the 
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire. Schizophrenia Research, 106(1), 3–12. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2008.05.031 
Wilson, R. S., Arnold, S. E., Schneider, J. A., Kelly, J. F., Tang, Y., & Bennett, D. A. 







Neuroepidemiology, 27(3), 143–153. https://doi.org/10.1159/000095761 
Wilson, R. S., Evans, D. A., Bienias, J. L., Mendes de Leon, C. F., Schneider, J. A., & 
Bennett, D. A. (2003). Proneness to psychological distress is associated with risk 
of Alzheimer’s disease. Neurology, 61(11), 1479–1485. 
https://doi.org/10.1212/01.WNL.0000096167.56734.59 
Wood, S. J., Yung, A. R., McGorry, P. D., & Pantelis, C. (2011). Neuroimaging and 
treatment evidence for clinical staging in psychotic disorders: From the at-risk 
mental state to chronic schizophrenia. Biological Psychiatry. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2011.05.034 
Wright, D., & Osborne, J. (2005). Dissociation, cognitive failures, and working 
memory. American Journal of Psychology, 118(1), 103–113. 
Yung, A. R., McGorry, P. D., Francey, S. M., Nelson, B., Baker, K., Phillips, L. J., … 
Amminger, G. P. (2007). PACE: A specialised service for young people at risk of 
psychotic disorders. The Medical Journal of Australia, 187(7 Suppl). 
Yung, A. R., Phillips, L. J., Yuen, H. P., Francey, S. M., McFarlane, C. A., Hallgren, 
M., & McGorry, P. D. (2003). Psychosis prediction: 12-month follow up of a high-
risk (“prodromal”) group. Schizophrenia Research, 60(1), 21–32. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0920-9964(02)00167-6 
Zeidner, M. (1995). Personality trait correlates of intelligence. In D. H. Saklofske & M. 



















Excluded Studies and Reasons for Exclusion (n = 80). 
Reference Reason for exclusion 
Alam, N., Katarkar, A., Shah, P., & Jalvi, R. (2012). 
Audiological, psychological and cognitive characteristics of 
tinnitus sufferers. Indian Journal of Otology, 18(1), 20. 
Clinical/substance 
abuse population 
Aukes, A. M., Wessel, I., Dubois, A. M., Aarnoudse, J. G., & 
Zeeman, G. G. (2008). Self-reported cognitive functioning in 
formerly eclamptic women. Obstetrical & Gynecological 
Survey, 63(2), 77–79. 
Clinical/substance 
abuse population 
Barker-Collo, S. L., Feigin, V. L., Lawes, C. M. M., Parag, V., 
& Senior, H. (2010). Attention Deficits After Incident Stroke 
in the Acute Period: Frequency Across Types of Attention and 
Relationships to Patient Characteristics and Functional 




Bassett, S. S., & Folstein, M. F. (1993). Memory complaint, 
memory performance, and psychiatric diagnosis: A community 
study. Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry and Neurology, 6(2), 
105–111. https://doi.org/10.1177/089198879300600207 
Measure of cognitive 








Bassel, C., Rourke, S. B., Halman, M. H., & Smith, M. Lou. 
(2002). Working memory performance predicts subjective 
cognitive complaints in HIV infection. Neuropsychology, 
16(3), 400–410. https://doi.org/10.1037//0894-4105.16.3.400 
Clinical/substance 
abuse population 
Boals, A. (2008). Intrusive thoughts and everyday cognitive 




Boals, A., & Banks, J. B. (2012). Effects of traumatic stress 
and perceived stress on everyday cognitive functioning. 




Bossema, E. R., Brand, A. N., Geenen, R., Moll, F. L., 
Ackerstaff, R. G. A., & van Doornen, L. J. P. (2005). Effect of 
carotid endarterectomy on patient evaluations of cognitive 
functioning and mental and physical health. Annals of 




Burdick, K. E., Endick, C. J., & Goldberg, J. F. (2005). 
Assessing cognitive deficits in bipolar disorder: are self-reports 










Cañizares, S., Torres, X., Boget, T., Rumià, J., Elices, E., & 
Arroyo, S. (2000). Does Neuroticism Influence Cognitive Self-




Caplette-Gingras, A., Savard, J., Savard, M.-H., & Ivers, H. 
(2013). Is insomnia associated with cognitive impairments in 




Chan, R. C. K. (2000). Attentional deficits in patients with 
closed head injury: a further study to the discriminative 




Commissaris, C. J. A. M., Ponds, R. W. H. M., & Jolles, J. 
(1998). Subjective forgetfulness in a normal Dutch population: 
Possibilities for health education and other interventions. 
Patient Education and Counseling. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0738-3991(98)00040-8 
Measure of cognitive 
failures included too 
few items 
Costigan, A., Elliott, C., McDonald, C., & Newton, J. L. 
(2010). Orthostatic symptoms predict functional capacity in 
chronic fatigue syndrome: implications for management. QJM, 









Dalgaard, L., Eskildsen, A., Carstensen, O., Willert, M. V., 
Andersen, J. H., & Glasscock, D. J. (2014). Changes in self-
reported sleep and cognitive failures: a randomized controlled 
trial of a stress management intervention. Scandinavian 
Journal Of Work Environment & Health, 40(6), 569–581. 
https://doi.org/10.5271/sjweh.3460 
Intervention study 
Dockree, P. M., Bellgrove, M. A., O’Keeffe, F. M., Moloney, 
P., Aimola, L., Carton, S., & Robertson, I. H. (2006). 
Sustained attention in traumatic brain injury (TBI) and healthy 
controls: enhanced sensitivity with dual-task load. 




Donohoe, G., Gill, M., Corvin, A. P., Hayden, J., McGlade, N., 
O’Grada, C., … O’Callaghan, E. (2009). Is “clinical” insight 
the same as “cognitive” insight in schizophrenia? Journal of 




Elferrich, M., Nelemans, P. ., Ponds, R. W., De Vries, J., 
Wijnen, P. M., & Drent, M. (2010). Everyday cognitive failure 
in sarcoidosis: the prevalence and the effect of anti-TNF-α 









Farrin, L., Hull, L., Unwin, C., & Wykes, T. (2003). Effects of 
depressed mood on objective and subjective measures of 
attention. Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical 




Ferguson, R. J., McDonald, B. C., Rocque, M. A., Furstenberg, 
C. T., Horrigan, S., Ahles, T. A., & Saykin, A. J. (2012). 
Development of CBT for chemotherapy-related cognitive 
change: results of a waitlist control trial. Psycho-Oncology, 
21(2), 176–86. https://doi.org/10.1002/pon.1878 
Clinical/substance 
abuse population 
Fisk, J. E., & Montgomery, C. (2008). Real-world memory and 
executive processes in cannabis users and non-users. Journal of 




Floridou, G. A., & Müllensiefen, D. (2015). Environmental 
and mental conditions predicting the experience of involuntary 
musical imagery: An experience sampling method study. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 33, 472–486. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.02.012 
Measure of cognitive 
failures included too 
few items 
Grisham, J. R., Norberg, M. M., Williams, A. D., Certoma, S. 









in compulsive hoarding. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
48(9), 866–72. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2010.05.011 
Hadjiefthyvoulou, F., Fisk, J. E., Montgomery, C., & Bridges, 
N. (2011). Everyday and prospective memory deficits in 
ecstasy/polydrug users. Journal of Psychopharmacology, 
25(4), 453–464. https://doi.org/10.1177/0269881109359101 
Clinical/substance 
abuse population 
Hallam, R. S., Mckenna, L., & Shurlock, L. (2004). Tinnitus 
impairs cognitive efficiency. International Journal of 




Hart, T., Whyte, J., & Kim, J. (2005). Executive function and 
self-awareness of “real-world” behavior and attention deficits 
following traumatic brain injury. Journal of Head Trauma 
Rehabilitation, 20(4), 333–347. 
Clinical/substance 
abuse population 
Heffernan, T. M., Jarvis, H., Rodgers, J., Scholey, A. B., & 
Ling, J. (2001). Prospective memory, everyday cognitive 
failure and central executive function in recreational users of 




Helton, W. S., Head, J., & Kemp, S. (2011). Natural disaster 
induced cognitive disruption: Impacts on action slips. 
Measure of cognitive 







Consciousness and Cognition, 20(4), 1732–1737. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.02.011 
few items 
Hutchinson, A. D., Hosking, J. R., Kichenadasse, G., Mattiske, 
J. K., & Wilson, C. (2012). Objective and subjective cognitive 
impairment following chemotherapy for cancer: A systematic 




Johansson, B., & Tornmalm, M. (2012). Working memory 
training for patients with acquired brain injury: effects in daily 




Jungwirth, S., Fischer, P., Weissgram, S., Kirchmeyr, W., 
Bauer, P., & Tragl, K. H. (2004). Subjective memory 
complaints and objective memory impairment in the Vienna-
Transdanube aging community. Journal of the American 
Geriatrics Society, 52(2), 263–268. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-5415.2004.52066.x 
Measure of cognitive 
failures included too 
few items 
Keizer, A. M. ., Hijman, R., van Dijk, D., Kalkman, C. J., & 
Kahn, R. S. (2003). Cognitive self-assessment one year after 
on-pump and off-pump coronary artery bypass grafting. The 










Koster, S., Hensens, A. G., Schuurmans, M. J., & van der 
Palen, J. (2012). Consequences of delirium after cardiac 




Koso, M., Sarač-Hadzihalilovic, A., & Hansen, S. (2012). 
Neuropsychological performance, psychiatric symptoms, and 
everyday cognitive failures in Bosnian ex-servicemen with 




Lamb, F., Anderson, J., Saling, M., & Dewey, H. (2013). 
Predictors of subjective cognitive complaint in postacute older 
adult stroke patients. Archives of Physical Medicine and 




Liebermann, D., Ostendorf, F., Kopp, U. A., Kraft, A., Bohner, 
G., Nabavi, D. G., … Ploner, C. J. (2013). Subjective 
cognitive-affective status following thalamic stroke. Journal of 











cognitive intervention for people with multiple sclerosis. 
Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, 72(1), 93–
98. https://doi.org/10.1136/jnnp.72.1.93 
abuse population 
Ling, J., Campbell, C., Heffernan, T. M., & Greenough, C. G. 
(2007). Short-term prospective memory deficits in chronic 
back pain patients. Psychosomatic Medicine, 69(2), 144–148. 
Clinical/substance 
abuse population 
Ling, J., Heffernan, T. M., Buchanan, T., Rodgers, J., Scholey, 
A. B., & Parrott, A. C. (2003). Effects of alcohol on subjective 
ratings of prospective and everyday memory deficits. 




MacQueen, G. M., Galway, T. M., Hay, J., Young, L. T., & 
Joffe, R. T. (2002). Recollection memory deficits in patients 
with major depressive disorder predicted by past depressions 
but not current mood state or treatment status. Psychological 




McMillan, R. L., Kaufman, S. B., & Singer, J. L. (2013). Ode 
to positive constructive daydreaming. Frontiers in Psychology, 
4. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00626 
Philosophical paper 







R., Keefe, R. S. E., … Moffitt, T. E. (2012). PNAS Plus: 
Persistent cannabis users show neuropsychological decline 
from childhood to midlife. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 1206820109-. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1206820109 
abuse population 
Merckelbach, H., Merckelbach, H., Muris, P., Nijman, H., & 
de Jong, P. J. (1996). Self-reported cognitive failures and 
neurotic symptomatology. Personality and Individual 




Muris, P., Nijman, H., & de Jong, P. J. (1996). Self-reported 
cognitive failures and neurotic symptomatology. Personality 




Middelkamp, W., Moulaert, V. R., Verbunt, J. A., van 
Heugten, C. M., Bakx, W. G., & Wade, D. T. (2007). Life after 
survival: long-term daily life functioning and quality of life of 
patients with hypoxic brain injury as a result of a cardiac 











deficits in ecstasy-polydrug users. Journal of 
Psychopharmacology, 21(7), 709–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0269881107077220 
abuse population 
Neupert, S. D., Almeida, D. M., Mroczek, D. K., & Spiro III, 
A. (2006). Daily Stressors and Memory Failures in a 
Naturalistic Setting: Findings From the VA Normative Aging 
Study. Psychology and Aging, 21(2), 424–429. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0882-7974.21.2.424 
Measure of cognitive 
failures included too 
few items 
Neupert, S. D., Mroczek, D. K., & Spiro, A. (2008). 
Neuroticism moderates the daily relation between stressors and 
memory failures. Psychology and Aging, 23(2), 287–296. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0882-7974.23.2.287 
Measure of cognitive 
failures included too 
few items 
Ornstein, T. J., Sahakian, B. J., & McKenna, P. J. (2008). 
Memory and executive impairment in schizophrenia: 
comparison with frontal and temporal brain damage. 




Palder, S. L., Ode, S., Liu, T., & Robinson, M. D. (2013). 
Living large: Affect amplification in visual perception predicts 
emotional reactivity to events in daily life. Cognition & 
Emotion, 27(3), 453–64. 
Measure of cognitive 









Parrott, A. C., Sisk, E., & Turner, J. J. D. (2000). 
Psychobiological problems in heavy `ecstasy’ (MDMA) 





Parrott, A., & Kaye, F. (1999). Daily uplifts, hassles, stresses 
and cognitive failures: In cigarette smokers, abstaining 




Poliakoff, E., & Smith-Spark, J. H. (2008). Everyday cognitive 
failures and memory problems in Parkinson’s patients without 




Ponds, R. W., Commissaris, K. J., & Jolles, J. (1997). 
Prevalence and covariates of subjective forgetfulness in a 
normal population in The Netherlands. International Journal of 
Ageing and Human Development, 45(3), 207–221. 
https://doi.org/10.2190/MVQ1-WB58-875H-Y4X0 
Measure of cognitive 
failures included too 
few items 
Preiss, M., Kramska, L., Dockalova, E., Holubova, M., & 









patients with unipolar depression. European 
Psychiatrysychiatry, 25(2), 69–74. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2009.08.007 
Preiss, M., Lukavsky, J., & Steinova, D. (2010). Decreased 
self-reported cognitive failures after memory training. 
Educational Gerontology, 36(9), 798–808. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03601270903534655 
Intervention study 
Preiss, M., Shatil, E., Cermáková, R., Cimermanová, D., & 
Ram, I. (2013). Personalized cognitive training in unipolar and 
bipolar disorder: a study of cognitive functioning. Frontiers in 




Robertson, I. H., Manly, T., Andrade, J., Baddeley, B. T., & 
Yiend, J. (1997). “Oops!”: Performance correlates of everyday 
attentional failures in traumatic brain injured and normal 
subjects. Neuropsychologia, 35(6), 747–58. 
Clinical/substance 
abuse population 
Robinson, M. D., Ode, S., & Hilmert, C. J. (2014). Cortisol 
reactivity in the laboratory predicts ineffectual attentional 
control in daily life. Psychology and Health, 29(7), 781–795. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08870446.2014.884224 
Measure of cognitive 
failures included too 
few items 







recreational users of “ecstasy.” Psychopharmacology, 151(1), 
19–24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s002130000467 
abuse population 
Rosti-Otajärvi, E. M., & Hämäläinen, P. I. (2011). 
Neuropsychological rehabilitation for multiple sclerosis. 




Schouws, S., Comijs, H., Stek, M., & Beekman, A. (2012). 
Self-reported cognitive complaints in elderly bipolar patients. 




Schwarz, N., Kastaun, S., Schoenburg, M., Kaps, M., & 
Gerriets, T. (2013). Subjective impairment after cardiac 
surgeries: the relevance of postoperative cognitive decline in 
daily living. European Journal of Cardio-Thoracic Surgery : 
Official Journal of the European Association for Cardio-




Singer, J. L. (1975). Navigating the stream of consciousness: 
Research in daydreaming and related inner experience. 









Singer, J. L., & Antrobus, J. S. (1963). A factor-analytic study 
of daydreaming and conceptually-related cognitive and 
personality variables. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 17(7613), 
187–209. https://doi.org/10.2466/pms.1963.17.1.187 
Philosophical paper 
Smilek, D., Carriere, J. S. A., & Cheyne, J. A. (2010). Failures 
of sustained attention in life, lab, and brain : ecological validity 




Smith-Spark, J. H., Fawcett, A. J., Nicolson, R. I., & Fisk, J. E. 
(2004). Dyslexic students have more everyday cognitive 




Sullivan, B., & Payne, T. W. (2007). Affective disorder and 
cognitive failures: A comparison of seasonal and nonseasonal 




Sunderland, A., Stewart, F., & Sluman, S. (1996). Adaptation 
to cognitive deficit? An exploration of apparent dissociations 
between everyday memory and test performance late after 
stroke. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 35(3), 463–476. 
Clinical/substance 
abuse population 







& Miskowiak, K. W. (2012). Is there an association between 
subjective and objective measures of cognitive function in 
patients with affective disorders? Nordic Journal of Psychiatry, 
66(4), 248–53. https://doi.org/10.3109/08039488.2011.626870 
abuse population 
Trick, L., Stanley, N., Rigney, U., & Hindmarch, I. (2004). A 
double-blind, randomized, 26-week study comparing the 
cognitive and psychomotor effects and efficacy of 75 mg (37.5 
mg b.i.d.) venlafaxine and 75 mg (25 mg mane, 50 mg nocte) 
dothiepin in elderly patients with moderate major depression 




Tun, C. G., Tun, P. A., & Wingfield, A. (1997). Cognitive 
function following long-term spinal cord injury. Rehabilitation 
Psychology, 42(3), 163–182. 
Clinical/substance 
abuse population 
Tzabar, Y., Asbury, A. J., & Millar, K. (1996). Cognitive 
failures after general anaesthesia for day-case surgery. British 
Journal of Anaesthesia, 76(2), 194–197. 
Clinical/substance 
abuse population 
Valentijn, S. A. M., Van Hooren, S. A. H., Bosma, H., Touw, 
D. M., Jolles, J., Van Boxtel, M. P. J., & Ponds, R. W. H. M. 
(2005). The effect of two types of memory training on 








individuals aged 55 years and older: A randomized controlled 
trial. Patient Education and Counseling, 57(1), 106–114. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pec.2004.05.002 
van den Bosch, R. J., Rombouts, R., & van Asma, M. J. O. 
(1993). Subjective cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenic and 




van Hooren, S. A. H., Valentijn, S. A. M., Bosma, H., Ponds, 
R. W. H. M., van Boxtel, M. P. J., Levine, B., … Jolles, J. 
(2007). Effect of a structured course involving goal 
management training in older adults: A randomised controlled 
trial. Patient Education and Counseling, 65(2), 205–13. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pec.2006.07.010 
Intervention study 
Vestergren, P., & Nilsson, L. G. (2011). Perceived causes of 
everyday memory problems in a population-based sample aged 
39-99. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25(4), 641–646. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1734 
Measure of cognitive 
failures included too 
few items 
Waber, D. P., Pomeroy, S. L., Chiverton, A. M., Kieran, M. 
W., Scott, R. M., Goumnerova, L. C., & Rivkin, M. J. (2006). 
Everyday cognitive function after craniopharyngioma in 










Wan, L., Friedman, B. H., Boutros, N. N., & Crawford, H. J. 
(2008). Smoking status affects men and women differently on 
schizotypal traits and cognitive failures. Personality and 




Whyte, J., Grieb-Neff, P., Gantz, C., & Polansky, M. (2006). 
Measuring sustained attention after traumatic brain injury: 
differences in key findings from the sustained attention to 




Willert, M. V., Thulstrup, A. M., Hertz, J., & Bonde, J. P. 
(2010). Sleep and cognitive failures improved by a three-
month stress management intervention. International Journal of 











Table B.1. Pearson correlations among study variables - males 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. CFQ-self -    
2. N-self .369** -   
3. CFQ-observer .426** .083 -  
4. N-observer .143 .516** .274** - 
 
 
Table B.2. Pearson correlations among study variables - females 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. CFQ-self -    
2. N-self .361** -   
3. CFQ-observer .264** .053 -  









With regards to dimension of failures, females reported more distractions (M = 20.61, 
SD = 6.11; versus M = 16.92, SD = 5.68 for males; t(861) = -8.21, p <.001), memory 
problems (M =11.25, SD = 5.30; versus M = 9.48, SD = 4.79 for males; t(861) = -4.60, p 
<.001), and blunders (M =12.79, SD = 4.56; versus M = 11.10, SD = 4.52 for males; 







Table C.1  
Pearson Correlations Among Study Variables Including Subscales of the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 
Variable Mean S.D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. Schizotypy total 23.43 14.51 -          
2. Cog-perceptual  9.56 7.07 .88** -         
3. Interpersonal 8.43 6.06 .83** .52** -        
4. Disorganisation 5.44 4.10 .81** .61** .55** -       
5. Negative affect 15.54 11.50 .51** .45** .44** .36** -      
6. Cog failures 46.92 15.68 .50** .42** .39** .47** .45**  -     
7. Distractions 19.54 6.21 .48** .39** .40** .44** .41** .92** -    
8. Memory 10.74 5.21 .40** .36** .28** .37** .39** .89** .74** -   
9. Blunders 12.30 4.61 .50** .43** .37** .46** .44** .89** .75** .74** -  
10. Names 4.34 2.03 .24** .16** .22** .25** .23** .58** .49** .39** .44** - 








Table D.1      
Pearson Correlations Among Study Variables Including Subscales of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire and SPQ Total Score With and 
Without Odd Speech Subscale Included – Study 2 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. CFQ total -            
2. SPQ total .50** -           
3. SPQ total less odd speech .47** .99** -          
4. SPQ odd speech .49** .77** .69** -         
5. SPQ ideas of ref .38** .75** .76** .50** -        
6. SPQ social anx .41** .72** .73** .46** .43** -       

















Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
8. SPQ unusual perceptions .37** .72** .72** .53** .59** .36** .57** -     
9. SPQ odd behavior .32** .64** .63** .56** .38** .32** .25** .44** -    
10. SPQ no friends .26** .70** .72** .41** .32** .64** .15** .32** .35** -   
11. SPQ constricted affect .34** .75** .74** .57** .38** .58** .21** .37** .44** .71** -  
12. SPQ suspicious .36** .79** .80** .53** .67** .49** .31** .51** .38** .52** .52** - 







Table D.2  
Pearson Correlations Among Study Variables Including Subscales of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire and SPQ Total Score With and 
Without Odd Speech Subscale Included – Study 3 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. CFQ total -            
2. SPQ total .48** -           
3. SPQ total less odd speech .44** .99** -          
4. SPQ odd speech .50** .75** .64** -         
5. SPQ ideas of ref .28** .66** .67** .44** -        
6. SPQ social anx .33** .71** .74** .38** .34** -       
7. SPQ odd beliefs .08 .26** .27** .12 .36** -.04 -      











Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
9. SPQ odd behavior .31** .60** .58** .52** .23** .30** -.01 .39** -    
10. SPQ no friends .19* .69** .72** .37** .16 .60** .01 .17** .34** -   
11. SPQ constricted affect .38** .72** .71** .55** .27** .55** -.12 .19* .38** .75** -  
12. SPQ suspicious .38** .82** .82** .55** .59** .55** .15 .38** .42** .52** .53** - 








Table E.1  
International Affective Picture System Picture Numbers by Emotion Group for 




































Performance for emotional versus neutral stimuli 
To first examine general differences in performance between emotional and 
neutral stimuli, performance outcomes for fearful, happy, and sad stimuli were averaged 
together to create outcome variables looking at overall emotional working memory. 
Collapsing across all working memory loads, paired samples t-tests revealed that high 
schizotypes’ hit rates were significantly lower for emotional stimuli (M = 2.57, SD = 
.30) than neutral stimuli (M = 2.65, SD = .26; t(38) = 2.78, p < .001). Low schizotypes’ 
hit rates did not differ according to stimuli type, with emotional stimuli (M = 2.64, SD = 
.22) and neutral stimuli (M = 2.65, SD = .24) eliciting similar hit rates (t(47) = .64, p = 
.26).  
To explore the individual impact of specific type of emotion load on hit rates, z-
scores were calculated for overall hit rates for fearful, happy, and sad stimuli using the 
mean and standard deviation for neutral stimuli hits for each group. This enabled a 
comparison of the magnitude of difference in hit rates with the addition of each type of 
emotional load versus performance for neutral stimuli as a baseline. Independent 
samples t-tests were then carried out to compare whether the magnitude of difference in 
hit performance for each type of emotional load relative to neutral stimuli differed 







Table 8.1. Whilst there were no significant group differences in the magnitude of 
deviation in performance for any type of emotion versus neutral, at a trend level, fearful 
stimuli elicited a more exaggerated reduction in hit rates and an increase in false alarms 
for high schizotypes than low schizotypes.  
For overall false alarm rates, high schizotypes produced more false alarms for 
combined emotional (M = .24, SD = .18) than neutral stimuli (M = .17, SD = .18; p < 
.001). Low schizotypes also demonstrated this pattern, with neutral stimuli (M = .15, SD 
= .14) eliciting fewer false alarms than emotional stimuli (M = .22, SD = .11; p < .001). 
Fearful stimuli appeared to result in the largest increase in false alarms relative to 
neutral stimuli in both groups; again there were no significant group differences. Given 
that emotional stimuli appeared to have some differential effects on working memory 
performance, further analyses explored the combined effects of emotion type and load 















Mean Performance and Deviations in Performance for Emotional Stimuli vs. Baseline 
of Neutral Stimuli by Schizotypy Group 
 Overall mean (SD) hits 
and false alarms 
Mean z-score (SD) 
deviations in performance 





 High  Low High Low  
Hits      
  Neutral 2.65 (.28) 2.65 (.24) 0 0  
  Fearful 2.55 (.29) 2.64 (.27) -.40 (1.14) -.03 (1.14) 0.06 
  Happy  2.49 (.38) 2.57 (.26) -.63 (1.47) -.33 (1.02) 0.14 
  Sad 2.66 (.31) 2.71 (.21) .06 (1.20) .24 (.83) 0.21 
False alarms      
  Neutral .17 (.18) .15 (.14) 0 0  
  Fearful .33 (.20) .28 (.17) 1.18 (1.35) .83 (.79) 0.07 
  Happy  .21 (.23) .20 (.13) .34 (1.58) .27 (.89) 0.40 










A mixed design ANOVA examined whether schizotypy interacted with load and 
emotion to shape hit rates. CFQ was included as a covariate and was significant (F(1, 
84) = 5.33, p = .02, ηp
2= .06).  Performance on 0-back blocks were tested for group 
differences, however none were evident and this was not included as a covariate (t(85) = 
-.28, p = .78). 
Hits – task effects 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the 
main effect of load (χ2(2) = 14.99, p < .01); this was also evident for the intercept of 
load and emotion (χ2(20) = 45.95, p < .01). Huynh-Feldt corrections were therefore 
applied to relevant data.  
Hits – effects of load 
The analysis showed a significant main effect of load (F(1.79, 144.18) = 19.14, 
p < .001, ηp
2= .19). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that as expected, hits 
declined as task difficulty increased. The 1-back load elicited the highest hit rate (M = 
2.80, SD = .34), followed by 2-back (M = 2.56, SD = .33), and finally 3-back (M = 2.29, 
M = .41). All loads differed significantly from each other, p < .001 for all comparisons. 







The main effect of emotion was also significant (F(3, 252)=2.24, p = .04, ηp
2= 
.03). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons indicated that happy stimuli (M = 2.53, SD = .32) 
resulted in a significantly lower hit rate than all other stimuli; neutral ((M = 2.65, SD = 
.26; p <.001), sad (M = 2.67, SD = .27; p < .001), and fearful stimuli (M = 2.63, SD = 
.27; p = .02). Fearful resulted in a lower hit rate than both neutral (p = .02) and sad 
stimuli (p = .02). Neutral and sad stimuli did not differ in terms of hit rates (p = .11). 
Hits – interactions for task effects 
There was a trend interaction between load and emotion (F(5.64, 473.73) = 1.54, 
p =.08, ηp
2= .02). Inspection of plotted data suggested that hit rates for fearful stimuli 
were slightly more stable across load level than other types of emotional stimuli.   
Hits - schizotypy group effects 
There was a main effect of schizotypy group (F(1, 84) = 5.02, p = .01, ηp
2= .06), 
with high schizotypes having a significantly lower hit rate (M = 2.48, SE = 0.40) than 
low schizotypes (M = 2.61, SE = .04).  
There was no significant interaction of load and schizotypy (F(1.72, 150.40) = 
.74, p = .48, ηp
2= .01), or emotion and schizotypy (F(3, 252) = 1.01, p = .39, ηp
2= .01); 
nor was there evidence of a three way interaction between emotion, load and schizotypy 
(F(5.64, 473.73) = .34, p = .91, ηp
2= .004). However given that a schizotypy by emotion 
interaction was a specific hypothesis of this study, further analyses were conducted in 







mean hit rates for high versus low schizotypes for each combination of load and 
emotion are depicted in Table 8.2. There was no main effect of emotion for the low 
group (F(3, 138) = 1.08, p = .12, ηp
2= .02), but an effect was present for the high group 
(F(3, 111) = 2.52, p =.03, η2= .06). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that high 
schizotypes had significantly lower hit rates for fearful versus both neutral (p = .005) 
and sad stimuli (p = .004), and hit rates were also lower for happy versus both neutral (p 
= .001) and sad stimuli (p < .001). Fearful and happy stimuli did not differ significantly 
from each other, nor did neutral and sad stimuli. 
False alarms 
The same three-way mixed design ANOVA was used to explore false alarms as a 
second n-back performance indicator of interest. CFQ score was also included as a 
covariate in this analysis, but its effect was present only at the trend level (F(1, 84) 
=1.99, p = .08, ηp
2= .02). Performance on 0-back blocks were tested for group 
differences, and as with hits none were evident and this was not included as a covariate 
(t(85) = -.25, p = .81). 
False alarms – task effects 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was again violated for 
load (χ2(2)=17.74, p < .001); this was also evident for interaction of load and emotion 













Table F.2  
Estimated Marginal Means for Hit Rates Across Schizotypy Group, N-Back Load Level, and Emotion Type 
 
1-back 2-back 3-back 
M (SE) 95% CI M (SE) 95% CI M (SE) 95% CI 
High       
Neutral 2.90 (.04) [2.82, 2.97] 2.44 (.08) [2.28, 2.59] 2.33 (.09) [2.15, 2.50] 
Fearful 2.83 (.05) [2.73, 2.94] 2.50 (.06) [2.38, 2.61] 1.96 (.09) [1.78, 2.13] 
Happy 2.52 (.05) [2.43, 2.61] 2.39 (.09) [1.98, 2.38] 2.18 (.10) [1.98, 2.38] 
Sad 2.80 (.05) [2.70, 2.90] 2.54 (.06) [2.42, 2.66] 2.35 (.08) [2.18, 2.51] 
Low  
Neutral 2.93 (.03) [2.86, 2.99] 2.55 ( .07) [2.41, 2.69] 2.39 (.08) [2.32, 2.54] 
Fearful 2.92 (.05) [2.83, 3.02] 2.67 (.05) [2.57, 2.78] 2.22 (.08) [2.07, 2.38] 
Happy 2.62 (.04) [2.54, 2.70] 2.61 (.08) [2.46, 2.76] 2.29 (.09) [2.11, 2.47] 







False alarms – effects of load 
A similar pattern of findings was observed for false alarms as in hits. There was a 
significant main effect of load (F(1.78, 149.41) = 11.13, p < .001, ηp
2= .12), with post-
hoc pairwise comparisons again indicating reduced performance with increased load, 
with the 3-back condition eliciting the most false alarms (M = .34, SD = .25), followed 
by 2-back (M = .22, SD = .19), and 1-back (M = .05, SD = .13). Again, each of the 
levels of load differed to each other, with comparisons significant at p < .001.  
False alarms – effects of emotion 
A main effect of emotion was also apparent (F(3, 252) = 2.56, p = .03, ηp
2= .03). 
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that happy stimuli (M = .21, SD = .17) elicited 
fewer false alarms than neutral (M = .16, SD = .15; p< .001), fearful (M = .31, SD = 
.18; p < .001) and sad stimuli (M = .16, SD = .17; p = .003). Fearful stimuli, meanwhile, 
elicited more false alarms than neutral (p< .001), happy (p< .001) and sad stimuli (p< 
.001). Neutral and sad stimuli, meanwhile, did not differ significantly from each other 
on false alarm rates. 
False alarms – interactions of task effects 
There were no significant interactions between load and emotion for false alarms 









False alarms – schizotypy group effects 
The between-subjects effect of schizotypy group was significant at a trend level 
(F(1, 84) = 2.07, p = .08, ηp
2= .02), with the high schizotypes producing slightly more 
false alarms (M = .23, SE = .03) than low schizotypes (M = .18, SE = .03).  
There was a significant interaction between emotion and schizotypy group (F(3, 
252) = 2.33, p = .04, ηp
2 = .03), as well as a significant three-way interaction between 
load, emotion, and schizotypy group for false alarms (F(4.67, 392.14) = 2.59, p = .02, 
ηp
2= .03). A variety of post-hoc analyses were conducted to explore these interactions 
further. Separate repeated measures ANOVAs for the high and low schizotypy groups 
failed to reveal clear differences in the effects of emotion or load between groups, 
although the main effect of emotion was absent for the low group (F(3, 138) = .87, p = 
.23, ηp
2 = .02), while a trend was evident for the high group (F(3, 111) = 1.66, p = .09, 
ηp
2 = .04).  
Graphs were plotted using mean false alarm rates for each combination of load 
and emotion (with marginal means as depicted in Table F.3) in order to specifically 
explore the meaning of the three-way interaction between load, emotion, and 
schizotypy. These helped to identify the areas of greatest difference in performance for 
different levels of emotion and load within each schizotypy group, which then informed 
follow up analyses. For example, from examination of the plotted data, there appeared 







load. However, at the 2-back level, there was greater separation between false alarm 
rates for different types of emotion for both the high and low groups; at the 3-back 
level, separation was evident for the high group only. A number of independent samples 
t-tests were conducted according to observed differences. These revealed that high and 
low schizotypes differed in their performance only for fearful stimuli at the 3-back 
level, with the high group making more false alarm errors than the low group (p < .01). 
Again, no other load/emotion false alarm outcomes were explored for between and 

















Table F.3  
Estimated Marginal Means for False Alarms Across Schizotypy Group, N-Back Load Level, and Emotion Type 
 
1-back 2-back 3-back 
M (SE) 95% CI M (SE) 95% CI M (SE) 95% CI 
High       
Neutral 0.07 (0.03) [.00, .13] 0.24 (0.05) [.14, .34] 0.36 (.06) [.25, .47] 
Fearful 0.07 (.03) [.02, .12] 0.42 (.05) [.33, .52] 0.54 (.07) [.41, .68] 
Happy 0.07 (.04) [-.01, .14] 0.10 (.04) [.03, .17] 0.27 (.06) [.16, .38] 
Sad 0.07 (.03) [.01, .13] 0.22 (.05) [.12, .31] 0.36 (.06) [.23, .49] 
Low  
Neutral 0.04 (.03) [-.02, .09] 0.19 (.05) [.03, .21] 0.37 (.05) [.27, .47] 
Fearful 0.02 (.02) [-.02, .07] 0.39 (.04) [.31, .48] 0.25 (.06) [.13, .37] 
Happy 0.06 (.03) [.00, .13] 0.09 (.03) [.03, .15] 0.21 (.05) [.11, .31] 







Role of cognitive failures in accounting for hits and false alarms in schizotypy  
As previously described, CFQ score acted as a covariate for hits, but not false 
alarms. Table F.4 depicts changes in main effects and three-way interaction F values 
according to the addition of CFQ as a covariate. Evidently, the inclusion of CFQ did not 
alter the significance of either interaction. It can be seen that inclusion of CFQ as a 
covariate did alter some of the main effects although not sufficiently to shift whether a 
finding was significant or not, with the exception of schizotypy group for hits. This 
suggests that interindividual differences in CFQ do not account for the observed 















Changes in F Value According to Addition of Cognitive Failures as a Covariate 
  F p-value Partial eta2 
Hits Load 117.57 <.001 .58 
 Load [CFQ] 19.14 <.001 .19 
 Emotion 17.60 <.001 .17 
 Emotion [CFQ] 2.24 .04 .03 
 Schizotypy group 1.63 .11 .02 
 Schizotypy group [CFQ] 5.02 .01 .06 
 Load x emotion x schizotypy .86 .52 .01 
 Load x emotion x schizotypy [CFQ] .34 .91 .004 
False alarms Load 76.85 <.001 .48 
 Load [CFQ] 11.13 <.001 .12 
 Emotion 20.73 <.001 .20 
 Emotion [CFQ] 2.58 .03 .03 
 Schizotypy group .68 .21 .01 
 Schizotypy group [CFQ] 1.99 .08 .02 
 Load x emotion x schizotypy  2.65 .03 .03 
 Load x emotion x schizotypy [CFQ] 2.59 .03 .03 
Note. [CFQ] denotes CFQ added to the model as a covariate. 
